Category: The Road to First Oil

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded -Column 154

Introduction

By its very name, the Ministry of Governance and Parliamentary Affairs should defend and advance democracy, promote and ensure transparency, and strengthen and enforce accountability. Regrettably, the Ministry, in pursuit of the party’s agenda, is increasingly a convenient vehicle for political deflection and democratic reversal, where Parliament is reduced to a rubber stamp for government (read Party) plans and governance is engineered to serve narrow interests rather than the public good.

This was evident in a recent response from the Ministry, which, rather offensively, dismissed a legitimate request by OGGN, a civil society organisation, for information about oil tax payments and access to information. It would have been to its credit if it had simply advised the OGGN of the statutory framework for accessing public information. Instead, it misrepresented the law, ignored glaring conflicts of interest, and deflected the issue of accountability.

Law is the bedrock, information is the oxygen

The Ministry knows that law – including the Constitution – is the bedrock of governance and that information is the oxygen of democracy. Without compliance and sanctions, laws become hollow instruments, existing on paper but non-existent in practice. Given its mandate, the Ministry should ensure these principles are applied in every sphere of government. It should strengthen mechanisms allowing free and open access to information – not shielding the government from scrutiny. Instead, it has chosen to defend a system in which:

The Commissioner of Information is neither independent nor effective. In the meme “family, favourites and friends”, the Commissioner’s son is a minister, his wife chairs the Teaching Service Commission, and his office is his home! A more egregious combination of conflicts is hard to imagine.

Just coincidentally, the Commission has not filed an annual report since 1996!

Parliament is merely a tool for government use, convened when an appropriation bill is needed, or legislation passed to fulfill some international obligation or domestic unavoidable need. Under this form of governance, parliament can never function as a meaningful check on executive power. And, of course, in another part of the tripod, the Speaker’s role appears to be to restrict and, as necessary, prevent meaningful debate.

Proper governance is practically absent, with constitutional safeguards twisted to accommodate political interests. The all-important Judicial Service Commission and, to a lesser extent, the Constitutional Reform Commission stand as examples of how institutions meant to strengthen democracy can be sidelined and manipulated.

The Integrity Commission, often held up by the Ministry as a bastion of accountability and guarantee against governmental corruption, has never filed an annual report of its performance. Currently chaired by the wife of a late PPP/C Minister, the Commission has been filing annual audited financial statements that are only part of the annual reporting process.

Troublingly, this Commission seems to be operating as a mere repository with no sample audits or reviews undertaken by the Commission.

A weak and ineffective Access to Information System

The Ministry must be in self-delusion to think that Guyana’s Access to Information framework has served any purpose other than its own or can somehow be compared with that of Canada. It knew about the weaknesses in the Act before its introduction when the Transparency Institute of Guyana Inc. raised concerns in 2011. Yet, no amendment has been made to ensure its proper implementation, let alone strengthen the law.

This impotence starkly contrasts with Canada, which has continuously improved its own Act, most notably through Bill C-58 in 2019, which expanded the law’s scope, strengthened the powers of the Information Commissioner and introduced mandatory proactive disclosure obligations.

While Canada refined its legislation to promote openness, Guyana’s Access to Information framework remains stagnant and ineffective. The claim that Guyana’s Act was “modeled wholesale” on Canada’s is false in many fundamental respects:

Canada’s system is decentralised, meaning requests go directly to the government agency holding the records. Guyana’s centralised model forces everything through the Commissioner of Information, frustrating the process to make it non-operational.

Canada’s Commissioner of Information has enforcement powers and can order disclosures. Guyana’s Commissioner lacks meaningful authority and serves more as a postbox than an active entity.

Canada’s Office of Commissioner of Information has an active website full of information, advice and assistance. That of the Guyana Commissioner does not even have a letterhead, much less a website, and an “office” inaccessible to the public.

False Claims, Misdirection, and a Lack of Accountability

The Ministry’s response to the Oil and Gas Governance Network (OGGN) was factually incorrect and legally flawed. It claimed that companies in Guyana are required to file their tax returns with the Deeds and Commercial Registries Authority. This is false – tax filings are made at the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA), not the Deeds Registry. Either the Ministry does not understand essential corporate compliance, or it is deliberately misleading the public. That is deliberate prevarication. The issue is not about financial statements but about whether or not certificates of assessment were properly issued, why the payments to support the certificates were made, and how they are accounted for. 

The Ministry is not even responsible for the Access to Information Act. Yet, it attempted to dismiss concerns about transparency while failing to address why the sole Commissioner of Information has been unresponsive and unproductive.

Conclusion

While the Ministry discredited itself with inappropriate language and style, citizens like Anand Goolsarran and Alfred Bhulai and organisations like TIGI and OGGN wait in vain for basic information on the petroleum sector. A Ministry that is properly informed and genuinely committed to governance would facilitate citizens. It would elevate Parliament to its proper role as an oversight body rather than reducing it to a rubber stamp for government approval. Such a Ministry would hold other ministers accountable for legal obligations, including filing annual reports as required by law. It would treat transparency as a fundamental democratic value rather than a threat to be contained.

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 153

“The OECD/G20’s Pillar Two framework mandates that all in-scope MNEs (multi-national enterprises) pay a minimum effective tax rate of 15% on profits in each jurisdiction. The Bahamas must act decisively to ensure that these taxes are collected here, rather than abroad”: The Bahamas Government

Introduction

In a development that would be almost comical were it not so devastatingly costly to Guyana, The Bahamas is now poised to collect taxes on income earned by Exxon from Guyana’s oil wealth. Contrast that with Guyana, whose government, despite widespread calls for similar action, refuses to exercise its sovereign right and power to tax all income earned in Guyana. The Bahamas’ initiative-taking adoption of the OECD’s Pillar Two framework exposes Guyana’s fiscal negligence and its leaders’ spineless subservience to ExxonMobil and multinational interests. The framework ensures that multinational enterprises pay a minimum tax of 15%.

Guyana’s refusal to adopt the OECD framework reveals an uncomfortable truth: our government has actively given up billions in revenue rather than even suggesting that ExxonMobil and its partners Hess and CNOOC should pay taxes on its hefty profits from Guyana. This active, deliberate and calculated inaction has led to the absurdity where The Bahamas, a country with only sand, sea and shells, will soon generate more tax revenue from Guyana’s oil industry than Guyana itself!!

The Bahamas is known for its tax haven status, but the country wants to collect revenues from its multinationals and stand alongside countries that take their reputation seriously – at least until Exxon finds another country to shield its Guyana profits.

The Cost of Inaction: Billions Lost, No Accountability

No one should be fooled that Guyana’s refusal to join the OECD framework is an oversight -it is a manifestation of the country’s leadership kowtowing to Exxon and Hess over the interest of their own people. They know that if they sign on, they must commit self-styled heresy by charging tax on Exxon. Unfortunately, this is not their only show of loyalty to Exxon. Their refusal to utilise the renegotiation clause in the 2016 Petroleum Agreement already stands as a glaring example of fiscal surrender, with Guyana not only waiving its right to collect taxes but also reimbursing ExxonMobil for its tax obligations and providing receipts for taxes Exxon and Hess never actually paid.

This is not about legal constraints or contractual obligations – this is about a government that has chosen to protect ExxonMobil from taxation rather than safeguard the financial future of its own people.

Giving away the Billions

It is estimated that Guyana has already given up around three billion United States Dollars in taxes which the oil companies should have paid since 2020. To put this in perspective, The Bahamas anticipates generating approximately US$$140 million annually through its new tax measures, applied across its entire economy. Given the vast scale of ExxonMobil’s operations in Guyana, our potential revenue under the same framework would dwarf this figure multiple times over.

The Flimsy Justifications for Guyana’s Tax Giveaway

Government officials, from President Irfaan Ali to Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo, continue to hide behind “contract sanctity” rhetoric to justify this inaction. Yet, their arguments collapse under even the most basic scrutiny. While The Bahamas is demonstrating the ability of a small nation to assert its tax sovereignty, Guyana’s leaders remain silent on why they refuse to do the same.

Former Prime Minister Samual Hinds has jumped on the Exxon Train and recently claimed that Guyana’s 2% royalty and profit-sharing arrangements compensate for the complete tax exemption granted to ExxonMobil. This is nineteenth-century, misleading, and fiscally irresponsible. No other oil-producing nation has accepted such terms, and the insistence on defending them reflects either shocking economic mismanagement or deliberate efforts to placate corporate interests at the expense of national development.

What contract sanctity?

It seems that the Government is engaged in some dodgy accounting regarding the taxes to be paid to the Guyana Revenue Authority. Under the 2016 Agreement, those funds should come from the government’s share of profits. But as we know, the 2021 Natural Resource Fund Act limits the use of the NRF funds. That, as lawyers would say, is an amendment by implication. However, an examination of the Government Estimates shows that there is no collection by the GRA, so the question then is who issued the Tax Certificate since it is not the GRA.

The inevitable question is whether Exxon accepted the amendment to the tax payment provision in the 2016 Agreement and whether there is some off-the-book arrangement between the company and the Government of Guyana.

Conclusion

The stark absurdity speaks for itself: The Bahamas, a country of sand and sea, will soon collect more tax from Guyana’s oil wealth than Guyana itself. While The Bahamas boldly asserts its rights under the OECD framework, Guyana’s government remains locked in what can only be described as an unholy alliance with ExxonMobil – providing tax receipts for unpaid taxes, refusing to renegotiate terms, and refusing to sign on to an international tax framework thereby surrendering billions in revenue. To describe this as fiscal negligence is too kind. It constitutes a deliberate betrayal of national interests that transforms Guyana’s oil blessing into a case study of corporate colonialism in the 21st century.

The Information Blackout: Oil Transparency and the Failure of Access to Information in Guyana

Introduction

Guyana’s Constitution identifies access to information as a right – not a privilege. Yet, for a decade and more since the Access to Information Act was passed in 2011, this right has been treated with contempt. The Office of the Commissioner of Information’s ongoing obstructionism reflects more than a question of competence – it is a deliberate affront to transparency and accountability.

Last Sunday, the North American NGO, Oil and Gas Governance Network (OGGN) pleaded for information on the taxes the Government of Guyana paid for the oil companies operating in the Stabroek Block. In yesterday’s Stabroek News, civil society activist Danuta Radzik eloquently highlighted similar frustrations in attempting to access public information from the Environmental Protection Agency. These letters underscore how the barriers to information access extend beyond the oil sector to affect various aspects of civil society oversight and citizen engagement.

While these public demands were not made using the Access to Information Act, they highlight the frustrations and obstructions in obtaining basic information on matters of public interest. Not that OGGN or Danuta would have had better luck if they had. The Act had many weaknesses from its inception, but these pale compared to how it has been operationalised by its sole Commissioner, Charles Ramson, S.C.O.R, former Justice of the Court of Appeal and Attorney General under an earlier PPP/C Administration.

Dysfunction

Former Natural Resources Minister Raphael Trotman retained the British law firm to investigate the circumstances surrounding the signing of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement. I had managed to obtain the report, but critical appendices were missing. So, on 6^th December 2021, I wrote to the Commissioner what should have been a straightforward request for information under the Access to Information Act 2011. In his acknowledgment, he advised that his Office would provide “an appropriate response”, subject to human and other resources.  

Acting on the Commissioner’s oral advice, I later directed a letter to the Ministry concerned. Not having had a response for more than a year, I sent the Commissioner a formal request to the Commissioner of Information using the Form set out in the Act, along with a letter pointing out the Minister’s non-response. The Commissioner’s letter dated May 10, 2023, was a masterpiece of verbose evasion. Rather than providing the requested information, Justice Ramson, referring to me as Comrade, stated that an applicant “ought not to arrogate to himself the liberty of any ad hominem criticism of his statutory benefactor.”

Bizarre

This extraordinary and bizarre statement reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of public bodies – not as benefactors bestowing favours but as public servants charged with statutory duties. The letter further suggested that I should have found the information in “the Bar Review contemporaneous with its delivery” or in the Commissioner’s own published work, his “3rd Book, Metrics of Bar and Further access thereto.” Such an absurd evasion directly undermines the very purpose of the Access to Information Act. To date, I have still not received the information, suggesting that the Commissioner’s assurance that “appropriate action will be taken to accommodate your non-timeous request” was not serious.

Perhaps most troubling is the phantom-like nature of the Commissioner’s office itself. Although officially under the Office of the President, that office could not provide information on the location of the Commission of Information. When even the President’s Office cannot direct citizens to a statutorily created office, one must question how seriously the Act and the broader issue of transparency are taken. But that is not all.

The Commission’s financial aspects are equally concerning. Tens of millions of dollars are allocated annually in the national budget for the Office of the Commissioner, yet no financial accounting for these funds has ever been provided. The Access to Information Act requires the responsible Minister to table an annual report on the operation of the Act. The parliamentary records do not disclose even a single report having been submitted to Parliament since the Act’s inception.

Implications

The implications for oil and gas governance are profound. When citizens and civil society organizations like OGGN cannot access basic information about tax payments, production figures, or environmental compliance, confidence in the management of the national patrimony and accountability is severely eroded – especially in the absence of an independent Petroleum Commission.

What makes this situation particularly troubling is that the Access to Information Act was introduced with great fanfare and is still marketed as a pillar of governmental transparency. Yet in practice, it has become a barrier rather than a conduit for information flow. The Commissioner actively undermines transparency, using unnecessarily complex language that obfuscates rather than elucidates.

These issues – obfuscatory language, failure to provide requested information, inability to locate the physical office, and non-compliance with statutory reporting requirements – are unacceptable in a democratic society. Indeed, it is fair to say that the Office of the Commissioner of Information has become an embarrassment to both the Government and the country. Measured by value for money, the Office of the Commissioner of Information is zero out of one thousand!

Conclusion

The Act’s poor performance and operations vindicate the criticisms made by the national transparency body TIGI and others when it was first introduced. On the few occasions that it does meet, the National Assembly can find the time to pass some gravely inconsequential amendment Acts. Meanwhile, a law meant to guarantee transparency has been perverted into a mechanism of secrecy. This farce must end.

Parliament must immediately demand an accounting of the Commissioner’s budget and require compliance with the Act’s reporting obligations. If the Commissioner’s Office continues obstructing access to information, drastic, surgical measures must be taken. The government cannot claim to champion transparency while allowing this mockery to continue.

The Natural Resource Fund Debate: Getting the Law Wrong

Introduction

The exchange over Guyana’s Natural Resource Fund (NRF) involving Dr. Terrence Campbell, VP Bharrat Jagdeo and Dr. Ashni Singh has revealed troubling misunderstandings of our fiscal legal framework, not least from those who ought to know better. What began as a straightforward observation about the utility of the NRF Board and its Investment Committee has exposed fundamental questions about how the Administration interprets and implements critical legislation.

Vice President Jagdeo, rather than addressing the core issue raised by Campbell, dismissed Campbell by contrasting their backgrounds – though his portrayal of Campbell as privileged compared to his own East Coast roots backfired when Campbell reminded everyone of his Mahdia origins. Finance Minister Singh then peculiarly echoed this line about Campbell receiving a “schooling” from an honorary doctorate holder.

The constitutional and legal framework

But let us focus on the law, which both officials seem to have misread or misunderstood. The legal framework rests on three pillars:

First, contrary to the Minister’s claims, Article 216 of the Constitution does not restrict the deposit of revenues into the Consolidated Fund. In fact, it allows Parliament the flexibility to place funds into other accounts. If it did not, the Natural Resource Fund itself would be unconstitutional.

Second, the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act (FMAA) defines public money and governs its management. While it creates strict rules about handling public funds, it also does not, and lawfully cannot, prevent placing money received into special or separate funds. Again, think of the Gold Board or the Forestry Commission, both of which receive public money.

Third, and most crucially, as Campbell pointed out, section 16(2) of the NRF Act explicitly requires all withdrawals (not just emergencies, as Jagdeo falsely claimed) to be used for national development priorities and disaster-related projects. This requirement creates a clear mandate for tracking and reporting – after all, how can a Parliamentarian, let alone a citizen, verify compliance without knowing the national development priorities.

Compounding the failings  

The Hansard of the debate on the 2021 NRF Act tabled by the PPP/C to replace the Coalition’s 2019 Act of the same name adds another layer of concern. On the occasion of its debate in the National Assembly, the same Minister who attempted to disparage Campbell was the only speaker in a segment that lasted much less than an hour. Instead of putting on the national record and informing his colleagues of the virtues of its historic piece of legislation, the Minister, as has become his style, spent much of his time on political criticism rather than on substantive analysis of how the law would work. For legislation governing intergenerational wealth, this was a grave dereliction of duty and disregard of the National Assembly. The Act’s Explanatory Memorandum, which could have clarified these matters, was no better.

Until the courts definitively interpret section 16, citizens will argue endlessly about its meaning and intent. But one thing is clear: the law does not prevent the detailed tracking Campbell advocates. If anything, it requires it. The current structure allows for proper monitoring of oil revenues and NRF expenditure.

The way forward requires honest engagement with these legal provisions rather than attempts to distort and misrepresent them or dismiss those who raise valid questions. When our highest officials misread (or misrepresent) basic fiscal laws, it raises serious concerns about the governance of our oil wealth.

Conclusion

Future generations will judge us not just on how our generation spent the nation’s money but on how we built the systems to manage it. Their judgment on the PPP/C Administration will be harsh. An Administration that refused to send the Natural Resource Bill to a Select Committee, that rushed it through the Bill in minutes rather than hours, days or weeks, that puts in charge of the NRF a toothless board, that prefers to vest the regulatory oversight over the sector in one man with a predisposition to get his facts and interpretation wrong, should expect the harshest verdict from Guyanese.

As the first column for the new year, we wish all Guyanese and especially readers of this column a successful, healthy and productive 2025.

From ‘No Guyanese Could Agree’ to ‘No Interest’: President Ali’s Impossible Retraction

Introduction

“No Guyanese could agree with this.” These were the unequivocal words of then-presidential candidate Irfaan Ali in 2020, speaking about the 2016 PSA in a virtual interview on 26 February 2020. Just a reminder – that was one week before the 2020 elections. He went further: “We have to go towards re-looking at these contracts, renegotiating these contracts… we have to ensure that our country does not get the wrong end of the stick.”

Today, four years later and comfortably ensconced as President, Dr. Ali declares he has “no interest” in even writing to ExxonMobil about renegotiation. The spoken word, like an arrow loosed from its bow, cannot be recalled – yet the President attempts the impossible, a truly regrettable situation which does no justice or honour to President Ali or to the highest office in the land.

From Conviction to Capitulation

What makes the situation so striking and so stark is the about-turn by Dr. Ali on a position he shared with ALL Guyanese a few years ago. Except, of course, the perennial bogey-man PNC. Now the President and the PNC adore the same exploitative oil contract, against the rest of Guyana. The contrast between candidate Ali and President Ali could not be starker. In the interview, when asked about the Global Witness report which identified the signing away of US$55 Bn, and about revisiting oil contracts, candidate Ali declared unequivocally: “We have made it clear that we have to go towards renegotiating these contracts. Everything is on the table for review …Review and renegotiate.” 

Today, that passionate commitment has evolved into the inappropriate principle about the “sanctity of contracts” which is now opportunistically joined by concerns about investment climate. Another significant contrast was his less than respectful treatment of a female journalist at his recent press conference, in which he questioned her motives and the political connection of her publisher. Compare this with his friendly tone with a male host in the earlier interview – on the exact same renegotiation issue which he so vociferously promoted before he became President. The banal explanation of “different strokes ….” cannot apply in our country’s president’s case.

The Inapplicability of Sanctity

My Oil and Gas Columns 146 to 150 exhaustively examined the legal analysis of the “sanctity of contracts” in a Canadian case. The circumstances of that case were so different that made its application to the 2016 Agreement completely irrelevant and inapplicable. As demonstrated through the Churchill Falls case and numerous other examples, the principle of sanctity has never been an absolute bar to renegotiation, particularly when:

1. The agreement itself provides for renegotiation (Article 31.2)
2. Circumstances have fundamentally changed (reserves quadrupling from 3 to far in excess of 11.6 billion barrels)
3. The original terms were demonstrably secured under duress and unequal bargaining power
4. That the principle cannot in a thousand years trump Guyana’s Constitution.

President Ali’s sudden expression of investment climate concerns rings particularly hollow given Guyana’s transformed bargaining position. With proven reserves now exceeding an understated 11.6 billion barrels, the oil companies will not risk a government-favoured monopoly in the most successful and productive oil fields of the past fifty years. Correspondingly, the unacceptable circumstances giving rise to a questionable extension country for another four decades deserve not only a review but a Presidential Commission of Inquiry.

Constitutional Duty Abandoned

Guyana’s constitution and international law are strong on permanent sovereignty over the country’s natural resources. His sworn duty is to protect those resources as if the country’s life depended on it. Apart from the President’s general obligations of his office, he has specific constitutional duties regarding natural resources. The Constitution mandates the protection of Guyana’s patrimony and the non-exploitative use of natural resources for the benefit of all citizens. By refusing to even consider renegotiation, the President abandons these fundamental responsibilities.

His position directly violates Article 50’s identification of “the Parliament, the President and Cabinet” as supreme organs of democratic power. Through his inaction, he cedes this constitutional authority and duty to a foreign corporation with a documented history of manipulated numbers and improper conduct. This surrender of sovereignty is made more egregious because Article 31.2 of the PSA explicitly provides for renegotiation – a tool the President refuses to even consider using.

Rather than addressing the Agreement’s fundamental flaws, the President appears content with passive landlordism – letting ExxonMobil control the country’s principal sector while Guyana collects minimal royalties and meagre profits. These well-known flaws aren’t mere technical issues – they represent systematic disadvantages that will affect generations of Guyanese.

The Shareholder/Citizen Paradox

Paradoxically, the President leaves his countrywomen and men in the position that they stand to gain better and more valuable benefits as ExxonMobil shareholder than as a Guyanese citizen relying on their government to protect national resources. As a shareholder, a Guyanese will benefit from huge dividends and increased share price driven by robust and aggressive corporate governance, detailed financial reporting and management accountability. As a citizen, the same person must depend on discretionary handouts, lack of information, non-consultation and dismissal of their concerns. Now they face a President unwilling to even write a letter seeking better terms.

It is to President Ali’s discredit that he has placed Guyanese in such a perverse situation.

Conclusion

It is a sad day for Guyana when its leader has broken that bond of trust with the citizens; when its president shows that there is no obligation to act consistent with his promises; casually ignores his constitutional obligations to protect the country’s national resources; and does not treat women with the same respect he extends to men. When citizens would find better protection of their interests as shareholders in their exploiters than as citizens of their own country, we have truly reached a nadir in governance.

It is too late now for the President to change course and to regain the trust that the presidency and the country deserve.  As an accomplished academic with access to the best local and international resources that money can buy, he must know that the question is not whether we have the right to renegotiate. We clearly do. Only he knows why he has acted as he did.

However, and by whomsoever he has came to the position he did, President Ali will forever carry the heavy burden of having let down his country, the presidency and the people.