The minister responsible for NIS is not the President but the Finance Minister

I applaud the initiatives in Friday’s Stabroek Business for persisting with certain issues that do not seem to receive much attention in the other sections of our newspapers. I must however take issue with the editorial in the Stabroek Business of May 8 in which the writer called on the President “to make clear his personal concerns over the particular transgression” regarding the non-deduction/payment by employers of NIS contributions for their employees.

Such a call is not only ill-informed but is also dangerous. Why do we need the President’s “personal concerns” when the minister responsible for the National Insurance Scheme is the Finance Minister? And the writer must surely know that the Attorney General, who just shifted chair back into Cabinet, can with proper respect for the principle of separation of powers among the arms of the state, raise the concern with the Chancellor.

It is also dangerous because as a paper of record Stabroek News should avoid endorsing the improper but regular practice of having the President interfere in matters completely outside his portfolio. We have seen what a mess he makes even when he speaks of matters within his portfolio, such as the Integrity Commission affair. Let me mention an example of the President speaking on the NIS. In 2007 before I resigned as a member of the NIS Reform Committee I wrote the President asking for particulars supporting an announcement he had made in Berbice that “thousands of persons” were being deprived of their pensions because of the state of the records in the NIS. After several weeks, the list I got back had just over 20 names, and on investigation, many of them did not qualify and were therefore properly denied.

While non-deduction/payment is indeed a problem, the NIS faces real and disastrous consequences from Cabinet’s failure to act on the recommendations contained in the 2001 and 2006 Actuarial Reviews and the unlawful and high-risk investments in Clico and the Berbice Bridge, apparently made under a paper baptised by Cabinet. The Head of Cabinet of course is the President himself, while his chief-of-staff Dr Roger Luncheon is the Chairman of the Board of the NIS.

Finally let me say that the scheme continues to act unlawfully or not act as the law requires with its misguided Ministry of Labour/NIS Memorandum of Cooperation. That seems to be the brainchild of someone who has not read the National Insurance Act or who does not have real work to do. Ironically any otherwise delinquent employer could challenge any action by this “inspectorate team” as being unlawful. Oh, what a mess we make!

The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009

I note that the Minister of Finance Dr. Ashni Singh has introduced legislation [The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009] that will bring the functions of the Commissioner of Insurance (CoI) under the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The Explanatory Memorandum states that the “Bill seeks to pave the way for the Bank of Guyana (not the Commissioner of Insurance) to administer the Insurance Act and for a person nominated by the Bank to be appointed by the Court as judicial manager.” Because it was the first reading of the Bill, the Minister was not required to nor did he otherwise give any reason for this move which is not without considerable significance. Such a move would however have been helpful in alerting parliamentarians and the public of the thinking behind the legislation and directing their minds to the kind of preparation they should begin in order to contribute meaningfully to the progress of the legislation.

The Clico meltdown exposed in a rather dramatic and disastrous fashion some of the weaknesses of the existing legislation and its operations. But it also emphasised the need for a more exhaustive examination by an impartial body of the causes of the debacle and the steps necessary to better regulate the insurance sector and prevent similar failures in the future. Without the benefit of that exercise, I can only rely on my experience of the Insurance Act in relation to audits, revelations about Clico as well as – let’s not forget – the GuyFlag/Fidelity story in offering any opinions. Those suggest that what we need are fundamental changes both to the regulatory framework as well as how it operates. The proposed Bill falls very short.

The only change being made by the Bill is the transfer of responsibility for the supervision of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance from the Commissioner of Insurance to the BoG. This raises the obvious question whether the Minister really believes that that is all that is necessary to fix the system that certainly failed us in the case of Clico and serves us poorly in the case of GuyFlag/Fidelity. One assumes that the Minister would have been kept fully informed by the Commissioner of Insurance that the breaches of key provisions of the Insurance Act by Clico were putting policyholders and depositors at considerable risk. Are those addressed by this Bill? I think not.

There is only one Commonwealth Caribbean country that I know of where the insurance industry is supervised by the Central Bank – Trinidad and Tobago which coincidentally has also had the biggest failure to stakeholders, other than Guyana. In Barbados and Belize the sector is supervised by a Supervisor of Insurance operating under the Ministry of Finance. Jamaica has what I consider to be the best model and one which was recommended in Ram & McRae’s Focus on Budget 2009, i.e. a Financial Services Commission. Under that umbrella can fall responsibility for the supervision of such sectors as insurance, securities, prevention of money-laundering and even the financial institutions. That would allow the central bank to deal with its core objectives, namely “the fostering [of] domestic price stability through the promotion of stable credit and exchange conditions, as well as sound financial intermediation conducive to the growth of the economy of Guyana.”

While the Commissioner of Insurance has had to take responsibility for much of Clico’s regulatory failure, the Bank of Guyana too failed to detect that Clico was engaged in deposit-taking which required Clico to apply to the Bank for a licence under the Financial Institutions Act. In fact the disclosures surrounding financial/quasi financial institutions including Clico, the Hand-in-Hand Trust, the New Building Society and the National Insurance Scheme suggest that the Bank of Guyana has its own problems. To add to its mandate supervision for the insurance sector can compound those problems.

I hope that the Bill is a mere temporary measure until the President’s promised investigation into Clico makes more extensive and meaningful recommendations. I hope we do not have to wait too long.

On the Line:National Insurance Scheme Annual Report 2007

Introduction
The column on March 29, 2009 featured the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) along with the New Building Society in a supporting role to Clico Guyana in which the NIS stands to lose several billions of dollars worth of investments. Today’s column is entirely on the NIS and specifically its Annual Report for 2007 which recently became available, well outside the statutory deadline, a recurring feature of just about every public body. Yet, the 120-page report is a rich minefield of statistical, demographic and economic information of potential importance and relevance to those engaged in policy formulation.

Some of the data seem inconsistent with the statistics provided by the Finance Minister in his 2008 Budget presentation, particularly as they relate to sectoral growth and labour participation. I will refer to some of those apparent inconsistencies later but now offer a review of the operating performance of the scheme for the year and compare it with the preceding three years.

20090426_table1
Source: NIS Annual Reports 2004-2007

Before discussing these numbers we need to be clear: Dr Roger Luncheon who has been Chairman of the Board since 1992 is incorrect in stating that the audited statements prove that the NIS is sound. The soundness of an entity, such as the NIS, that provides long-term benefits is determined, not by the auditors but by an actuarial examination which, using a range of data and assumptions, projects into the future. In fact the auditors draw specific attention to the report by the actuaries while the financial statements devote a full two pages to the recommendations of the actuary. Those, like the recommendations for the 2001 examination, are still being “reviewed” by the directors. Among the actuary’s many recommendations is the immediate need to address a shortfall of 7.1% in the contribution rate − hardly a sign of financial soundness. The problem for Dr Luncheon is that he seems unable to distinguish when he should speak as a politician, or as a director with fiduciary obligations or as a key policymaker responsible for oversight.

Commentary
Income over the period 2004 to 2007 has increased by 24.6% while expenditure has increased by 38.4%. Expressed another way expenditure as a percentage of income has moved within the short period of three years from 80.7% to 89.5%, a significant increase indeed. On the other hand, the composition of expenditure between Benefits and Administrative Costs has remained − as the Table shows − extremely constant. The significance and danger of the increase is best seen when compared with say the average of the five years 1997 to 2001 when it was below 60%. The warnings to the decision-makers about the growth of expenditure relative to income are not new and have been as consistently made as they have been consistently ignored.

With over 80% of its expenditure being in long-term benefits, the scheme should be concerned primarily about its actuarial viability which automatically takes care of its financial soundness, to use Dr Luncheon’s word. But to make up for the unwillingness of the government to raise the rates of contributions to levels that would meet actuarial sustainability, the scheme has become involved in investments that could seriously undermine both its actuarial and financial viability.

The 2006 Actuarial Report projected that total expenditure would, in 2014, exceed total income for the first time in the scheme’s forty years and unless contribution rates are increased the scheme’s reserves would be exhausted by 2022. With the (temporary?) loss of its capital and income in Clico investments and the inaction of the government and the board, including in addition to Dr Luncheon, PPP/C fixtures like trade unionist Komal Chand and Chitraykha Dass, it is possible that the actuary’s fears about expenditure exceeding income may happen sooner rather than later.

Blame the employers
Much of the problems of the Scheme are attributed to delinquent employers not paying over their contributions. As the logic goes the scheme would have been able to invest those monies and earn investment income. However there is nothing to indicate that investments are managed any better than contributions. According to Dr Luncheon the scheme’s investments are made based on a Prudential Investment Progamme which was “baptised by cabinet.” It is therefore surprising that the President recently criticized investments made under that programme when he is the head of the cabinet.

Dr Luncheon correctly states that the law governs the NIS and its investments (particularly those outside government paper) but does not recognise or acknowledge that the report and recommendations underlying that programme did not once mention the restrictions which the law places on the type of investments which the scheme can make.

There is increasing evidence that many of the scheme’s investments are not authorised by law and are not as profitable as they may appear. We will look more closely at the question of the investments under Balance Sheet but with respect to investment income, while $1.492B appears in the income statement, some $790M is shown as investment income receivable. The level was likely to be the same when Clico was put under judicial management and there is still uncertainty as to whether the government would cover accrued interest in its bailout of that entity. The possible infringement of the law, the high risks being undertaken in the search for high returns and the apparent delay in the receipt of investment income would cause even ordinary persons serious migraine. It is therefore very surprising that this does not seem to trouble the board which includes Messrs Maurice Solomon and Paul Cheong who have been on the board for several years and who would be fully aware of the concerns of the actuary about the viability of the scheme.

20090426_table1
Source: NIS Annual Reports 2004-2007

Included in Current Assets for 2007 is an amount of $197M as sundry receivables (2006-$207M) and prepayments of $62M (2006-$2M). Neither of these amounts is explained for the poor contributor, a key stakeholder. Included as well is an amount of $790M (2006-$753M) described as Accrued income, ie income recognised but not received. Nothing would be wrong with such accounting unless the entities in which the investments are made do not have the cash resources to pay the interest. Other than Treasury Bills the scheme’s principal investments are the Berbice Bridge Company Inc $1.560B; Clico $5.195B; Hand-in-Hand Trust Corp Inc $2.465B; a 25-year US$4M loan to the Government of Guyana for the construction of the Caricom Headquarters and Laparkan Holdings Limited $276M. From a concentration perspective, directly and indirectly the NIS is dangerously exposed with the Berbice Bridge.

With one exception (Laparkan), the private sector entities have recently been subject to public scrutiny − mostly negative – which can impact on their own profitability and their debt service capability. Clico is an immediate and major problem for the NIS. The Berbice Bridge can become another if its cash flows do not pick up significantly to allow it to meet its huge annual interest obligations. Hand-In-Hand Trust (HIHT) has just lost almost its entire reserves with its Stanford investment and as a consequence, a major income stream.

At more than $10B, NIS investments and accrued income in Clico, the Bridge and HIHT account for about 35% of the reserves of the scheme. A significant portion of the $10B is already impaired. The loss has implications not only for the balance sheet and therefore its reserves but annual income as well. It has been estimated that the income the NIS is losing on a daily basis on the Clico investment alone is more than $1M. When the actuary predicted the evaporation of the scheme’s reserves, he did not contemplate the kind of man-made, governance-created misfortunes we are now experiencing. Employees and employers better prepare for what can be a rough and costly ride.

Some statistics
2007 was the year of the World Cup, the biggest sporting extravaganza ever hosted by Guyana. According to Dr Singh there was 5.4% real growth in the economy with increased contributions by sugar (2.7%); mining and quarrying (22.7%); engineering and construction (5.7%) and transportation and communication (9%). Inflation grew by 14% and the minimum wage in the public sector grew by 14.5%. These significant numbers and impressive statistics however are not matched by growth in contribution income (8.01%) or registrations of employers by industry types (Table A of the report) which disclose that not a single sector had a new employer registrant with over 100 employees, and only three had between 51 and 100 employees. These were Transport, Community and Business Services and Personal Services, an interesting and eclectic mix indeed.

Women registrants in the Employed Persons category are fast catching up with their male counterparts and in 2007 for every 100 males there were 87 females. In the self-employed category the ratio is about 2:1. Compared with the gender mix of pensioners (more than 3 males for every 1 female) there is a dramatic transformation in the workforce, even as women still carry the burden of the work to be done at home. Only in the age group 41-45 do women come anywhere close to men in the number of self-employed registrants in 2007. Table G of the report indicates that some sixty-five persons in receipt of Old Age Pension are aged 98 and a surprising 389 are 95 years and older. With such numbers we should have far more centenarians than our newspapers consider worthy of celebration. We need to make sure that there are no phantom pensioners.

One other significant gender difference appears in Table N which presents the number of sickness spells by diagnosis and sector. Here women seem to do very badly. Diseases of the female genital organs accounted for 880 sickness spells, the fourth highest. Complications arising from pregnancy and childbirth account for 845 sickness spells, the fifth highest. Such statistics should impress both our Ministers of Health, and the Ministers of Labour and Human Services. While the statistics are not significantly different from preceding years it is yet hoped that we will see some policy initiatives to address them.

Conclusion
The state of the NIS confronts the government with a real dilemma. The government seems to have an insatiable appetite for spending which it finances mainly through direct taxes (Income and Corporation Tax) and indirect taxes (VAT, Excise and Customs) borne mainly by the workers and the lower income group. As a result Guyana is now among the most taxed countries in the world. In public finance, NIS contributions are a tax. Except that in a contributions-based scheme such as ours, the contributor can get back benefits in proportion to contributions. Even without the Clico debacle and the other challenges, contributions should have been increased. Based on the recommendations of the actuary the required contribution rate (without Clico) should be around 20% instead of 13% but the government’s reluctance to increase the rate may reflect its own recognition that increased NIS contributions are already too high for the overtaxed Guyanese.

While the NIS inherited by the government in 1992 was not as healthy as one would like, its condition is now much worse. The expenditure to income ratio was already 67% in 1992. It is now 89%. Failure by the government over the years to act promptly on successive actuarial recommendations has aggravated the situation. This however does not exonerate the directors of the NIS who have sat back and done precious little to stem the drift.

On the Line: New Building Society Limited Annual Report 2008

– $200M exchange loss

Introduction
Forgive the rather misleading heading which is the standard for the review of annual reports in this column. It is misleading because at the time of writing the annual report of the Society, including the report of the directors and the financial statements, has not yet been made available to its members. Compelled by its own law that the AGM must be held before April 30, the directors have chosen for the venue of the meeting the Cotton Tree Primary School, West Coast, Berbice on Saturday April 25 with the first item on the agenda “to receive the financial statements and the Reports of the Directors for 2008.”
The financial statements of the Society audited by long serving and proposed-to-be-replaced Jack A Alli, Sons and Company show growth in deposits by just over 5% from $28.9B to $30.5B. This is the smallest percentage increase in deposits since 2002 and represents a recent trend of declining annual percentage increases. More significantly, however, is the decline of more than $103M in profits for the year. This is the second successive decline but is the highest decline recorded by the Society in recent history. Readers will recall that the 2007 profits were charged with the sum of $74M resulting from the fraud on an account holder.

It really has not been two good years for the Society under new Chairman Dr Nanda Gopaul, who signed the 2008 financial statements along with Mr Floyd McDonald, Deputy Chairman and former Commissioner of Police now on contract with the government, and Mr A Khan, Director/Secretary.

Commentary
The major reason for the decline in 2008 is an exchange loss of $200M, arising almost entirely on UK Government Treasury Bills which are denominated in pounds sterling, the exchange rate of which declined to the Guyana dollar by more than 20% between December 31, 2007 and December 31, 2008. While the Society had an exchange gain of $67M in 2007 it may be time for the directors to consider whether in the light of the volatility of international currencies it should liquidate those investments and repatriate the proceeds or invest in a currency to which the Guyana dollar is more aligned.

Loan assets have increased by 12.1 % from $16.99B to $19.1B almost a third more than GBTI, the performance of which was reviewed in a guest column last week and which has deposits of considerably more than the NBS. NBS, a creature of legislation, is restricted to how much it may lend and the nature of the security it has to have. On the other hand its income is tax-exempt and it can afford to and does pay the highest rates of interest on deposit accounts and charges the lowest rates on lending.

Despite the fall in income, reserves have increased from $4.5B to $4.79B or 6.4%. The Society is cash strong with some $4.2B in cash resources, almost all being held in interest-bearing fixed deposits. As discussed later in this column, that position would change significantly in 2009. The average interest earned on those resources was 5.6% compared with 4.2% earned in 2007. Investments which with the exception of the bridge bonds are liquid, amount to $11.3B, down from $13.55B. They earned an average return of 4.3% in 2008 compared with 4.5% in 2007.

Governance, the bridge and Clico
Perhaps the most controversial issue arising out of the financial statements is its investment in the Berbice Bridge. When financing for the bridge was first sought, the Society was approached by Mr Winston Brassington for a $3B investment. Independent consultant Raymond Gaskin questioned both the lawfulness and the viability of the investment and it is understood that on a split-decision the board, with Mr Moen McDoom as Chairman, accepted the advice and rejected the approach but went for $350M, a sum it was “prepared to lose.” Just over one year later the board with Dr Gopaul as Chairman reversed itself, and according to the financial statements bought bridge bonds with a face value of $1.5B. Regrettably the financial statements do not disclose the price paid for those bonds, but it is believed that they were bought at face value. More controversially, not only did the board reverse itself, but from all reports it did so by way of round-robin, ie without a physical meeting of the directors.

The composition of the board has changed significantly since its rejection of the $3B overture. Of the four who voted against the investment Mr McDoom has been replaced by Dr Nanda Gopaul, Director Secretary Mr Maurice Arjoon’s services have been terminated and directors Leon Rockliffe and Steve Bovell were voted off the board. As a result of the changes, the board with one exception is now made up of persons close to the government or the ruling party, some of whom are in receipt of compensation from the public purse. Mr Clement DeNobrega, a professionally qualified accountant who was elected as a director in April 2008 resigned some five months later, apparently dissatisfied with the way the board conducts the business of the Society. Once again there is no accountant on the board nor, as far as I am aware, is there any governance committee in the Society. Mr Kenneth Joseph, Head of NAACIE and the pro-government breakaway trade union organisation FITUG, was appointed by the board to fill the vacancy left by Mr DeNobrega’s resignation. His appointment is to be confirmed at the AGM.

Another possible reason for the reversal of the decision to invest in the Bonds may have to do with note 23 to the financial statements: Events After the Balance Sheet Date. This reports ambiguously that the Society’s retirement benefit plan held at December 31, 2008 a flexible annuity policy with Clico amounting to $110.9M. Note 12 to the financial statements devotes a full two pages to the plan, but did not refer to note 23. The directors should not by their silence encourage speculation that the Society may have undertaken the purchase of the bonds from Clico on the understanding that it could deduct the value of the policy from the purchase price of the bonds. That is a possibility fraught with serious legal implications and requires an unambiguous statement from the board which despite the public furore over the matter has so far not even publicly acknowledged the purchase.

Governance and risk
With the recent purchase significantly altering the composition of the Society’s assets and liquidity position, the Society is betting more than 40% of its accumulated profits on the Berbice Bridge Company meeting its annual interest obligations of about $800M. The financial projections were considered “overly optimistic” by the independent consultant. If the Bridge Company is unable to do so, then the Society could find itself along with other bondholders having to mark down the investment in its accounts. A proper analysis would have to wait on the release of financial statements of the Berbice Bridge Company.

The liquidity situation of the Society will be further eroded as it engages on the construction of a new, near billion-dollar head office in Georgetown. Consulting work in connection with that building is now the subject of a court action, but the investment itself is hardly the type of investment any risk-conscious entity would undertake in an uncertain financial environment.

Governance and the Bank of Guyana
One concern that has been vociferously expressed recently is the non-supervision of the Society by the financial regulator, the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The bank does not dispute that the Society carries on financial business as defined by the Financial Institutions Act which requires it to have a licence issued by the BoG. Yet it has inexplicably failed to enforce this provision. Such laxity by the regulator can have serious implications for any financial institution, let alone one that is subject to the control of persons with strong political affiliations and no private sector experience.

Without such a licence the Society does not operate within the FIA, which among other things provides for single borrowers limits to minimise the impact of a failure of a single loan or investment. Even if the Bridge Company investment was lawful, had the FIA applied to the Society then it would have been prevented from investing more than approximately $1.2B in the Bridge Company. The Society would also have been subject to the reserve requirement and its directors to the “fit and proper test.” It is hardly likely that such a loaded board could collectively be considered “fit and proper” to direct the operations of the third largest financial institution in the country.

Governance and members
The decision by the Society to hold its first ever meeting outside of Georgetown in 2008 followed a contentious meeting in September 2007 requisitioned by members who questioned the board about a fraud, the existence and implications of which it had stoutly denied. Those members were vindicated when the Society was left to make good the fraud to the tune of $73M. This time the dissatisfaction is about the adequacy and contents of the notice of Saturday’s meeting. By law, notice must be given 21 (clear) days prior to the meeting which does not appear to have been the case. Item 8 on the agenda seeks to increase the lending limit from $10M to $12M and beyond, even as the quality of the assets to secure lending has been diluted both by practice and the Berbice Bridge Company Act 2006. The implications are huge – higher lending and lower security will lead to higher provisioning and loan losses.

Governance and the auditors
By a notice in Friday’s newspapers the Society is proposing to replace long-serving auditors Jack A Alli, Sons & Co “in accordance with Rule No. 16 of the Act.” Apart from the statutory rules governing change of auditors there is also professional guidance under which any auditor proposed for nomination should seek professional clearance from the outgoing auditors. My understanding is that this has not been done. This could lead to an absurdity if it had to wait until after the meeting. In any case the outgoing auditors would be represented at the meeting to answer any questions, should these arise.

The proposed new auditors are Solomon, Parmessar & Co, headed by Mr Maurice Solomon, a director of the National Insurance Scheme. At a minimum this late change which appears to have taken the outgoing auditors by surprise must be regarded with considerable concern, since a change in auditors is done only for very good reasons.

Conclusion
Despite the mounting concerns the Bank of Guyana seems unwilling to act in a timely manner. It failed to do so with Globe Trust. It failed to act with Clico in connection with its deposit-taking. It should not fail the members of the Society. A group calling itself the Concerned Members of the NBS (including the writer) will be meeting Tuesday coming to decide on its participation at the AGM.

Recent developments involving Clico, the NIS, the NBS and Hand-in-Hand Trust show how contagion plays out in the financial and credit markets. The role of regulations is to prevent, detect and minimise such contagion. But effective regulations require as well independence and will. The NBS offers the Bank of Guyana another opportunity to show that it is on the ball.

It’s not too late for President to honour promise to Globe Trust depositors

The Kaieteur News of Thursday April 9, 2009 reported the Office of the President (OP) as stating that I and other (sic) directors of Globe Trust blocked payout of up to $100,000 each to 5,404 depositors of the financial institution. Apparently OP produced a “critique” to support its allegation that it was certain that up to “$235M would have been recovered from the realizable assets of Globe Trust”. I will deal briefly with the allegation, indicate my role in the Globe Trust imbroglio and offer a possible reason for President Jagdeo’s breach of promise.

The allegation though malicious and misleading is not surprising. It is also a mathematical impossibility. Even a junior clerk in the Office of the President could have told the manufacturer of the allegation that 5,404 times $100,000 is $540.4M. Where would the balance of $305.4 M ($540.4 M – $$235 M) have come from? But even the figure of $235 M is what the Liquidator very recently said was actually collected to date.

The architects of the allegation obviously intended to divert attention from my assertion – which I now repeat – that Jagdeo on August 3, 2001 had promised that approximately 2,000 small depositors defined by him as those with savings “in the vicinity of about $10,000 each” would get back their money. Instead of responding to my factual assertion, they create this absurd allegation and spurious diversion.

Second, I never was a director of Globe Trust or had a direct role in the Globe Trust case. Ram & McRae was retained by the institution to advise on and prepare a restructuring plan to address the difficulties being faced by the company. I was not a party to the action No 429/P in which Bank of Guyana (BoG) was the petitioner and Globe Trust was the respondent. I appeared as a witness to explain what came to be referred to as the Ram & McRae plan. I should add that the plan itself had identified as a first step – partly for administrative reasons – the repayment of all the under $10,000 accounts. In other words, there was no opposition to Jagdeo’s pledge which by coincidence was consistent with the Ram & McRae plan.

The basis of the intervention by Globe Trust in the legal action was that the BoG had acted outside of the law (the Financial Institutions Act) when on September 20, 2001 it took possession of Globe Trust “for the purpose of liquidation”. Then Chief Justice Carl Singh in his prompt, written judgment found that the decision by the BoG “manifested its misconception of its powers”; that the determination by the BoG that Globe Trust could not be restored to financial soundness was made “in a manner that was unfair to Globe Trust”; and that Globe Trust had been “unfairly treated”. The Chief Justice however did not hesitate to criticise the directors of Globe Trust for their “failure to act decisively in the face of lax, loose and grossly incompetent management.”

I should add that as set out in the written submission of Attorney-at-Law Stephen Fraser for Globe Trust, its intervention and proposed restructuring plan was not an objection to the Bank of Guyana assuming possession. In fact the point was made by Globe Trust director Professor Clive Thomas and emphasised by Mr. Fraser that the foundation of the Ram & McRae plan was that it would operate under the protection of the Financial Institutions Act. The premature and high-handed manner in which the Bank of Guyana acted leads inescapably to the conclusion that it did not want Globe Trust to survive.

Regarding the President’s failure to honour his commitment, it is possible that he forgot, which is human. But my belief is that when he made his promise on August 3, 2001 he hoped to neutralise popular opposition to an unlawful and politics-driven decision that had already been made but not yet announced – to liquidate Globe Trust. The liquidation announcement came seven weeks later. In the end he got both his wishes, i.e. the liquidation of Globe Trust and preempting any opposition. No need then to bother about any commitment.

A final thought. For years I have tried unsuccessfully to get the President not to make unlawful and unconstitutional spending out of the Lotto funds and more recently out of the Privatisation proceeds. Now OP would have the public believe that I prevented the President from meeting an obligation he made in good faith. Like their math, this just does not add up.

But it is still not too late. The President’s guarantee on Clico involving failures by his people is the equivalent of a blank cheque for billions and billions. He knows the exact and comparatively modest exposure on Globe Trust. It is far easier and clearly less costly for him to honour that commitment. I am not in his way.