Category: The Road to First Oil

Insurance and its adequacy (Part 2)

Introduction

Yesterday’s column addressed three Guarantee and Indemnity Agreements (GIA) granted by the oil companies to the Environmental Protection Agency. These we are told, is to provide some assurance to Guyana that there is money available to deal with any environmental events or accidents arising from petroleum operations under the 2016 Petroleum Agreement.

On environmental matters, petroleum operations in Guyana must be conducted in accordance with the requirements of that Agreement, and the Environmental Permits issued to the oil companies under the Environmental Protection Agency Act (EPA). It must not be forgotten too that the 2016 Agreement was issued under the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act of 1986 (PEPA) which has its own Regulations, also addressing environmental issues. Not surprisingly, however it is the EPA came some ten years after the PEPA which is the main environmental protection and regulation statute. And just for completeness, the Constitution has elevated the citizens’ right to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health or well-being – a negative right rather than a positive right to a healthy environment.

The EPA

The EPA was passed in 1996 and was probably then in line with international best practice. The problem is that that was twenty-eight years ago, and the law appears to have been frozen in time. The official copy of the Laws of Guyana shows that except for a single amendment in 2005 there has been no modernisation of the legislation since its passage. That is a most unfortunate state of affairs, and one must wonder why no Government since the discovery of oil has thought it necessary to review the legislation. What we are stuck with therefore, is an Act that is out-of-date, and which is administered and enforced by an under-resourced and under-qualified management.

The 2016 Agreement

Because the 2016 Agreement enjoys a forty-year stability, it is perhaps the first place we need to look. In summary, this is what the Agreement provides.

1. The oil companies must obtain an environmental authorisation from the Environmental Protection Agency and comply with the Act, for any activity governed by the Act. Generally, the geographical area over which activity is allowed and the scope of the activity would be set out in the Permit.

• The oil companies must take necessary and adequate precautions to prevent pollution and protect the environment and living resources in rivers and sea. “Living” in this context will include flora and fauna, such as birds, animals, plants.

• If non-compliance with its obligations results in pollution or environmental damage, the oil companies must take reasonable measures to remedy the situation and treat or disperse the pollution in an environmentally acceptable manner. However, the Contractor is not obligated to remedy pre-existing pollution or environmental damage.

• Where there is an emergency or accident arising from Petroleum Operations, the Contractor must notify the Minister immediately and take prudent and necessary actions in accordance with good international petroleum industry practices. If the Contractor fails to control or clean up pollution within a reasonable period specified by the Minister, the Minister may take necessary actions after giving notice to the Contractor and pass on not actual costs but reasonable costs and expenses to the Contractor.

Now, this is where the Agreement looks asinine – is it realistic to expect the Government to find the resources, negotiate the terms and contract some third party to come and sort out the problem or disaster while the oil companies sit back and contact their lawyers?  This also places the US$2 BN. in some relief. As noted in yesterday’s column, drawdown from the Indemnity Agreement is not automatic, and the Government will have to carry out a series of preliminary tasks. Of course, one needs to be realistic: a spill will have serious effect on the stock price of the oil companies which is always their first consideration. Altruism, self-interest and reputation protection will push those companies into high gear to deal with the disaster.

It’s the risk, stupid.

But that brings us back to the US$2 BN. While the probability of an oil spill may seem low, there are so many things that can go wrong – an electrical fire, an explosion, equipment failure, ship’s collision, etc. More importantly, this is not only about the probability of an accident but also the consequences of that eventuality.

The US$2 BN. might have been a direct result of pressure from certain quarters of society, but that itself raises several questions. While Article 28 of the Agreement seems to cast the responsibility new far and wide, the Indemnity sub-clause 2.4 provides some express limitations, as follows:

Liability by the Contractor to the Government for damages in respect of Petroleum Operations under this Agreement is limited to insurance required in accordance with Article 20.2 (a), provided however, that the Contractor shall not be liable to the Government for indirect, punitive or consequential damages, including but not limited to, production or loss of profits.

But Article 20.2 (a) seems to be wider, not narrower, than Article 2.4. It requires the Contractor to effect at all times, insurance of such type and sums customary in the international petroleum industry and not limited to loss or damage to all assets used in Petroleum Operations; pollution caused in the course of Petroleum Operations for which the Contractor or the Operator may be held responsible; and loss or damage to property or bodily injury suffered by any third party.

Self-insure

But here is the catch. The oil companies have the right to self-insure with the permission of the Minister. There is no indication from their financial statements that the oil companies are self-insured, and it appears therefore that the companies are in breach of their obligations under Article 20.2 (a) for which the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement is not a substitute. 

It is evident that this whole question of insurance, guarantee and indemnity is a mess. Hopefully, there is an adult somewhere in the room who understands the Petroleum Agreement, is not compromised, and who is courageous enough to stand up for Guyana. Will that person please get to work and resolve this confusion.

This Friday, I will address the 159-page Insurance Contract.  

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 126 – May 21, 2024

Insurance and its adequacy (Part 1)

Introduction

The Official Gazette of 11 May 2023 published two documents – a Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement  dated 9^th. June 2023 (GIA) and a Contract of Insurance effective 1^st. February 2024. The first deals with the Environmental Obligations of the three Contractors – Exxon, Hess and CNOOC – and the second, with third party insurance taken out by the companies to protect against a range of risks to their assets and operations. The beneficiary under the GIA is the Environmental Protection Agency while the beneficiary under the Contract of Insurance is the oil companies themselves.  

The 39-page GIA is made up of three separate but identical Agreements in which the Guarantors – all affiliates of the oil companies – undertake on behalf of the three Contractors to indemnify the EPA as the beneficiary on behalf of the Guyana Government.

Here is a table of the respective GIAs.

Oil Company	Share	Guarantor	Jurisdiction
Hess Guyana Exploration Limited	30%	Jamestown Ins. Co. Ltd.	Bermuda
CNOOC Petroleum Guyana Limited	25%	CNOOC Limited	Hong Kong
Esso (E & P) Guyana   Limited	45%	Exxon Equity Holding Company	Delaware (USA)

G$2 BN not adequate 

The maximum total sum payable under the three GIA is US$2 Bn., less than bird feed in relation to the average US15 Bn. cost of the last five international environmental disasters. Given the number of wells in simultaneous production in relatively close proximity to each other in the Stabroek Block, the risk of things going wrong increases exponentially.

The 2016 Agreement repeats identically the Indemnity provision of the 1999 Agreement, which was already overgenerous to the oil companies, on more than just royalty and taxation. If the GIAs are all the country can insist on in relation to environmental insurance, then Guyana is dangerously exposed. Any spill can spell disaster, wiping out the Natural Resources Fund in one stroke.  

In every case, the GIA is guaranteed by an affiliate of the respective oil company. In identical wording, the three GIAs assure that the Guarantor is rated by an internationally recognised credit rating agency. It seems that the EPA forgot to ask the name of the credit rating agency, the actual rating. The lawyer representing the EPA should feel extremely uncomfortable about this omission.

 In any case, it is doubtful whether the Agreements meet the requirement of the environmental permits which require Exxon as the Operator, to provide to the EPA legally binding undertakings of adequate financial resources for the Co-Venturers to pay or satisfy their respective environmental obligations regarding the Stabroek Block if their respective Co-venturers fail to do so. A total $2 BN for the three companies is far short of adequate.

The centerpiece of the Environmental Obligations is in respect of any pollution or other harm to the environment caused by petroleum operations in the Stabroek Block. These include the cost to prevent, reduce or contain the discharge or release of any contaminant; any monetary fine or penalty imposed by the government; and any damages arising from failure by the oil companies to comply with lawful directions given by the EPA. 

Bearing the real burden

Drawing down from the GIA is not automatic and will probably be costly since the EPA will have to bear all legal costs incurred by it in enforcing or attempting to enforce the guarantee. To do so, it must first show that there has been a default; that the oil company has failed to discharge its environmental obligation; that the amount does not exceed the sum guaranteed in respect of that oil company; and that the EPA intends to draw down under the Agreement. In strict legal language, the Agreement provides that the Guarantor shall have no liability for any indirect, special, consequential loss, loss of profit or punitive damages arising from or relating to the guarantee and Indemnity Agreement, or the transactions contemplated. The consequences of these exceptions fall squarely on the country.

Suspicion

It is rare for finance companies operating in three different jurisdictions to  have identically worded legal documents, or to have a choice of law in favour of a developing country with only a partially developed legal system. What is unprecedented is to have each of these three Agreements signed on the same day, across three different time zones, in which one signatory is common – that of the EPA head. It is unclear what legal advice the EPA took in negotiating and signing these complex documents, or why the Agreements have no subscribing witnesses, or why all the pages are not initialed as good practice requires.

There is a sneaking suspicion that these Agreements were put together with an eye on the case brought by citizens seeking to have such an agreement produced in court. The three companies have been evasive and possibly dishonest along the way, as the matter wended its way to the CCJ. Courts look with disfavour at such conduct. Something seems wrong that Exxon Guyana is now a major user of an expensive, overburdened court system to which it contributes nothing and extracts every drop of blood and ounce of flesh. Oh, and to have a state agency pay the cost of publishing their documents!    

In a column on Wednesday of this week, I will compare the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement under the environmental laws with the 2016 Agreement.  

Government should take over Hess’ share

Introduction

The disagreement involving the three Contractors under the 2016 Agreement (Exxon Guyana, Mobil, Hess and CNOOC) and Chevron over the friendly takeover of Hess by Chevron has gone to arbitration in the United States. There is nothing to indicate that the Irfaan Ali Administration has expressed any interest in the matter before the Arbitrators, although it clearly should. Guyana not only has standing and a direct interest in the matter, but a duty to do so. It is too rare an opportunity to pull something back from Trotman’s diabolical act of historical proportions, and we must not let it slip by.

Recent appearances on American television channels CNBC and Bloomberg by Exxon CEO Darren Woods and Chevron CEO Mike Wirth have brought this conflict into the international public eye. Both executives touted their companies’ robust performance in the first quarter of 2024, but Woods’ focus on delivering value to Exxon’s American shareholders while failing to acknowledge the Guyanese people, whose resources are being exploited, has drawn criticism.

The dispute

At the heart of the current dispute is Chevron’s attempt to acquire Hess Corporation, whose Cayman Islands subsidiary has a branch in Guyana which holds a 30% stake in the Stabroek Block. Exxon and CNOOC, themselves branches of shell companies incorporated in low/no tax jurisdictions holding 45 and 25 percent respectively, are claiming that they have preemptive rights over Hess’ shares, as outlined in a secret Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) between them. Woods has publicly accused Chevron of disregarding these rights in its pursuit of Hess.

 For his part, Woods is not only insensitive to the host country Guyana but appears oblivious to the fact that the JOA is subordinate and subject to the Petroleum Agreement signed in very controversial circumstances in 2016 between the Government of Guyana and the three shell companies. Woods boasted about value-creation by Exxon engineers ignoring the fact that the true value lies in the abundant resources and the country’s generosity under arguably the worst petroleum agreement ever – no exaggeration intended. The Agreement itself is governed by the country’s Petroleum Exploration and Production Act and its associated regulations, the essential provisions of which are:

Any transfer of rights, privileges, duties, or obligations under the Agreement or related licenses is subject to prior written consent from the Minister responsible for petroleum.

The Minister is obligated to approve the transfer if it does not adversely affect the performance or obligations, is not contrary to Guyana’s interests, or is to an approved affiliated company.

If the Minister fails to respond within 60 days of receiving the request for transfer, consent is considered to have been granted.

The assignee is bound by all terms and conditions of the agreement or license.

A specific form must be used when applying for an assignment or transfer.

Ignoring Guyana

Neither Woods nor Wirth made any reference to the Guyana legislation or the Agreement. But now that the matter is brought to its attention, it would be interesting to see how Guyana’s government will address the matter on which it has so far been totally silent. The Government should use this opportunity to assert our national interest, a successful outcome of which could have significant benefits for the country’s economy and its ability to benefit from its substantial oil reserves on behalf of the people of Guyana. As managers and  trustees of the people’s patrimony, the Government needs to get off its knees in supplication to the oil colonialists and function as the law states, “that the property of petroleum existing in its natural condition in strata in the national territory is vested in the State.” And in keeping with the government’s overriding duty  to the people of Guyana.

The law and the Agreement vest in the Minister responsible for petroleum a decisive role in the matter. He can refuse approval for the transfer of Hess’ interest to Chevron, which could potentially result in the interest reverting to the Guyanese government. On the grounds that the transfer of Hess’ interest to Chevron is contrary to the interests of Guyana, he could refuse to grant approval.

Woods insists, without proof – other than that Exxon wrote the JOA – that under the JOA, the transfer is subject to the preemptive rights of Exxon and CNOOC. Whether or not Chevron’s acquisition of Hess violates such rights as may exist, once the JOA is found to be inconsistent with the Petroleum Agreement and with Guyanese laws, the Minister has sufficient grounds to refuse approval for the transfer. There is a catch. If an application has been made to the Minister, he must respond in sixty days, failing which consent is deemed to have been given. Therefore, if the Minister wishes to refuse approval, he will need to do so within the stipulated time. The question is whether any application has been made to the Minister. It is frightening to contemplate that an application might have already been made and that the Minister has done his usual nothing, then we “caak duck.” 

In the event that the Minister refuses to grant approval and the refusal is found to be in accordance with Guyanese laws and the Petroleum Agreement, Hess’ 30% interest ought to revert to Guyana. It is not without legal significance that each of the three oil companies is a separate contractor, and in any case, a share participation is a capital and not an operating issue. It seems clear that if the Government gives to Hess a licence, it is not Hess’ to pass on to whomsoever it will. It should pass it back to the Government. The Agreement defines “contractor” as the three named companies and their “permitted assignees.” (Emphasis added).

The Government’s starting gambit should be refusal and a statement that it will buy out Hess’ interest, paying for it out of future profit oil. It is not inconceivable that Exxon and CNOOC would be presumptuous enough to tell the Government of a sovereign state that it cannot take a stake in its own resources. Exxon is known to walk over developing countries.

Sadly, relevant as they are, the real issue is not about Exxon, CNOOC or Hess/Chevron but whether the Government has the courage, the rectitude and the independence to show the oil companies that at the end of the day, the resources belong to Guyana and its Government will not allow itself to be excluded or pushed around. Not that this is going to be easy, and we all know about the litigious nature and instinct of oil companies. Let us be as prepared to protect and regain something of Guyana’s patrimony.

    

Questions for the confident Alistair Routledge, Exxon Guyana’s President

Introduction

During the recent Oil and Gas conference in Guyana, Mr. Stephen Sakur, renowned BBC journalist, did a brief interview with Exxon Guyana’s President Alistair Routledge about its operations in Guyana. Unfortunately, the limited nature of the engagement did not allow Sakur the high standard which viewers across the world associate with his flagship programme Hard Talk.

Mr. Routledge was his usual self, confident of the obsequious support of Guyana political leaders. While he has consistently demonstrated a preference for foreign journalists, soft questions locally and false billboards, he would do Exxon a world of good and remove some of the more serious suspicions and accusations against them, if he could provide direct responses to the following.

1. Shell had paid Exxon for two farms-in in the Stabroek Block, for a total of 50% interest. Can Mr Routledge say how much was paid by Shell and whether the money was credited to the accounts of the Guyana operations?
2. Can he also state for the edification of Guyanese, how much Hess and CNOOC paid to Exxon for their 55% share in the Stabroek Block and whether those sums were credited to the accounts of the Guyana operations?
3. The audited financial statements of these three oil companies (Exxon, Hess and CNOOC) at 31 December 2015 showed a total expenditure of US$368 million, while the companies claimed US$460 million as pre-contract costs incurred up to that date. Would Mr. Routledge present to the Guyanese public a reconciliation of this difference?
4. The Companies Act of Guyana only allows an external company to hold an interest in land with the approval of the President. Would Mr Routledge identify the President who granted that approval to lease land in Ogle?
5. Under its lease from the Government of Guyana, Ogle Airport Inc is permitted to sub-lease land only for narrowly defined activities. Can Mr. Routledge identify the government official who authorised the exemption from this requirement to allow for the construction of an Administrative Office, and whatever else?
6. Whether Exxon and its partners obtained from the Government approval of their joint operating agreement, the date of such approval and the Minister who granted that approval?
7. Whether the purported takeover of Hess by Chevron constitutes an assignment by Hess to Chevron for purposes of Article 25 of the Petroleum Agreement for which approval of the Minister is required?
8. Particulars of annual tax credits claimed by Exxon in the USA in respect of its Guyana operations and provide evidence of the GRA certificates of taxes paid, used to claim tax credits.
9. Would Mr. Routledge state whether he considers a receipt for taxes not paid by Exxon not only raises legal and ethical questions but violates the OECD/G20 Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting which requires large companies to pay a 15% effective minimum tax rate?
10. The Laws of Guyana only allow the petroleum minister to grant to any company a single petroleum agreement. Would Mr Routledge state the statutory basis for a second agreement over the same area even before the first Agreement had expired?
11. Can he identify for Guyanese the provision in the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act the authority for a Bridging Deed and state the name of the Government official with which Exxon negotiated such a deed?
12. Can he state the role of Sir Shridath Ramphal as Escrow Agent under the Bridging Deed and whether he (Sir Shridath) was retained and paid by Exxon or the Government of Guyana, and to meet EITI disclosure requirements, how much he was paid?
13. Is it correct that US$15 Mn. of the “signing bonus” of US$18 million was intended to take the legal case against Venezuela to the International Court of Justice, the success of which would be a major benefit to Exxon?
14. Would he agree that it is a complete misnomer to describe the US$18 Mn. as a signing bonus?
15. There are four types of expenditure provided for under the Petroleum Agreement. Can he provide details of any expenditure under the categories “Costs recoverable only with Approval of the Minister” and Costs “recoverable subject to the approval by Minister” over the past four years?
16. Would he provide a statement of the annual costs of petroleum deducted from Gross Revenue for purposes of royalty payment to Guyana under Article 15.6 of the Agreement?
17. And further, confirmation that such costs are also not deducted as operating expenses.
18. Would he provide an estimate of how much Guyana has lost annually in Profit Oil since 2020 in the absence of ring-fencing?
19. Whether Exxon accepts that the Government of Guyana has the power to set conditions on the granting of a Production Licence, including ring-fencing?
20. Has the Coalition Government or the current Government formally raised with Exxon the question of ring fencing?
21. Former petroleum minister Raphael Trotman wrote in his book Destiny to Prosperity that a named Exxon official was involved in the Cabinet Paper for the 2016 agreement. Would Mr Routledge confirm the name of that person as Mr. Brooke Harris?
22. Has Mr. Routledge read the Clyde & Company report into the 2016 Agreement, and does he have any disagreement with the facts set out therein, including the role of Mr. Harris?
23. Whether he as the President of Exxon had confirmed that Mr Bobby Gossai had the necessary authority to clear US$211 Mn. of US$214 Mn. not supported by evidence provided to the auditors?
24. Has Exxon agreed to pay the Government 50% of the US$214 million which was therefore wrongly claimed, and if not, why not?
25. Would Mr. Routledge confirm that the ministerial audit and the Guyana Revenue Authority audit for tax purposes are two separate and distinct audits?
26. Can Mr. Mr. Routledge state the quantity of proven petroleum reserves of the Stabroek Block as at the end of February 2024.
27. Mr. Routledge must be aware that Mr. Raphael Trotman, former Natural Resources Minister has indicated that he would give evidence in any inquiry into the 2016 Agreement. Would Exxon participate in any Commission of inquiry established by this government to look into the circumstances leading to the 2016 agreement?
28. Does Exxon consider that the exploration and production activities in the Stabroek Block harmful to the environment and a breach of the Paris Accord? If yes, what measures are in place to mitigate such effects?
29. What is the estimated total cost of the gas-to-shore project and is any cost being charged against Oil Revenue?
30. Would the procedures and the valuation of private property compulsorily acquired for the project comparable to how eminent domain operates in the United States of America?

Conclusion

Mr. Routledge is aware that Exxon will be the dominant player in Guyana for the next forty years or more and is no doubt concerned about the negative image associated with the company and its operations. It is in the interest of Guyanese to have answers to burning questions about the 2016 Contract, the company’s operations and the unconscionable situation of a country with a high poverty rate paying the taxes of one of the world’s top companies. He must be aware too that Guyanese have a right to have their questions and concerns addressed, by those who are enjoying the benefits of the people’s patrimony. It cannot be too much to ask a major beneficiary of that patrimony to provide responses that will allay the fears of the people.

A royal storm

A letter by Professor Kenrick Hunte appearing in the press earlier this week generated a wave of conversation across the society. Essentially, the Professor claimed that Guyana has been receiving Royalty of about a quarter of the 2% to which it is entitled under the 2016 Petroleum Agreement. Rather unusually, Mr. Elson Low of the PNC -R, Dominic Gaskin, former member of the Coalition Cabinet f the AFC and Vice President Jagdeo found common ground in rejecting Hunte. Low grounded his view on official pronouncements from the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Guyana reports, claiming that the number of lifts – the division point for sharing profit oil – being commensurate with a 2% royalty and not 0.5%. Gaskin, who was one of Granger’s Quintet + 1 on oil and gas, was positive that “there’s a perfectly logical explanation for these seemingly contradictory figures”, referring to Hunte’s and the Government’s.

The Vice President was even more expansive. His words are too precious and ordained to invite reported speech, or a summary. This is how he rebutted Hunte. “Royalty is calculated on production minus, so total crude production minus the crude used in the operations for transport and on the FPSOs (Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessels). In Guyana’s case, the FPSOs are operated by gas, so there is no deduction whatsoever, so royalty is calculated on the basis of total production and total sales. There is no deduction whatsoever. Every month, they have to confirm what the average price would be, the weighted average, and the [government] gives approval for that”.

Clearly, he does not know what the government does, if anything in relation to royalty, or indeed to anything else.

It does not appear that the VP has ever bothered to read the 2016 Agreement, let alone its reference to the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act and its definition of “petroleum”. In fact, the very first item in the definition of “petroleum” is this: “any naturally occurring hydrocarbons, whether in a gaseous liquid or solid-state”. Does the country’s petroleum czar not know that billions are charged to operations annually for supplies to the oil companies by at least one oil distributor? His answer was not only completely wrong, but shockingly misinformed, misleading and a total misrepresentation of reality. If this is Jagdeo’s knowledge of the petroleum sector, then President Ali has to step in, lest things get worse than they are.

Now back to Hunte.

His professorial approach with its mathematical formula involving Sugar and Timber Exports and a mystique of equations was probably beyond the level of quite a few Guyanese and may have led to the sensationalizing in some quarters. I took a different route and did find numbers that require real explanations, in the absence of which Hunte’s findings rather than his methodology have to be taken seriously. Here is what the Agreement prescribes about “royalties”.

‘The Contractor shall pay, at the Government’s election either in cash based on the value of the relevant Petroleum as calculated pursuant to Article 13 or in kind, a royalty of two percent (2%) of all Petroleum produced and sold, less the quantities of Petroleum used for fuel or transportation in Petroleum Operations, from all production licenses subject to this Agreement.”

Even the most diligent journalist or forensic investigator cannot compute the royalty payable to Government in the absence of the cost of Petroleum used for fuel or transportation in Petroleum Operations. There is no real solace in the fact that the effect on royalty is 2% of that total. The other problem is that we will not know the value of petroleum sold by Exxon, Hess and CNOOC until their 2023 numbers are released in the form of audited financial statements within the next couple of months. To reduce the margin of error therefore, I have used just 2022 data from the financial statements of the three companies, plus the proceeds from sale of Government share of profit oil and apply to that total, a 2% for royalty. 

The results of that exercise are represented in the Table below showing the Oil Companies’ Revenue and Royalty due and received by the Government over the three years 2020-2022.

What is apparent is that there is indeed some US$73.8 Mn. of royalties unaccounted for and one can speculate whether this is all to do with the implausible absence of the cost of fuel used in production or transportation, or in the difference in the accounting methodology used – accrual in the case of the oil companies and cash basis in the case of the NRF. Yes, the numbers are lower than Hunte’s, but he extrapolated to the end of 2023 when production, and therefore royalty soared. His numbers ought not to be discounted or dismissed.

Conclusion

I repeat again, unless President Ali puts a Petroleum Commission in place, Guyana’s incompetence in oil and gas will continue to be exploited at the national expense. He has to act in the national interest rather than as if he is afraid of or beholden to Jagdeo. We must not forget as well that hundreds of thousands of US Dollars were spent on an audit. Did their report, which is shrouded in mystery and secrecy, touch on royalty and profit oil? Only a Petroleum Commission can save us from this tragic farce.