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Audited figures must be published on this $10b NIS injection
Dear Editor,
It is deeply disappointing that Dr. Ashni Singh, the de facto Minister of Finance, failed in his 2025 mid-year report to account for the much-publicised $10 billion “injection” into the National Insurance Scheme. Though repeatedly touted by the President and Dr. Singh, no report – let alone an audited statement – has been produced to show what was paid or how contributors’ rights were affected. This was all political theatre, not transparency, not governance.
As minister responsible for the NIS, Dr. Singh’s record is troubling. Annual NIS reports are years overdue, denying Parliament and the public meaningful oversight. For decades, actuarial recommendations to restore the Scheme’s viability have been ignored. Its survival has depended largely on fortuitous contributions from temporary oil and gas workers – a matter of chance, not competent management.
It also bears recalling that Dr. Singh presided over the Ministry of Finance when the Scheme suffered heavy investment losses following the collapse of Clico, in a sector over which he exercised oversight. That failure continues to haunt the NIS. And in fifteen years as minister responsible for the NIS, not a single amending law has been introduced to modernise this Burnham-era legislation.
Against this background, the one-off cash grant is misleading, coercive and unjust. No new funds are injected; the State merely reimburses payments made. Contributors are required to surrender legal claims arising from disputed contributions – many of which exist only because of chronic mismanagement and poor record-keeping. In effect, the Government has used a cheap avenue to settle its moral and legal obligations.
The Scheme, encouraged by the Government, intimidates claimants by way of appeals – as in the case of the carpenter, and another (an octogenarian) who must wait for his appeal to be heard by a vacant internal tribunal awaiting an appointment, yes by the Minister of Finance.
This week I learnt of another contribution saga, this time of a retired teacher who over a period of several years had her contributions adjusted from 621 to 674 and then to 721, still short of 750, the minimum to qualify for a pension. The NIS likes to placate such persons by assuring them that some persons are short by one contribution!
Elderly claimants, facing ill health and delay, are abandoning valuable legal rights for the one-off grant. This makes the NIS happy, no more hard work, thorough investigations and follow-up with employers, or having their inadequacies pronounced on by the courts in a public forum.
In practice, contributors are forced to trade pension rights worth millions for a one-off payment of $650,000, while bearing the near-impossible burden of proving decades-old employment and contributions.
This injustice is compounded by a Board shaped through ministerial appointments, leaving contributors without meaningful representation.
Until audited figures are published, contributors’ rights clarified, and genuine reform undertaken, the NIS will continue to operate behind a façade of action. Responsibility now rests squarely with Dr. Ashni Singh. Continued inaction is both glaring and inhumane.
Yours faithfully,
Christopher Ram
Guyana’s long-awaited census: Why the delay matters
Business & Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram
Introduction
The release of the preliminary results of Guyana’s 2022 Population and Housing Census on 12 January 2026 was met with a broad sense of relief. After more than a decade without updated demographic data, it offered a first official glimpse of how the country has changed since 2012 and provided long-awaited information for policymakers, analysts, and the private sector. That relief, however, must be set against the delay: enumeration ended in September 2022, and several announced timelines for preliminary results passed unmet.
Placed in an international context, Guyana’s wait is difficult to justify. Countries such as China and India, which together account for well over one-third of the world’s population, published census results years ago, as did other large and administratively complex states. Scale or technical difficulty cannot plausibly explain such a delay in a country of fewer than one million people.
What makes the delay more consequential is what Guyana has been doing since 2012. Major decisions have been made on outdated population data. Hospitals, schools, roads, housing schemes, and social programmes have been planned using census figures more than a decade old, even as the country has undergone rapid demographic and economic change. The placement and scale of hospitals, schools, police stations, courts, and government offices all depend on where people live. Reliance on obsolete data invites mis-location and misallocation, errors that are often costly to undo.
Population growth
The preliminary census results now show why this matters. The population has grown faster than previously announced, reaching about 879,000 by late 2022, an increase of roughly 18% since 2012, and is projected to be close to one million by the end of 2024. The number of households has also risen by nearly one-third to about 272,000, signalling smaller household sizes and increased demand for housing, utilities, transport, schools, and health services. Such shifts should change the dynamics of public spending and action.
Recent budgeting, however, proceeded on a different demographic picture. Appendix B to the 2025 Budget Speech places the mid-year 2024 population at about 780,900, significantly different from what the census now indicates. Understating population size in this way affects per-capita spending, sectoral allocations, and assessments of service demand.
The release of a partial census report should therefore be seen as catch-up rather than progress. Still, it remains incomplete, and priority must now be given to the timely publication of the full results so that planning and policy can rest on a complete, current, and reliable demographic base.
The Preliminary Report and its missing elements
The preliminary census report provides headline population totals, national and regional distribution, urban–rural splits, housing stock counts, and selected demographic characteristics. It confirms strong population growth since 2012, continued urbanisation, and a substantial increase in the number of households. The report also includes initial information on housing conditions relevant to housing policy, infrastructure planning, and service delivery. Taken together, these data establish a more realistic demographic baseline than the estimates that have guided planning and budgeting in recent years.
What remains outstanding are the detailed analytical tables that give a census its real value, including age and sex profiles by region, migration patterns, education attainment, labour force participation, employment and unemployment, disability, household composition, and housing conditions. Without this detail, it is not possible to assess accurately where school-age populations are concentrated, how the labour force is changing, or where health demand is rising fastest.
The absence of these data also limits serious fiscal and policy analysis. Per-capita spending, poverty targeting, workforce planning, and regional investment decisions depend on demographic detail, not just headline population totals. Until the full outputs are published, much of Guyana’s planning will continue to rest on approximation rather than evidence.
What to expect from the full report
The full census report should provide comprehensive demographic and socio-economic profiles, including age and sex distributions by region, migration flows, education levels, labour force characteristics, household composition, and housing quality. These outputs are essential for investment decisions on health and education, transport, and local and regional services.
Responsibility now rests with the Bureau of Statistics and its supervising ministry to complete and publish these outputs on a clear timetable. The preliminary release has reset the baseline; the full report must now complete the picture.
Conclusion
The preliminary census results are welcome, but they are not an end. They confirm strong population growth, rapid household formation, and accelerating urbanisation – developments that make the prolonged absence of timely data especially consequential in a post-oil economy.
The census is not an unserious matter. It underpins planning, budgeting, service delivery, and accountability. Treating a delayed, partial release as closure risks normalising failure. The task ahead is straightforward: complete the census promptly, professionally, and transparently. Minister Singh must be uncompromising about this.
Proposed capping of Banks shareholders voting power at 15% is misconceived and legally impermissible
Dear Editor,
Yesterday’s (11 January 2026) Stabroek News carried a notice by Banks DIH Holdings Inc. convening its second Annual General Meeting for Saturday, 31 January 2026. The newspaper also reported that the company proposes to cap shareholder voting power at 15%.
No shareholder I have spoken to – including several members of staff at Ram & McRae – has received either the notice of meeting or the company’s annual report. An electronic copy of the annual report was, however, made available to me, having been downloaded from the company’s subsidiary’s website.
That circumstance immediately raises questions concerning the adequacy of notice and the distribution of the annual report. The Companies Act sets out a clear statutory framework governing these matters, and compliance with both the Act and the company’s constituent documents is not optional.
While that matter is important, I treat it as secondary. The more serious concern lies in one of the proposed resolutions and, in particular, the proposed amendment to the company’s by-laws.
The Notice states that “Article 8 of the By-Laws” is to be amended to impose a 15% cap on shareholding and voting power, with votes above that threshold to be rendered invalid and not counted. The proposal further provides for the aggregation of interests held by spouses, children, trusts, controlled companies and persons said to be “acting in concert”, establishes a special register, appoints a “Special Registrar”, and ultimately empowers the directors to compel the disposal of shares deemed to be held in excess of the limit.
This proposal is misconceived, constitutionally unsound, legally impermissible, and violative of the most basic principles of company law and the fundamental nature of a public company. It seeks, through by-laws, to do what the law permits, in appropriate circumstances, only by amendment of the articles of incorporation by way of a special resolution.
To begin with, there is a fundamental conceptual error. There is no such thing in our Companies Act, or in company law generally, as an “Article of the By-Laws”. Articles are mandatory constitutional instruments; by-laws are separate and secondary, generally confined to internal administration. They cannot define, restrict, or extinguish proprietary rights. The reference to “Article 8 of the By-Laws” therefore reflects not loose drafting, but disappointingly, a fundamental misunderstanding of the most basic principles of company law and the hierarchy of corporate instruments established by the Act: first the Act, then the Articles, and only then the by-laws.
More fundamentally, a restriction on voting rights or on the effective enjoyment of shares is a restriction on property. Under the Companies Act, such restrictions must be expressly stated in the articles and should appear on the share certificate. They cannot be imposed, enlarged, or enforced through by-laws, however carefully they are worded. A by-law cannot lawfully invalidate rights attached to issued shares, nor can it set conditions to their disposal. Even unanimous shareholder approval cannot cure an illegality.
But beyond illegality, the proposal is objectionable in conception. It is not even-handed. While it aggregates certain relationships to enforce the 15% cap, it ignores economically aligned companies that together exercise significant influence. That selectivity exposes the proposal for what it is: a mechanism to entrench existing control by neutralising potential rival shareholders.
Restrictions of this nature belong to the private-company model and, in those limited circumstances, require amendment of the articles by special resolution. In a public company, their effect would be to destroy its public character by undermining the free and proportionate exercise of shareholder rights.
There are additional concerns with the structure of the proposed resolutions. The prudent course is either to withdraw the Notice and reconsider the proposal, in which case a new meeting would have to be convened, or, if it is satisfied that the statutory notice period has been properly complied with, to withdraw the impugned amendment and proceed with the remaining business on the agenda.
That would ensure and demonstrate compliance and respect for the law, for shareholders, and for the integrity of the company’s governance.
Yours faithfully,
Christopher Ram
Deportees, Trump and the price of oil
Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram
Introduction
The Government of Guyana has announced that it has agreed to accept foreign deportees from the United States – persons who are not Guyanese nationals. The announcement was made calmly, almost casually – by one of the “family” – as if it were a routine domestic arrangement. There was no explanation of the legal basis for such an agreement, no disclosure of its terms, and no acknowledgement of its implications for Guyana’s immigration laws, internal security, or sovereignty. There was no parliamentary debate and no public consultation.
Yet this decision must not be treated as a technical matter. US President Doland Trump has made it clear that he does not regard international law, multilateral agreements, or established norms as binding on the United States, rejecting even frameworks that his own country previously championed. In Trump’s world, power is not limited by law or institutions but only by his personal morality — a position he has stated explicitly and acted upon repeatedly.
Trump world
It is against this backdrop of unilateralism, coercion, and transactional dominance that Guyana’s decision must be understood, not as a neutral administrative arrangement, but as an accommodation made in Trump’s world where rules are increasingly replaced by raw power. A world in which there is open contempt for international law (if at all), of multilateral institutions, and of the sovereignty of weaker states.
Donald Trump has already signalled his willingness to discard global norms at will. He has informed the OECD that the United States will not be bound by the 15% global minimum tax. He has pulled out of almost every international institution not in the US’ interest. And has made it clear that international rules apply to others, not to America. Power, in his worldview, is constrained only by his own judgement.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Venezuela.
Without even a murmur from our otherwise talkative CARICOM leaders, including our own President Irfaan Ali, Trump’s administration has used brute military force in the Caribbean, resulting in the deaths of civilians off the Venezuelan coast. U.S. forces seized the leader of a sovereign state and removed him and his wife in handcuffs. This was not multilateral action, not international law enforcement, and not humanitarian intervention. It was unilateral power, exercised openly and without restraint. The Caribbean as a zone of peace has become a zone of fear.
It is oil, stupid
From Trump himself, it is all about oil. The United States has effectively taken control of the world’s largest proven oil reserves. Trump has announced that Venezuelan oil fields will be restored, production ramped up, exports controlled, and prices influenced — with him deciding how much revenue will be returned to the Venezuelan people. This is not regime change in disguise. It is resource capture unlike any seen for more than several decades. It makes Afghanistan, Iraq and Grenada look like exercises in restraint by comparison.
Trump is not finished. He has shown himself willing to overturn democratic outcomes at home, to threaten friendly states abroad, and to redraw spheres of influence as if international law were an inconvenience. He speaks casually of peace with Russia while demanding a substantial share of Ukraine’s future in return. He does not need international law. He is international law. His narcissism has led to the so-called Donroe Doctrine, infinitely worse than the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which the US claimed the Caribbean as its sphere of influence. But the Caribbean is not enough. He wants Greenland and maybe, later, Canada.
And it is at precisely this moment that Guyana appears eager not only to accept foreign deportees at Washington’s request, but also to deepen defence cooperation with the same administration now destabilising the region. We refused renegotiation of the 2016 Agreement in place of sovereignty. Now we surrender our dignity, our laws, our patrimony posing as neutrality.
More oil less money
That brings us to the most immediate and dangerous consequence for Guyana.
Donald Trump has announced his intention to use Venezuelan oil to drive the global price of crude down to US$50 per barrel. If he succeeds – and there is no effective international mechanism to prevent it – the impact on Guyana will be severe. At this price, Guyana’s oil revenue will collapse. The State would receive approximately US$1 per barrel in royalty and about US$7.50 in profit oil. With NRF funding accounting for 50% of the National Budget, we will experience increased and unsustainable budget deficits -or raid the NRF.
The Government would face three options, none of them attractive: heavy and expensive borrowing, sharp expenditure cuts, and drastic shortage of foreign exchange. Borrowing on that scale would undermine debt sustainability. Spending cuts would fall on wages, social programmes, infrastructure, and transfers – areas that have expanded rapidly in anticipation of sustained oil revenues.
Foreign exchange shortages would follow quickly. With oil inflows reduced, the supply of U.S. dollars would tighten just as import demand remains high. Pressure on the exchange rate would intensify. The cost of food, fuel, medicine, and construction materials would rise sharply. Inflation would not be a statistical abstraction; compounding the already his cost of living, the poor would suffer.
America hasn’t always been a friend of Guyana. Just read The West on Trial. As we turn our backs on countries that supported us during our darkest days, let us not forget our past. Guyana needs to face the dangers of the path of accommodation.
It must read the winds that can blow our house down. The finance minister hinted at an oil price adjustment in his mid-year report. That was before Trump had got his hands on Venezuela’s oil. The whole vision of One Guyana will evaporate.
Silica City – Pradoville 3 in the Making
Introduction
Other than periodic, campaign-style announcements, the Silica City project on the Soesdyke-Linden Highway operates in near-complete secrecy. It is repeatedly celebrated as the President’s “brainchild”, yet the public has been told nothing of how it is financed, how it is structured within government, or by what criteria the beneficiaries of its house lots will be selected. That pattern was maintained most recently as last week, when Collin Croal, Minister of Housing, announced that agreements have been signed and allocations of houses made, without accompanying disclosure of any legal authority, eligibility rules, pricing framework, or institutional approvals governing those allocations.
This silence is not accidental. Silica City has been variously described as a housing scheme, a “young professionals” enclave, a smart city, a decongestion strategy, and a commercial and healthcare hub. The descriptions shift with the audience – and with each statement. That is contrived confusion to avoid the project being pinned down to a single statutory regime, a single governance framework, or a single line of accountability. When a project is so flaky, when it begins to appear like a recycled scheme, it is time to raise the alarm.
We have seen this movie before. The Sparendaam housing project – Pradoville 2 – did not unravel by accident. The investigation showed that it was financed through multiple state entities, with no single institution carrying the full cost and no consolidated accounting of the project. That fragmentation diluted responsibility, obscured the true cost, and prevented scrutiny until long after land was transferred and beneficiaries entrenched. By the time the full picture emerged, accountability was already lost – and no one was ever held responsible.
The forensic investigation later showed how the absence of clear statutory footing, the bypassing of institutional processes, undisclosed allocation criteria, missing records, and political direction substituting for law produced outcomes that benefited a select few, including the then President, Ministers, party figures, and carefully chosen beneficiaries.
The project
Little has been said about Silica City’s administration, except that it appears to fall under the Central Housing and Planning Authority, established under the Housing Act, more noted for its outdatedness (1946) than for its relevance. The CHPA is a statutory authority governed by the Housing Act, with defined objectives – Housing of persons of the Working Class – procedures, reporting obligations, and safeguards designed to prevent the kind of opacity and looseness exposed by the Sparendaam investigation.
Yet, an enduring and necessary safeguard provided for under the Act has been dispensed with – too inconvenient for Silica City. Annual Reports have disappeared. There is no identifiable public accounting for the project. The project does not appear in the National Estimates, nor is it identifiable in the financial statements of the CHPA or any other government authority. This is despite the vast sums being spent on infrastructure and construction.
The chain of command compounds the danger. The Minister administering CHPA reports directly to Mohamed Irfaan Ali. There has been some reshuffling of junior ministers, but a party loyalist remains in charge. From all accounts, the administrative structure and key personnel unchanged. The result: a flagship housing project executed by CHPA under direct political oversight, with diminished reporting and no transparent disclosure of financing, governance, or allocation criteria. All in an environment of an explosion of funds accompanied by an erosion of accountability.
Loosening the reins of accountability
Since the PPP/C returned to office in 2020, CHPA has abandoned the comprehensive Annual Reports required by section 49 of the Housing Act, substituting bare audited financial statements that say nothing about projects, allocations, beneficiaries, or policy decisions. The stage was set: no meaningful statutory reporting. As a result, Silica City is rendered financially invisible to citizens and Parliament alike. This violation of the law shields the project from scrutiny while land is allocated, infrastructure constructed, and commitments locked in.
That this has gone undetected and unchallenged is itself a serious institutional failure. The Audit Office of Guyana exists to ensure compliance not only with accounting standards, but with the laws governing public authorities. The absence of Annual Reports, and the complete invisibility of Silica City in CHPA’s published accounts, should have been explicitly flagged.
Equally troubling is the silence of the National Assembly of Guyana, at least some of whose members know that the Housing Act requires far more than numbers stripped of context. When a statutory reporting framework collapses in plain sight, unnoticed by auditors and unchallenged by Parliament, accountability disappears, and lawful administration collapses.
President Ali
At this point, it is no longer credible to discuss Silica City without addressing the common role of President Ali himself. The Sparendaam investigation did not describe a single rogue decision or a momentary lapse. It documented an infrastructure of persons and practices through which housing projects were executed: political direction overriding statute, institutions reduced to conduits, records absent or reconstructed after the fact, and accountability dissolved by design.
What makes the current project more troubling is that many of the same enabling conditions have re-emerged on a far larger and more expensive scale. Then, Dr Ali operated as Housing Minister under a President. Now, he is the President. Then he reported to Cabinet. Now, Cabinet reports to him.
Silica City is framed as a legacy project. But vanity cannot come before legality, and legacy cannot be built on secrecy, evasion, and disregard for statutory accountability. History is unforgiving on this point. It judges leaders not by the size of their projects, but by whether those projects followed the law, the institutions of the state, and earned the public trust.
Conclusion
Having been involved in the investigation into the Sparendaam project, I recognise the warning signs. I fear that if this project is allowed to continue under existing conditions of opacity, avoidance of scrutiny, and deliberate invisibility, we will not later be wondering whether Silica City was Pradoville 3.
We will already know the answer.