Carl Singh-led Constitution Reform Commission is already a colossal failure with no reasonable prospect of redemption

Dear Editor,

The appearance in the press on August 15 of a notice dated June 23, 2026, signed by Attorney-at-Law Javed Shadick, Secretary to the Constitution Reform Commission, is the first public indication in some time that the Carl Singh-led Commission is still alive and, after more than two years in office, has finally reached the first stage of public consultation.

The notice invites written proposals until December 31, after which comes the second stage – public engagements. More remarkable than the timetable is that the matters on which submissions are invited are substantially a wholesale transposition of the mandate Parliament gave the Commission in Act No. 16 of 2022. This means that nearly four years after the Act and more than two years after the Commission was sworn in, it has arrived at the starting point Parliament prescribed for it.

This is not a snail’s pace. The snail, at least, keeps moving towards its destination.

There is a ready benchmark for judging this performance, and it is one which the present Commission itself invited. Ms. Gail Teixeira, now Vice-Chair of the Commission, told the National Assembly in 2022 that “repeating what happened in 1999 is the model that has been most progressive and most innovative not only in Guyana but in the entire region.” Very well. Let us make the comparison.

The 1999 Constitution Reform Commission was born out of the political crisis following the 1997 elections and the Herdmanston Accord. Its circumstances were difficult: it was the first wholesale examination of the justifiably derided 1980 Constitution; its issues were contentious; and its timetable demanding. Yet, sworn in in January 1999, the Commission considered some 4,600 proposals drawn from oral and written submissions, public hearings, organisations and individuals across the country, including substantial proposals from the PPP/C and PNCR. It drew on Guyanese and international expert advice, deliberated and reported by July, making 171 recommendations.

In roughly six months, under far greater political pressure and under the chairmanship of Mr. Ralph Ramkarran, S.C., the 1999 Commission substantially completed an exercise which the Carl Singh-led Commission, after more than two years, has barely begun.

Attorney General Anil Nandlall – never short of words – was emphatic during the debate on the legislation. He described the Commission as “time-bound and assignment-bound” and said it would have the institutional support to operate “effectively and efficiently”. Most appropriately, he told the National Assembly that the people must hold accountable those who make promises and do not deliver.

Let us apply his test.

This is not a resource-starved exercise. Hundreds of millions of public funds have been allocated to constitutional reform and its supporting machinery. I understand that the monthly payment to the Chairman is $1.3 million, the Vice Chair $500,000, each Commissioner $200,000, and the Secretary $600,000. Farcically, egregiously and unconscionably, Commission members accepted payment for each of the four months that the Commission went into recess for the 2025 elections campaign. And when it was meeting, things were hardly better: Chairman Singh himself acknowledged publicly in September 2025 that attendance by Commissioners had been a problem. Knowingly accepting public money for work one does not perform strikes me as conduct of an altogether different order from mere absenteeism.

Incredibly, the Commission and its members are entitled to the same privileges and immunities as the National Assembly and its members. Is this Government serious, or has the entire National Assembly taken leave of its senses? In any case, these privileges cannot convert non-performance into public service or unearned remuneration into value for money.

The Commission is expressly charged with considering the safeguarding of public funds and integrity in public life. It can start with itself. Every member should therefore have no difficulty confirming that the appropriate taxes have been paid on the remuneration received.

Nor is the Commission short of personnel, experience or political clout. Its twenty-one members include five Government nominees, all Ministers when appointed and already remunerated from the public purse, among them Vice-Chair Gail Teixeira and Attorney General Anil Nandlall, S.C.; four Opposition nominees; attorneys Timothy Jonas, S.C. and Kamal Ramkarran; and private-sector representative Ramesh Persaud. 

Responsibility for the Commission’s dismal performance is therefore collective. It is inconceivable that these politicians, professionals and businesspeople would tolerate such delay, cost and paucity of output if their money was being spent. 

There is an even more fundamental problem with the Commission’s composition. The 2025 elections swept away the political configuration on which it was constituted. Nigel Hughes, to his credit, resigned when the AFC disappeared from Parliament. Yet, the representative from the Joinder parties – ANUG, Liberty Justice Party and The New Movement – none of which is represented in the National Assembly post – 2025 remains on the Commission while WIN, with sixteen seats and now the principal Opposition party, has no representative at all.

The Attorney General himself recognised the problem. In October 2025, Mr. Nandlall acknowledged that the Act had been drafted for the previous parliamentary configuration and said that amendments had already been made to a draft Bill to reflect the new Opposition arrangement. Yet the Commission is now proceeding with public consultation without that acknowledged defect having been corrected.

The absurdity does not end there. Whatever recommendations the Commission eventually produces must enter the parliamentary process. WIN now holds sixteen of the twenty-nine Opposition seats. The Commission is therefore attempting to devise constitutional reform without the principal Opposition party, only eventually to send its proposals to a National Assembly in which that party’s support may be indispensable.

Measured against the time, resources and output, this performance amounts to gross incompetence.

While the Commission sits and waits more than four months for submissions – perhaps expecting the public to function at a pace similar to that of the Commission – the Attorney General and the Minister responsible for Finance should produce and publish a full accounting of expenditure and remuneration, while the Commission publishes its meetings and attendance, research undertaken and substantive work produced.

This Commission has had ample time to carry out a detailed assessment of the 1999 Report – including the submissions, the action taken on its recommendations, and the issues arising from their implementation or non-implementation. Where is its assessment of what was implemented, what was not, what worked, what failed and why? That should have been both its starting point and part of its invitation to the public.

Those who still hope for something useful from this exercise should remember that two genuine heavyweights – Haslyn Parris and Dr. Rupert Roopnaraine – were centrally involved in preparing the 1999 Report. But that was not all – and here I stand guilty of omissions. The Commission drew on constitutional experts including Justice Albert Sachs of South Africa, Professor Kathleen Mahoney of Canada, Anund Hylland of Norway, and our own Professor Keith Massiah, Professor Harold Lutchman and Professor Rudolph James. The question is what comparable intellectual firepower has the present Commission assembled?

Twenty-five years of experience have meanwhile supplied important issues requiring examination: the concentration of presidential power and presidential immunity; the failure to give meaningful effect to Article 13 and inclusionary democracy; constitutional appointment deadlocks, including at the apex of the judiciary; GECOM’s partisan architecture; parliamentary oversight; and genuine local government autonomy.

Guyana in 2026 is not Guyana in 1999. Petroleum wealth now raises fundamental constitutional questions about stewardship of natural resources, intergenerational equity and accountability for national wealth. Above all, constitutional reform must distinguish constitutional deficiency from constitutional non-compliance. There is little point endlessly rewriting the Constitution if governments and constitutional actors fail to observe the provisions already there.

Mr. Shadick’s advertisement has therefore performed one useful public service. It has told the country where the Commission stands in August 2026. Unfortunately, after more than two years, continuous remuneration and substantial public expenditure, it is scarcely beyond where Parliament placed it in November 2022.

Mr. Shadick himself also has some accounting to do. How does he discharge this important function as Secretary to the Commission alongside his appointment as Secretary to the presidential Commission of Inquiry into the MV Barima disaster?

And Mr. Nandlall needs no reminding. He himself told Parliament that those who make promises and do not deliver must be held accountable. That Guyanese may have forgotten the existence of the Commission about which he spoke so confidently is no excuse for its failure to account.

I am not usually a pessimist, but on the application of any reasonable test – including the Attorney General’s own metric – the Carl Singh-led Constitution Reform Commission is already a colossal failure. Nothing in its record so far suggests to me any reasonable prospect of redemption.

The question therefore is no longer whether this Commission needs more time. It is whether it should be permitted to continue in its present form. In my view, it should not. The present exercise should be ended and the task returned immediately to the constitutional Parliamentary Standing Committee for Constitutional Reform, where the political representation reflects the present National Assembly. That Committee can determine, transparently and with appropriate expert and civil-society participation, the arrangements for taking constitutional reform forward within a firm timetable and with proper accountability for public expenditure.

Yours faithfully,

Christopher Ram

From 12.5% to Nearly 40% – The Good News, and What It Means

Fri, August 21 2026, 2:01 AM GMT-4

Road to First Oil – Every Man, Woman and Child Must Become Oil Minded – Part 195

Part I of II

President Irfaan Ali brought Guyanese some genuinely good oil news this week. He announced that Guyana’s entitlement from production in the Stabroek Block has risen from the historical 12.5% to approximately 39.8%. Even if oil prices had remained unchanged, Guyana would now be receiving more than three times its earlier share. And because of the war on Iran, oil has risen more than 50% from its end-2025 price. That is great news and since I believe strongly in the old advice not to look a gift horse in the mouth, I welcome it.  

This two-part column examines first what the increase means and how Guyana’s benefit compares with that of the oil companies. Part II will consider how durable this favourable position is, given today’s high oil price, prospective exploration expenditure and the unchanged terms of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement.

Let us be clear. The movement from 12.5% to nearly 40% is not the result of renegotiation. It follows from the Agreement’s cost-recovery mechanism. In the early years, up to 75% of petroleum could be allocated to recovering exploration and development costs. The remaining profit oil was divided equally, leaving Guyana with 12.5% of gross production. The logic is simple. As accumulated costs are recovered, cost oil falls, profit oil rises and Guyana’s share increases.

But first, this column notes an ambiguity over whether the 39.8% includes Guyana’s 2% royalty. The President’s own comparison points strongly to the royalty being additional. He compared today’s 39.8% with the original 12.5%, which was Guyana’s share of profit oil, not its total take including royalty. The natural reading is therefore profit oil against profit oil: 12.5% then and 39.8% now.

At an illustrative US$90 per barrel, 39.8% gives Guyana US$35.82 of profit oil. The 2% royalty adds US$1.80, producing US$37.62 per barrel, or 41.8% of gross value. If instead the 39.8% includes royalty, Guyana’s profit oil would be US$34.02, which with the US$1.80 royalty gives US$35.82. Either way, the improvement is substantial.

But nearly equal profit-oil shares do not mean equal economic benefits. The 2016 Agreement contains two major tax concessions to the contractors: the Government pays their corporation tax and provides the corresponding tax certificates, while distributions and remittances of profits are exempt from withholding tax.

The companies’ tax benefits

For illustration, I treat profit oil as taxable profit, apply corporation tax at 25%, and assume after-tax profit would otherwise attract 20% withholding tax, with no other adjustments. For every US$100 of profit oil, the corporation-tax benefit is therefore US$25. The remaining US$75 would attract US$15 withholding tax. On these assumptions, every US$100 of profit oil carries US$40 of tax benefits.

On what I consider the more likely interpretation; Guyana receives US$37.62 in profit oil and royalty. The companies receive US$35.82 of profit oil, plus an assumed US$8.96 corporation-tax benefit and US$5.37 withholding-tax benefit – a total economic benefit of US$50.15 per barrel. That is US$12.53, or approximately one-third, more than Guyana.

If the 39.8% includes royalty, Guyana receives US$35.82, while the companies receive US$34.02 of profit oil plus US$8.51 and US$5.10 in assumed tax benefits, giving them US$47.63. Again, their economic benefit is approximately one-third greater.

These figures are illustrative, not calculations of the companies’ actual tax returns or tax certificates. Taxable income can be affected by deductions and other adjustments. The purpose is to expose the structure of the bargain: equal profit oil does not mean equal economic benefit. Guyana receives a 2% royalty on top of its profit oil; the companies receive substantial tax benefits on top of theirs.

Cautionary tale

None of this diminishes the announcement. Moving from 12.5% to nearly 40% profit oil is excellent news. At present production and prices, the additional revenue is enormous. The cost-recovery mechanism that once restricted Guyana’s profit-oil share to 12.5% is now working strongly in our favour because enormous, accumulated costs have been recovered.

But today’s position reflects unusually favourable circumstances. Much of the earlier investment has been recovered, production is at record levels and oil is around US$90. Yet not a word of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement has changed. The 2% royalty remains; the tax concessions remain; the withholding-tax exemption remains; and the cost-recovery and stabilisation provisions remain. The economics have changed. The contract has not.

Nor are today’s economics guaranteed to continue. Oil was around US$61 at the end of 2025 and has risen sharply with the US/Israeli war on Iran. Prices can fall again. ExxonMobil and its partners also retain substantial exploration ambitions, and renewed exploration and development could generate another major cycle of recoverable expenditure, increasing cost oil and reducing Guyana’s profit-oil percentage.

Those issues belong in Part II. We should welcome the movement from 12.5% to nearly 40% for what it is: very good news for Guyana. But the next question is more difficult: how long can these favourable conditions last, and does receiving much more under the 2016 Agreement make the Agreement itself any less inequitable?

To be continued

Disgraceful for VP Jagdeo, Min. Bharrat to allow citizens to rely on Exxon for updates on recovery of all investments – Christopher Ram

…as Gov’t yet to address nation on promised 50% oil profits

(Kaieteur News) – Since July 31, 2026 ExxonMobil announced to its shareholders that the company has recovered all of its investments made in Guyana to develop the seven projects approved to date – a significant development in the country’s petroleum sector that is yet to be addressed by the Government of Guyana (GoG).

Attorney and Chartered Accountant, Christopher Ram in a scathing commentary to this newspaper on the matter blasted the administration for its silence on such a key milestone in the nation’s oil story, describing it as an act of disgrace for government to leave citizens reliable on information supplied by a multinational corporation that has proven to be “less than straight and honest” in its dealings locally.

Ram has been a vocal advocate against the GoG for its appalling lack of transparency in the management of the oil and gas sector, leading a string of protests last year particularly against the Commissioner of Information, Charles Ramson (SC) whom he accused of guarding key information instead of making same available upon the request of citizens.

In an invited comment on the recovery of some US$55B in investment and operating expense by ExxonMobil, Ram said Guyana is now positioned to receive 50% of profit oil which is what is available after the deduction of recoverable expenses.

The Chartered Accountant was careful to point out, “This statement that Guyana will receive 50% of all oil produced is absolutely and verifiably misleading. It is also not consistent with the provisions of the contract.”

“How disgraceful it is that we have no less than a Vice President (Bharrat Jagdeo) and a cabinet minister responsible for the petroleum sector (Vickram Bharrat), and yet we have to rely on Exxon whose accounting has been less than straight and honest to provide us with information on the recovery of all their costs.” – Christopher Ram

Shifting his attention to the fact that the GoG is yet to address the nation on this issue, the lawyer argued, “How disgraceful it is that we have no less than a Vice President (Bharrat Jagdeo) and a cabinet Minister responsible for the petroleum sector (Vickram Bharrat), and yet we have to rely on Exxon whose accounting has been less than straight and honest to provide us with information on the recovery of all their costs.”

He added that Guyana must now wait to see what charges and provisions will now be concocted and invented to ensure the nation does not realise a larger share of profit from the agreement.

More than two weeks have now elapsed since the major announcement was made by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of Exxon, Darren Woods. During the company’s second quarter earnings call on July 31, 2026 the CEO described Guyana’s progress as a success story that has set a new standard for the industry, exceeding even the company’s expectations. Exxon said it expected the cost bank to be cleared in another two years. Woods however said, “Delivering on tight schedules, at industry-leading cost – with strong reliability and optimised production – has resulted in recovering our capital and cost nearly two years earlier than anticipated, increasing NPV, and desaturating the cost bank.”

On August 11, the Natural Resources minister told this newspaper that a statement would be issued by the GoG. Up to the time of this report, this commitment was not honoured.

Former Finance Minister, Winston Jordan previously told this newspaper that Guyana is now entitled to a larger share of the resources being generated offshore but instead of government providing full disclosure on what the recovery of Exxon’s investments means for the nation, citizens continue to be left in the dark while the opposition appears caught up in other matters.

Jordan explained, ““…in accordance with the PSA, profit should now be calculated in the usual manner, that is revenue minus all eligible expenditure, and shared in the same 50:50 split.”

He continued, “I’ve seen calculations where expenditure could go down to about 37% of revenues, which would leave 63% as profit to be shared equally between. That means GoG would be entitled to 31.5%+2% royalty = 33.5%.”

He pointed out that this would be more than double the 14.5% Guyana currently receives in profit along with the 2% royalty.

Moreover, he highlighted that this could result in the Natural Resource Fund (NRF) receiving between US$8-10 billion annually at current oil prices – up from the average US$2.7 billion.

My position on the Crisis within the CCJ

The CCJ Crisis: Its President Has Responded. Questions Remain.

The lengthy statement by CCJ President Justice Winston Anderson is an important development in a crisis which has damaged the integrity and perceived impartiality of the Court – hopefully not irreparably, but certainly for years to come, particularly if the existing leadership remains in place.

Justice Anderson deserves credit for responding publicly. He rejects allegations of panel fixing and improper attempts to influence judicial outcomes. His explanations deserve fair consideration, but cannot substitute for an independent examination of allegations made by five of the Court’s six other sitting judges.

Two of the controversies are of particular importance to Guyana. On the Mohamed extradition case, Justice Anderson does not directly answer Justice Jamadar’s specific allegation that he attempted to influence colleagues whose views differed from his. Unanimity in the eventual result does not answer an allegation about the integrity of the process by which that result was reached.

The other concerns Guyana’s Judiciary, for which the Constitution makes specific provision. Anderson now acknowledges that in October 2025 he privately sought to encourage agreement on the substantive appointments of Chancellor and Chief Justice, speaking separately with President Irfaan Ali and then Opposition Leader Aubrey Norton. He concedes that another course would have been better and that he might have confined himself to public commentary, as his predecessors had done.

This not only reflects poor judgment unbecoming of the holder of such an exalted judicial office, but raises the more important question whether the President of Guyana’s final appellate court should intervene in a constitutional process entrusted to the President and Leader of the Opposition of a Member State.

Significantly, Anderson sidesteps Norton’s more specific allegations: that he sought Norton’s agreement to particular appointments; said that he had participated in negotiations concerning then acting Chancellor Yonette Cummings-Edwards and sought to facilitate them; and told Norton that the President and others were waiting to swear in the proposed appointees, indicating when questioned that he had been with President Ali.

In a lengthy statement intended to answer the controversies surrounding him, omissions of that significance cannot simply be dismissed as oversight.

Nor can responsibility rest with Justice Anderson alone. At the political level, the circumstances demanded strict observance of the separation between Executive and Judiciary. Instead, President Ali appears to have lent support to an intervention by the President of the CCJ in a process which, according to Norton, encompassed the departure of the then acting Chancellor and the proposed appointment of Guyana’s two highest judicial officers.

Ali must – but won’t – explain his role in these serious matters. Who initiated the discussions? What was discussed? What did he understand Anderson’s role to be? Was the Attorney General consulted?

More fundamentally, if the President was prepared to engage the head of Guyana’s final appellate court in such an intervention at the apex of the judicial system, Guyanese are entitled to ask where he believes the boundary lies between legitimate executive action and interference with the Judiciary. If Ali is prepared to cross that boundary with the apex court, what assurance is there that it will be respected in the domestic courts?

Against this background, Guyana’s institutional responses are disappointing. The Bar Association concentrated on confidentiality and expressly declined to address the substance. That position will inevitably reinforce existing suspicions about its political independence.

For its part, Guyana’s judicial leadership associated itself with a regional statement which declined to address the merits while expressing grave concern about the breach of confidentiality. Given Guyana’s exceptional involvement, was there consultation within our Judiciary before its leadership joined that statement?

There is also an unavoidable issue of perception. In the 2018 presidential term-limits case, Justice Anderson was the lone dissenting judge in the CCJ’s six-to-one decision upholding Guyana’s constitutional term limits. His dissent was entirely within his judicial right and is not evidence of political bias. But his subsequent acknowledged intervention with Guyana’s political Executive inevitably causes that history to be viewed in a new and uncomfortable context.

The controversy also unfairly casts a shadow over the acting Chancellor and acting Chief Justice and their prospects for confirmation. Nothing disclosed establishes wrongdoing by either. That unfair consequence itself demonstrates why the appointment process should have been insulated from outside intervention.

Finally, the Guyana Bar Association and the regional judicial leadership elevated the leaking of confidential correspondence above grave allegations which the CCJ President’s lengthy statement has only partially addressed. There is no evidence that any of the five judges leaked the emails. The disclosure could have come from anyone with access. What matters is that the correspondence exposed an atmosphere harmful to the Court and the Region. The five judges did not create this crisis by raising these concerns. The crisis lay in the conditions that caused them to do so.

Justice Anderson’s statement is welcome but incomplete. It cannot be the final word.

Saturday, August 15, 2026

AN OPEN LETTER TO HIS EXCELLENCY DR. MOHAMED IRFAAN ALI, PRESIDENT OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA

Mr. President,

On 21 July in an Open Letter, I asked two things of you. You granted the first, a period of national mourning. That is appreciated. The second was that you establish an independent Commission of Inquiry under the Guyana Shipping Act, 1998. That request has neither been granted nor refused. It has been passed over in silence.

Yesterday, the Prime Minister said that the Government had not yet considered the role of the Opposition in the Commission of Inquiry. Today, Demerara Waves reported that you announced that you would name five commissioners tomorrow. This letter is written tonight, before you do so, and intentionally so.

I have read the terms of reference reported in Demerara Waves. Strong on the details: the loading; the boarding; seaworthiness and maintenance; compliance with maritime law; conduct and competence of the master and crew; the weather; the rescue efforts. Without exception, every one concerns the night of 18 July. Not one concerns the years before it. Your Commission will inquire exhaustively into a voyage without asking why that voyage was made in that vessel at all.

The MV Kalliopi N arrived in May, two months before the disaster. She is new, built for this service, and was assigned by your own Public Works Minister to this very Region One route. She lies at her berth still, awaiting a date for a commissioning ceremony convenient to you. Throughout those two months an eighty-seven-year-old hull built in 1939 carried our people to Port Kaituma, Morawhanna, Kumaka and Mabaruma, because she was their only lifeline. Your Minister has since called it unfortunate that the Barima went down before she could be replaced.

And what became of the earlier expectation that the MV Ma Lisha, commissioned in 2023 at some twelve point seven million United States dollars, would relieve the Barima of this service? If that was never her purpose, the country should be told what she was bought for while the North West kept a hull built for a long past era.

None of this was misfortune. These were decisions, taken by identifiable people who had new ships in the water, a designated route, and a river transport budget running into billions of dollars this year. Nothing in your ToR permits the Commission to examine them.

Please bear with me while I raise with you a few issues before you name the Commissioners tomorrow.

  1. The law under which this Commission is constituted. You did not say. This cannot be left open and unaddressed.
  • The investigation required under Part XVIII of the Shipping Act? Recall that I referred to this in my first Open Letter to you. It is a statutory obligation that has so far gone unused. It must be chaired by a Judge or Magistrate – not retired ones – with expert assessors, holding the powers of a Magistrate’s Court, able to cancel the certificates of those found seriously negligent. Parliament passed the law hoping that a disaster of this magnitude does not happen. It has, under your watch. That adds a moral dimension to a statutory duty.  
  • Enlargement of the Terms of Reference. It is vital not to exclude inquiring into the circumstances leading to the decision to keep the Barima in service, including why the Kalliopi N was not deployed on arrival and the decision that her activation was subject to your availability and the known condition of the Barima then. It is not enough that the country spends hundreds of millions on a report about a ship and not about a government.
  • The funding of your Commission of Inquiry. Under Articles 216 and 217 of the Constitution, no sum leaves the Consolidated Fund save as Parliament authorises. You hold the Finance portfolio yourself. The man appointing the Commission, writing its terms, receiving its report and deciding on its publication is also the man signing the cheque. Do you find that reassuring?

Two undertakings are also owed: that the report be published in full by a stated date, and that Minister Edghill and the Director General of MARAD stand aside while the Commission sits, and attend and answer before the Commission. You have no doubt read that the Minister of Education in India resigned over the leaking of exam papers. I am sure you recognise the principle and the contrast.   

And one direction that cannot wait. Every record touching this vessel – all the documentation required under Part XVIII – including surveys, certificates, manifests, maintenance logs, deficiency notices, and the files on the Ma Lisha and the Kalliopi N sit tonight in the institutions to be examined. Official accounts of how many were aboard have already varied. I ask that you now direct that nothing is removed, altered or destroyed, and that all be secured in independent custody. A government with nothing to hide loses nothing by giving that direction.

These documents are not merely material for your Commission. They are evidence in civil proceedings which the bereaved are entitled to bring, and the duty to preserve them arises now, not when a writ is filed. Their loss, alteration or destruction would carry consequences in any such proceedings, and for those responsible.

Finally, Mr. President, please reflect on this. A new ship sat at her moorings waiting for you. In its stead, an old one sailed without you and did not come back, with more than one hundred innocent and unsuspecting lives lost. The least the country and its Chief Citizen owe them is a full and independent investigation. Guyana has had inquiries whose findings the country never read, and inquiries that reached no higher than a junior officer. The Rodney Commission came thirty-four years too late, and its report was repudiated by the government that received it. Mahdia reported after the parents had already been made to sign. This one must serve the dead and not you, your Administration or your party.  

You may grant what I have asked. You may refuse it. What you cannot do, after tonight, is say that you were not asked.

Respectfully,

Christopher Ram

Georgetown, Saturday 25 July 2026