Category: The Road to First Oil

Every man, woman and child must become oil minded (Part 170)

Introduction

This column takes up from last week’s discussion on the September 23 letter from US Senators Whitehouse, Van Hollen and Merkley to Exxon’s Chairman, Darren Woods on tax credits claimed in his company’s tax returns in the USA. As a reminder, that letter arose out of some sterling efforts and representation by OGGN, a US NGO formed to promote a better deal for Guyana from the Stabroek Block. In their letter, the senators requested that Woods, by October 23, show whether Exxon has in fact paid income taxes in Guyana under the 2016 Agreement.

I have since reviewed Hess’ Standard Disclosure 4 filed in the USA. In it, Hess states:

“A portion of gross production from the Stabroek Block, separate from the joint venture partners’ cost recovery and profit share entitlement, is used to satisfy the joint venture partners’ income tax liability. Delivery of this production to the government in satisfaction of the joint venture partners’ income tax liability is administered by ExxonMobil Guyana Ltd. as the operator and therefore is not included in this report as a payment.”

That is not only gibberish. It is false and deliberately so. Hess and its accountants know how article 15.4 and 15.5 of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement are worded. Column 169 set out the process in a narrative chart. 

But now comes Exxon itself. On September 26 Exxon filed its own Form SD with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. And there, in black and white, Exxon reports for Guyana in 2024 under a column Taxes US1,236.2 Mn.  Beneath the table appears Exxon’s explanatory note:

“Production entitlement of 28,073,185 BBLs is valued at the realization price issued in the press by the Ministry of Natural Resources offset by EMNI Taxes.”

The message which Exxon sought to convey is that it paid US$1,236 Mn in taxes to the Guyana Revenue Authority in 2024. It is public knowledge that no such money was taken out from the NRF and that there is no payment of that amount into the GRA/Consolidated Fund. This shifts the onus to the GRA and the Minister of Natural Resources who is required by the Agreement to pay the money to the GRA on behalf of the Exxon. Neither the Government, the Minister of Natural Resources nor government appointee Charles Ramson Snr., Commissioner of Information, has provided any information that could settle this issue.

Provide the proof

If the money was actually paid, Guyana should be able to produce proof instantly. But if not, there seems to be a grand conspiracy in which Exxon has made a misleading, or false statement in a statutory SEC filing. Maybe OGGN should take this matter one step further: Make a complaint to the SEC for false or misleading information. 

To sum up then, there is not one but three alternative facts, a feat which not even Kellyanne Conway could achieve. Here they are:

Hess, with its incoherent, mythical talk of gross production and operator administration.

Exxon, with its “Taxes” column showing US$1,236 Mn.

The Government of Guyana, with its silence over certificates issued in its name for money never received.

Gibberish at Hess’ level in a public document signed by an official cannot be dismissed as ignorance. It is distortion. A billion-dollar column presented to the SEC by Exxon cannot be brushed aside. The non-description other than “Taxes” is no oversight. It is deliberate ambiguity designed to mislead.

Silence is not an option for Guyana when there is a formal request under the Access to Information Act.  It constitutes concealment, evasion in public office and a breach of a statutory duty.

Don’t cry for Exxon

The senators have given Exxon one month to provide the information. They also showed both prescience and frankness in their letter to Darren Woods. We should, however, manage our expectations. Three senators writing on their own, however senior, do not possess the authority of a Senate committee. Their letter to Darren Woods is not a subpoena. Exxon is therefore not legally compelled to respond in the way it would be to a congressional committee. But that does not mean the letter is without weight. Failure by Exxon to respond would entitle the senators to draw their own conclusions – and to say publicly that the company cannot produce proof of payments.

Hope for Guyana

Civil society in Guyana needs to take the lead from OGGN. Its members have no real skin in the game. We have seen in President Ali’s statement on the troubling foreign exchange situation in Guyana. If he reflects for one minute only, he will realise that his failure to “review and renegotiate” is a major cause of that situation.

 We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) and its leader Azruddin Mohamed can take the example of the three senators. They can play a leading role and earn further success in addressing what is the most significant economic issue facing Guyana. This is not a cause from which patriotic Guyanese should shirk.

Conclusion

The Senators have asked for proof. Hess has provided gibberish. Exxon has provided a column.  Guyana has provided silence. On October 23, Darren Woods must answer. And when he does, there will be two simple questions for Guyana: Were receipts issued by the GRA? And who issued the certificates to Exxon and Hess?

Every Man, Woman and Child must become oil minded – Column 168

Introduction

Petroleum and gas and supporting services make up 94% of the Mining and Quarrying sector which in turn makes up 70% of Guyana’s economy. Since 2021, it has been primarily responsible for the spectacular growth that has earned Guyana the distinction of fastest growing economy in the world. Money from the oil fund (NRF) makes up exactly 50% of current revenues in 2025. It is acknowledged as the product of the most lopsided oil contract for the past several decades, measured by what the Government gets out of the sector compared with the blessings to the oil companies. All this while the private sector has a minimum wage of $60,000 per month, businesses complain about workers and foreign exchange and the poor complain about the cost of living.  

Naturally, the Government wants to divert attention from its management of the sector and has pushed the opposition into arguing how the miniature cake is to be shared rather than how to fight for a bigger cake. It is an area on which the ruling party ought to be most vulnerable although some might argue that corruption is mightily serious.

Come Monday September 1, as voters go to the polls, they may not be aware that the sector offers the greatest opportunity to truly transform Guyana. This is perhaps the last best chance to have some say on whether Guyana should re-assert its sovereignty rights and power to exercise control over our vast petroleum resources. That choice is not limited to oil but to the direction of the nation. If left unchallenged, the PPP’s model of petroleum sector administration will be no better than its administration of GuySuCo. Undisturbed, this model will define the country’s future for decades. And that is why the coming elections matter so deeply.

Trusting Ali and Jagdeo

We all recall how much we trusted Irfaan Ali and Bharrat Jagdeo when they told us five years ago that they would review and renegotiate the 2016 Agreement as soon as they got back into power. The echo of their sounds had hardly receded before being replaced by the mantra “sanctity of contract”, national interest replaced by Exxon’s interest. 

The response to every criticism, suggestion or recommendation is met with the same response, as though repetition could transform political deception into some constitutional principle. The PPP try to sell its 2021 Petroleum Activities Act as an antidote, without ever mentioning that the 2021 Act does not apply to the 2016 Agreement.

Therefore, the iniquities remain, even if the electorate is led to believe the problem has been solved. With every passing day, every election cycle, every success at the polls or in the courts, the chance of change becomes less. Every act of theirs, and of the Ministry of Natural Resources, is designed to favour Exxon and its partners while the people go after the crumbs. 

The cost of the about turn

It is easier to see investments in roads, bridges, schools and physical, visible infrastructure than it is to see poverty and hardships. Only those who feel it know it. We need to do so much more than have large swathes of our population lament their state of poverty. A working-class government that truly cares would see it as a primary duty to say that we will not accept 14% for our depletable resources. It is the moral equivalent of the theft of our sovereignty. And the PPP/C is a willing accomplice. 

Its capitulation to Exxon manifests in concrete actions that undermine Guyana’s sovereignty: allowing Exxon to build its Ogle headquarters without the required Presidential license for foreign land acquisition, issuing production licenses without any conditions, and defending an overly broad stability clause that freezes Guyana’s laws until 2056 rather than utilising the agreement’s own renegotiation provisions, as the previous Coalition government successfully did with royalty rates. Most troubling is the government’s refusal to establish an independent Petroleum Commission, leaving critical oversight in the hands of the same politicians who have betrayed our trust.  

The last, best chance

The truth is simple: once these elections are done, the prospects for revisiting the 2016 Agreement will vanish. With each year, the unfairness will harden, and the legal and financial entanglements will grow more difficult to unwind.

That is why these elections must be understood as the last, best chance for Guyanese to demand action. A new mandate is the only leverage strong enough to force a government to put sovereignty above sanctity – and to borrow from Sir Jock Campbell- the people before Exxon’s profits.

Conclusion

This election is not an ordinary contest of parties and personalities. It is a referendum on the PPP’s management of the sector. This column argues that more than even oil, but because of it, sovereignty itself is on the ballot.

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 167

Introduction

The electorate in 2020 punished APNU+AFC for the lopsided 2016 Petroleum Agreement, revealed to the public only long after it had been signed in June 2016. Civil society was relentless, and the Ali–Jagdeo ticket was brutal and emphatic. They pledged to review and renegotiate the Agreement. They would establish an independent Petroleum Commission. They promised better contract administration.

Five years later, the debate has come full circle. This column looks specifically at the oil and gas sections of the manifestos of the PPP/C, APNU, AFC, WIN, and the Forward Guyana Movement, now offered up to the public. The focus is on what each party promises, what has been delivered, and which proposals stand up to scrutiny.

PPP/C: Spin Versus Reality

The PPP/C takes a dual approach. A review, nay boast of its achievements and a promise of what is yet to come. So, it highlights its legislative action: a new 2021 Natural Resource Fund Act, the 2023 Petroleum Activities Act to replace the age-old Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, and a new model Production Sharing Agreement with less outrageous fiscal terms for future blocks. It boasts about US$3.1 billion in the NRF which is in fact overstated by the amount of taxes it has paid on behalf of the oil companies but which it refuses to disclose. Boasts about 1,000 local firms registered under the Local Content Act which it promised to revise since 2023 but did not. Then it conflates these with stalled progress on the Wales Gas-to-Energy project which is being done without a feasibility study or a disclosed cost.

Nowhere does the manifesto admit that none of these touch the 2016 deal that lies at the heart of the controversy. The government promised renegotiation in 2020 but never tried. Contract administration has been poor: no audit completed on time, the first audit mishandled, and relinquishment deadlines allowed to drift. The Petroleum Commission, once sold as a centrepiece of independent oversight, has been quietly abandoned.

Even the NRF reform was shallow. Transfers are set by a simplistic formula based on percentages of the fund’s balance, ensuring political control rather than professional management. What the PPP/C calls reform is, in truth, centralisation of power in the hands of politicians.

It faces a huge trust deficit to explain the reality that its government campaigned as a reformer but governed as a dormouse and apologist.

APNU: Renegotiation and Fiscal Rules

APNU overlooks its primary role in the 2016 Agreement and has been annoyingly ambivalent about the Agreement and the PPP/C’s management of the oil sector for five years.

If we can take it at its word, it will “get a better deal within two years.” It proposes an autonomous Petroleum Commission, professional advisory teams, fiscal rules to discipline savings and spending, and publication of all contracts.

This is right in principle. Guyana cannot rely on future agreements alone while the Stabroek PSA drains the treasury. Codified fiscal rules would add stability and protect future generations. The challenge, however, is feasibility. Exxon is unlikely to accept changes easily, and legal routes are narrow. APNU may risk overpromising, but it at least faces the reality of the 2016 deal and couples renegotiation with stronger institutions.

AFC: Oversight and Environment First

Ironically, the AFC, whose top leader Raphael Trotman signed the 2016 Agreement and whose current leader and presidential candidate is a key professional service provider to the oil companies, offers the most detailed timetable. Within 30 days it would initiate renegotiation; within 60 days establish a Petroleum Commission. It pledges to enforce ring-fencing, ban routine flaring and produced-water dumping, and require full liability insurance for spills. It also promises quarterly NRF reporting with civil society oversight.

The manifesto’s strength is its seriousness about oversight and environment. By focusing on insurance and liability, it addresses the gravest risk – that a spill could cripple the country. Its emphasis on transparency and civil society participation aligns with international best practice.

The weakness is ambition. Attempting renegotiation, regulatory reform, and NRF overhaul simultaneously may overwhelm capacity. Yet of all the manifestos, the AFC’s is the most technically robust and grounded in the mechanics of sound petroleum management.

These provisions bear the unmistakable hand of Dr. Vince Adams, arguably the most accomplished Guyanese petroleum environment specialist.  

WIN: Transparency and Renewables

While not the most technically sound or complete set of policy proposals, WIN relies on its appeal and offers a people-centred focus. It promises full publication of all extractive contracts, strict ring-fencing, and transparent monitoring of oil revenues. More strikingly, it proposes a bold national wind and solar programme to complement gas-to-shore, reduce tariffs by up to 70%, and end chronic blackouts.

WIN’s vision and its perceived authenticity seem to resonate with the ordinary voters. Households care as much about electricity bills and reliability as they do about royalty rates. Tying petroleum wealth to cheaper, cleaner power connects oil policy directly to daily life. The weakness is feasibility — financing and executing such an ambitious renewable rollout will be difficult. Still, WIN adds a valuable emphasis on sustainability and transparency.

Forward Guyana Movement: Linking Oil to Governance

The Forward Guyana Movement situates oil inside a broader governance reset: shared power, zero tolerance for corruption, audited NRF accounts, and movement toward a National Oil Company. It emphasises that without tackling corruption and exclusion, no resource management system will succeed.

This perspective is valid. Oil cannot be insulated from Guyana’s wider governance challenges. The weakness is that the manifesto offers fewer technical details compared with the AFC or WIN. But its central message – that petroleum governance is an offshoot of political governance – is important.

Conclusion: Rating the Promises

My assessment is that the AFC’s proposals come out tops, followed by the APNU, WIN and FGM with the PPP/C’s suffering from a betrayal of trust and a promise of more of the same.

 The electorate’s decision will determine whether Guyana continues with political control dressed up as reform, or whether it begins the hard work of building professional institutions and securing a fairer share of its oil wealth.

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 167

Introduction

The electorate in 2020 punished APNU+AFC for the lopsided 2016 Petroleum Agreement, revealed to the public only long after it had been signed in June 2016. Civil society was relentless, and the Ali–Jagdeo ticket was brutal and emphatic. They pledged to review and renegotiate the Agreement. They would establish an independent Petroleum Commission. They promised better contract administration.

Five years later, the debate has come full circle. This column looks specifically at the oil and gas sections of the manifestos of the PPP/C, APNU, AFC, WIN, and the Forward Guyana Movement, now offered up to the public. The focus is on what each party promises, what has been delivered, and which proposals stand up to scrutiny.

PPP/C: Spin Versus Reality

The PPP/C takes a dual approach. A review, nay boast of its achievements and a promise of what is yet to come. So, it highlights its legislative action: a new 2021 Natural Resource Fund Act, the 2023 Petroleum Activities Act to replace the age-old Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, and a new model Production Sharing Agreement with less outrageous fiscal terms for future blocks. It boasts about US$3.1 billion in the NRF which is in fact overstated by the amount of taxes it has paid on behalf of the oil companies but which it refuses to disclose. Boasts about 1,000 local firms registered under the Local Content Act which it promised to revise since 2023 but did not. Then it conflates these with stalled progress on the Wales Gas-to-Energy project which is being done without a feasibility study or a disclosed cost.

Nowhere does the manifesto admit that none of these touch the 2016 deal that lies at the heart of the controversy. The government promised renegotiation in 2020 but never tried. Contract administration has been poor: no audit completed on time, the first audit mishandled, and relinquishment deadlines allowed to drift. The Petroleum Commission, once sold as a centrepiece of independent oversight, has been quietly abandoned.

Even the NRF reform was shallow. Transfers are set by a simplistic formula based on percentages of the fund’s balance, ensuring political control rather than professional management. What the PPP/C calls reform is, in truth, centralisation of power in the hands of politicians.

It faces a huge trust deficit to explain the reality that its government campaigned as a reformer but governed as a dormouse and apologist.

APNU: Renegotiation and Fiscal Rules

APNU overlooks its primary role in the 2016 Agreement and has been annoyingly ambivalent about the Agreement and the PPP/C’s management of the oil sector for five years.

If we can take it at its word, it will “get a better deal within two years.” It proposes an autonomous Petroleum Commission, professional advisory teams, fiscal rules to discipline savings and spending, and publication of all contracts.

This is right in principle. Guyana cannot rely on future agreements alone while the Stabroek PSA drains the treasury. Codified fiscal rules would add stability and protect future generations. The challenge, however, is feasibility. Exxon is unlikely to accept changes easily, and legal routes are narrow. APNU may risk overpromising, but it at least faces the reality of the 2016 deal and couples renegotiation with stronger institutions.

AFC: Oversight and Environment First

Ironically, the AFC, whose top leader Raphael Trotman signed the 2016 Agreement and whose current leader and presidential candidate is a key professional service provider to the oil companies, offers the most detailed timetable. Within 30 days it would initiate renegotiation; within 60 days establish a Petroleum Commission. It pledges to enforce ring-fencing, ban routine flaring and produced-water dumping, and require full liability insurance for spills. It also promises quarterly NRF reporting with civil society oversight.

The manifesto’s strength is its seriousness about oversight and environment. By focusing on insurance and liability, it addresses the gravest risk – that a spill could cripple the country. Its emphasis on transparency and civil society participation aligns with international best practice.

The weakness is ambition. Attempting renegotiation, regulatory reform, and NRF overhaul simultaneously may overwhelm capacity. Yet of all the manifestos, the AFC’s is the most technically robust and grounded in the mechanics of sound petroleum management.

These provisions bear the unmistakable hand of Dr. Vince Adams, arguably the most accomplished Guyanese petroleum environment specialist.  

WIN: Transparency and Renewables

While not the most technically sound or complete set of policy proposals, WIN relies on its appeal and offers a people-centred focus. It promises full publication of all extractive contracts, strict ring-fencing, and transparent monitoring of oil revenues. More strikingly, it proposes a bold national wind and solar programme to complement gas-to-shore, reduce tariffs by up to 70%, and end chronic blackouts.

WIN’s vision and its perceived authenticity seem to resonate with the ordinary voters. Households care as much about electricity bills and reliability as they do about royalty rates. Tying petroleum wealth to cheaper, cleaner power connects oil policy directly to daily life. The weakness is feasibility — financing and executing such an ambitious renewable rollout will be difficult. Still, WIN adds a valuable emphasis on sustainability and transparency.

Forward Guyana Movement: Linking Oil to Governance

The Forward Guyana Movement situates oil inside a broader governance reset: shared power, zero tolerance for corruption, audited NRF accounts, and movement toward a National Oil Company. It emphasises that without tackling corruption and exclusion, no resource management system will succeed.

This perspective is valid. Oil cannot be insulated from Guyana’s wider governance challenges. The weakness is that the manifesto offers fewer technical details compared with the AFC or WIN. But its central message – that petroleum governance is an offshoot of political governance – is important.

Conclusion: Rating the Promises

My assessment is that the AFC’s proposals come out tops, followed by the APNU, WIN and FGM with the PPP/C’s suffering from a betrayal of trust and a promise of more of the same.

 The electorate’s decision will determine whether Guyana continues with political control dressed up as reform, or whether it begins the hard work of building professional institutions and securing a fairer share of its oil wealth.

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana must become oil-minded – Column 166

Today’s column compares the role of oil and the 2016 Petroleum Agreement in the 2025 election campaign and in 2020, the first year of oil production. Then Bharrat Jagdeo and Irfaan Ali were seeking to unseat the APNU + AFC Coalition. The Agreement was released to the public on 28 December 2017, but its terms were hotly debated and Jagdeo was violently opposed to every aspect about the contract.

Critics could hammer its poor terms and secrecy, link it to Raphael Trotman’s signature, and fold it into a wider indictment: APNU+AFC had lost a no-confidence motion in December 2018, refused to call elections on time, and then – when elections were finally held – spent five months trying to rig the results. With its 2% royalty, sweeping tax exemptions, lack of ring-fencing, and a year of secrecy before disclosure, it was the PPP/C’s sharpest weapon against the APNU+AFC coalition.

In that climate, the oil contract symbolised incompetence, impunity, and contempt for the rule of law. It was political dynamite.

Today, the deal is intact, citizens’ worst fears about the lopsided nature of the Agreement have been proved right. Yet, the political fire is gone – not because the problems have been resolved, but because the ground shifted.

A changed landscape in 2025

Production has more than quadrupled. Prices have stayed steady, revenues have kept flowing, and the budget is now about four times 2020’s size. The PPP/C has used this wealth not to fix the deal, but to bury it under high-visibility spending, ribbon-cuttings, and cash grants with more to come. For many households, a grant feels more important than a royalty clause. Attention has shifted from how the deal was made to how the windfall is distributed.

The opposition is weakened. APNU+AFC cannot credibly attack its own agreement. The scars of the no-confidence saga and the 2020 electoral impasse remain, and leadership changes have not restored trust.

More significantly and inexplicably, the PPP/C changed its tune. In opposition it promised “review and renegotiate.” In government it has refused to release the report on how the deal was signed, avoided investigating Trotman, kept secret the financing of billions in tax concessions, completed no audits of cost claims, stalled on renegotiation, and quietly channeled oil revenues into the much-delayed, over-budget gas-to-energy project. Its language now matches APNU+AFC’s old line: “sanctity of contract” and the Venezuela bogey.  Then of course, the Vice President is the Petroleum Commission.

Several forces have removed the oil contract from Guyana’s political agenda. Direct cash handouts have proven more politically effective than contract debates. When voters receive immediate benefits, arguments about royalty rates lose both urgency and meaning. For many, the fear of antagonising Exxon – and by extension, the Trump administration – has become a new political reality. With Trump’s return to power and his pro-business stance, challenging American oil interests may seem  riskier than defending sovereignty.

The National Assembly has avoided discussion of the petroleum agreement. Neither party shows willingness to reopen the contract, quarantining the issue from debate. Government influence over media has shifted coverage toward positive messaging while marginalizing critics. The transformation has been so complete that even Kaieteur News, once the loudest critic, lost a leading anti-contract journalist to the camp of its defenders.

Years of technical arguments with little change have exhausted commentators and the public. The complexity of petroleum economics has proven difficult to sustain politically. The absence of disasters has weakened reform arguments. Without oil spills, critics’ warnings remain theoretical, removing catalysts for concern.

Broader democratic concerns have overshadowed contract issues. Questions about governance have drawn energy away from petroleum debates toward institutional health. Venezuela’s territorial claims have made ExxonMobil’s presence geopolitically valuable. Challenging the company is seen as undermining security, increasing threats to our territoriality.

With this retreat, Exxon may feel that it has taken ownership of Guyana. 

The consequences of silence

But the PPP/C is as much an asset to and a friend of Exxon as the APNU +AFC has been. Its record on oil governance is no better than APNU+AFC’s: no reform of a widely criticised contract, no completed audits, no accountability for its signing, no delivery of an independent petroleum commission; secrecy over vast tax credits that would wipe out the Natural Resource Fund if properly accounted for. And the control of every aspect of the largest sector of the economy in the grip of one man, in a mutual pact with Exxon.

Each passing year reinforces the belief that nothing can and will be changed. An agreement condemned in 2020 that remains unchanged in 2025 becomes more entrenched with each passing year. And that does not escape the wily eyes of Exxon.

Yet, the fundamental issues remain as they were in 2020. Oil belongs to the people; so do the revenues. Being “oil-minded” does not mean memorising production data – it means looking beyond today’s grants to securing Guyana’s sovereignty and tomorrow’s sustainability. It means insisting on transparency, audits, and investments that outlast the oil era: education, health, infrastructure, and diversification.

Conclusion

The 2016 Petroleum Agreement has not faded because it is no longer an issue. It has lost its sharpness because of the duplicity and the about face of the PPP/C. It has been buried by money, messaging, a weakened opposition, parliamentary silence, media influence, fatigue, democratic erosion, geopolitics, growing evidence of pervasive corruption, and the threats to our democracy.

In 2020, it was a sword. In 2025, neither main party wants to touch it. That is exactly why the people must. Every year of silence makes Exxon’s position more unshakeable and Guyana’s leverage weaker. The window for fair terms is closing with each passing barrel. We must remain oil minded.