Category: The Road to First Oil

From 12.5% to nearly 40% – How long can the good times last? Part II of II (but see note)

Part I welcomed President Irfaan Ali’s announcement that Guyana’s entitlement from the Stabroek Block production has risen from 12.5% to approximately 39.8%. That percentage reflects mainly the recovery of accumulated exploration and development costs: as less production is required as cost oil, more becomes profit oil. The value of Guyana’s increased share has been magnified by rising production and oil prices, driven in part by geopolitical events including the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, more recently, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, much of the Stabroek Block remains unexplored.

The Stabroek Block remains a developing petroleum province, with further exploration and development bringing new recoverable expenditure. New discoveries are of course welcome, but the expenditure is ultimately recovered from production. If costs rise sufficiently, more oil will be required for cost recovery, reducing profit oil and Guyana’s share. The movement from 12.5% to nearly 40% should therefore not be regarded as permanent.

ExxonMobil’s claim of force majeure over acreage affected by Venezuela’s territorial claim adds another dimension. Any extension of the exploration period postpones relinquishment and potentially allows additional exploration and development expenditure to enter the cost-recovery pool. Government should disclose the acreage and obligations affected, the period of any extension and its consequences for relinquishment. Time and acreage in Stabroek have considerable value and cannot be treated simply as matters between the Government and ExxonMobil – still less as matters for ExxonMobil alone.

The other major variable is oil price. Guyana is enjoying both a much larger share of production and sharply higher prices following the war involving the United States, Israel and Iran. At the illustrative US$90 used in Part I, Guyana’s 41.8%, including the 2% royalty, is worth US$37.62 per barrel. At US$70 the same percentage produces US$29.26 and at US$60, US$25.08. At current production levels, the difference quickly runs into billions of US dollars. The percentage has not changed, but the value of what Guyana receives certainly has.

The Bank of Guyana’s figures put the revenue surge in perspective, though they do not establish the 39.8% share. For the first six months of 2026, petroleum receipts into the Natural Resource Fund were approximately G$378 billion, compared with G$224.7 billion for the same period in 2025 – a rise of about 68%. Profit-oil receipts rose by approximately 76%. These remarkable numbers reinforce the need for Government to publish the calculations and production data behind the announced 39.8%.

Peace in Ukraine and with Iran, whenever it comes, could remove a substantial part of the current price windfall. Equally, increased recoverable exploration and development expenditure could reduce Guyana’s percentage even if oil prices remain high. Guyana’s extraordinary fortune is that both variables are presently working in its favour: cost recovery has fallen substantially while oil prices have risen sharply. Neither can be assumed to continue indefinitely.

None of this results from any change in the 2016 Petroleum Agreement. The royalty remains 2%; profit oil continues to be divided equally; and the cost-recovery, tax and stabilisation provisions remain. What has changed is the economics of the Stabroek Block. Petroleum companies are entitled to returns commensurate with the risks they undertake, and exploration can undoubtedly result in enormous losses, but that argument carries considerably less weight today than it did in 2016.

The Stabroek Block today is a proven petroleum province with enormous resources already discovered multiple developments and exceptional production. Much of the early expenditure has been recovered, the risks have diminished considerably, yet the fiscal terms remain essentially those agreed in 2016. There is therefore no contradiction between welcoming Guyana’s greatly increased revenues and continuing to regard the Agreement as inequitable. A modest share of an enormously profitable enterprise can still produce a very large cheque; the size of the cheque does not establish the fairness of the bargain.

Part I demonstrated another aspect of that bargain. Even as Guyana’s profit-oil share rises, equal profit oil does not mean equal economic benefit because the contractors enjoy substantial tax advantages under the Agreement. The billions now flowing to Guyana are therefore evidence of the exceptional value of the Stabroek Block, not proof that the contractual division of that value was fair or reasonable.

Under pressure from the independent press, especially Kaieteur News, President Ali repeated the announcement earlier made by ExxonMobil Chairman Darren Woods. Having repeated the figure, he should substantiate it after confirmation from Woods and the Ministry of Natural Resources. Guyanese should be told whether the 39.8% includes the 2% royalty, the current balance of unrecovered cost, expected exploration and development expenditure, and the projections for cost oil and profit oil over the next several years. We should also know whether the 39.8% is expected to rise, remain broadly stable or decline as additional expenditure enters the accounts.

This is not information of merely commercial interest or reserved for specialists. Petroleum revenues are now central to the national finances and the percentage of production accruing to Guyana affects present revenues, future budgets and the resources available to succeeding generations. Parliament and the public therefore have a legitimate interest not merely in the headline percentage announced by ExxonMobil and repeated by the President, but in the figures, assumptions and projections behind it. Transparency requires more than announcing good news; it requires providing the information by which that news can be understood and independently assessed.

Guyanese are understandably frustrated by the obstinate refusal of President Ali and Vice President Jagdeo to entertain even the mildest suggestion that they invoke the renegotiation provisions of the 2016 Agreement, as they had promised to do. Having secured the electorate’s trust partly on that promise, they abandoned it on taking office. The hypocrisy is obvious, but it goes further: it is a betrayal of the electorate and – to use Jagdeo’s own words – a selling out of the national interest.

Note: The scale of the increase in oil revenues raises issues which go well beyond the 2016 Agreement. I have therefore decided to add a Part III – this coming Friday – examining the danger of this explosion in oil revenues becoming a licence for more waste, uncontrolled corruption and destructive economic management.

Fri, August 21 2026, 2:01 AM GMT-4

Road to First Oil – Every Man, Woman and Child Must Become Oil Minded – Part 195

Part I of II

President Irfaan Ali brought Guyanese some genuinely good oil news this week. He announced that Guyana’s entitlement from production in the Stabroek Block has risen from the historical 12.5% to approximately 39.8%. Even if oil prices had remained unchanged, Guyana would now be receiving more than three times its earlier share. And because of the war on Iran, oil has risen more than 50% from its end-2025 price. That is great news and since I believe strongly in the old advice not to look a gift horse in the mouth, I welcome it.  

This two-part column examines first what the increase means and how Guyana’s benefit compares with that of the oil companies. Part II will consider how durable this favourable position is, given today’s high oil price, prospective exploration expenditure and the unchanged terms of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement.

Let us be clear. The movement from 12.5% to nearly 40% is not the result of renegotiation. It follows from the Agreement’s cost-recovery mechanism. In the early years, up to 75% of petroleum could be allocated to recovering exploration and development costs. The remaining profit oil was divided equally, leaving Guyana with 12.5% of gross production. The logic is simple. As accumulated costs are recovered, cost oil falls, profit oil rises and Guyana’s share increases.

But first, this column notes an ambiguity over whether the 39.8% includes Guyana’s 2% royalty. The President’s own comparison points strongly to the royalty being additional. He compared today’s 39.8% with the original 12.5%, which was Guyana’s share of profit oil, not its total take including royalty. The natural reading is therefore profit oil against profit oil: 12.5% then and 39.8% now.

At an illustrative US$90 per barrel, 39.8% gives Guyana US$35.82 of profit oil. The 2% royalty adds US$1.80, producing US$37.62 per barrel, or 41.8% of gross value. If instead the 39.8% includes royalty, Guyana’s profit oil would be US$34.02, which with the US$1.80 royalty gives US$35.82. Either way, the improvement is substantial.

But nearly equal profit-oil shares do not mean equal economic benefits. The 2016 Agreement contains two major tax concessions to the contractors: the Government pays their corporation tax and provides the corresponding tax certificates, while distributions and remittances of profits are exempt from withholding tax.

The companies’ tax benefits

For illustration, I treat profit oil as taxable profit, apply corporation tax at 25%, and assume after-tax profit would otherwise attract 20% withholding tax, with no other adjustments. For every US$100 of profit oil, the corporation-tax benefit is therefore US$25. The remaining US$75 would attract US$15 withholding tax. On these assumptions, every US$100 of profit oil carries US$40 of tax benefits.

On what I consider the more likely interpretation; Guyana receives US$37.62 in profit oil and royalty. The companies receive US$35.82 of profit oil, plus an assumed US$8.96 corporation-tax benefit and US$5.37 withholding-tax benefit – a total economic benefit of US$50.15 per barrel. That is US$12.53, or approximately one-third, more than Guyana.

If the 39.8% includes royalty, Guyana receives US$35.82, while the companies receive US$34.02 of profit oil plus US$8.51 and US$5.10 in assumed tax benefits, giving them US$47.63. Again, their economic benefit is approximately one-third greater.

These figures are illustrative, not calculations of the companies’ actual tax returns or tax certificates. Taxable income can be affected by deductions and other adjustments. The purpose is to expose the structure of the bargain: equal profit oil does not mean equal economic benefit. Guyana receives a 2% royalty on top of its profit oil; the companies receive substantial tax benefits on top of theirs.

Cautionary tale

None of this diminishes the announcement. Moving from 12.5% to nearly 40% profit oil is excellent news. At present production and prices, the additional revenue is enormous. The cost-recovery mechanism that once restricted Guyana’s profit-oil share to 12.5% is now working strongly in our favour because enormous, accumulated costs have been recovered.

But today’s position reflects unusually favourable circumstances. Much of the earlier investment has been recovered, production is at record levels and oil is around US$90. Yet not a word of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement has changed. The 2% royalty remains; the tax concessions remain; the withholding-tax exemption remains; and the cost-recovery and stabilisation provisions remain. The economics have changed. The contract has not.

Nor are today’s economics guaranteed to continue. Oil was around US$61 at the end of 2025 and has risen sharply with the US/Israeli war on Iran. Prices can fall again. ExxonMobil and its partners also retain substantial exploration ambitions, and renewed exploration and development could generate another major cycle of recoverable expenditure, increasing cost oil and reducing Guyana’s profit-oil percentage.

Those issues belong in Part II. We should welcome the movement from 12.5% to nearly 40% for what it is: very good news for Guyana. But the next question is more difficult: how long can these favourable conditions last, and does receiving much more under the 2016 Agreement make the Agreement itself any less inequitable?

To be continued

Column 194 – The Resource Curse Begins on a Farm (Part 2)

In Column 193, I argued that the controversy surrounding President Irfaan Ali’s farm at Long Creek is not fundamentally about agriculture. It is about governance in an oil-producing state. It raises questions that no presidential video, however polished, can answer. Those questions belong to independent institutions.

But Long Creek did not arise in isolation. It is the latest manifestation of a style of governance that has become increasingly evident during President Ali’s administration. The issue is not simply the acquisition or operation of a farm. It is whether Guyana’s institutions of accountability have kept pace with the extraordinary concentration of political and economic power that has accompanied the country’s petroleum transformation.

Every presidency leaves an institutional legacy. Some strengthen Parliament, reinforce the rule of law and enlarge the space for independent oversight. Others centralise authority, weaken scrutiny and leave institutions less capable of performing their constitutional functions. It is against that standard that every presidency should be judged, including this one.

The record is troubling.

Parliament, the central institution of representative democracy, has become progressively less effective as an instrument of accountability. The Public Accounts Committee, historically one of Parliament’s most important oversight mechanisms, has ceased to play the role contemplated by the Constitution and the Standing Orders. Public accounts have remained outstanding for years, depriving Parliament and the public of timely scrutiny of the expenditure of billions of dollars of public money. Parliamentary sittings themselves have become infrequent, often convened principally to facilitate the Government’s legislative and financial agenda rather than to provide sustained scrutiny of executive action.

Equally significant has been the weakening, or failure to strengthen, institutions specifically intended to hold the Executive to account. The previous administration established the State Assets Recovery Agency as part of a wider accountability framework. The Ali administration repealed that legislation and abolished the Agency. Whether SARA was effective is open to debate. Eliminating an accountability institution rather than reforming it sent an unmistakable signal about the direction of governance.

The promised Petroleum Commission has likewise failed to materialise. That omission is difficult to reconcile with the scale of Guyana’s petroleum sector. Every major oil-producing nation recognises that technical regulation should not rest exclusively within central government. Guyana, despite repeated commitments, continues without the independent regulator that has long been promised.

The same concerns arise in relation to access to information. A democracy cannot function effectively if the disclosure of information depends upon executive goodwill rather than enforceable legal rights. Yet the Office of the Commissioner of Information has never assumed the prominence or effectiveness that Parliament intended. Transparency remains more an aspiration than an institutional reality.

Perhaps no institution better illustrates the failure to modernise accountability than the Integrity Commission. Guyana is no longer the country it was when that legislation was enacted. The economy has been transformed by petroleum wealth, sophisticated corporate structures and unprecedented opportunities for the accumulation of assets. Yet the disclosure regime remains substantially frozen in time.

The declaration form itself is wholly inadequate for a modern petroleum economy. It is neither a comprehensive disclosure instrument nor a true statutory declaration attracting the ordinary legal consequences of sworn statements. It occupies an uncertain space between the two. More remarkable still, despite almost three decades of profound economic change, successive governments have failed to modernise it. If Guyana is serious about integrity in public life, the law requires more than cosmetic adjustment. It requires fundamental reform.

These institutional weaknesses matter because they coincide with the expansion of executive discretion in matters involving immense public resources.

Silica City is a striking example. Presented as one of the country’s flagship development initiatives, it has attracted commitments involving billions of dollars. Yet the public has received little comprehensive accounting of expenditure, procurement, implementation or measurable outcomes. Public confidence cannot be sustained where projects of such magnitude proceed without regular and detailed public reporting.

Long Creek therefore assumes a significance that extends well beyond the President’s private affairs. The question is not whether President Ali is entitled to own a farm or engage in agriculture. He is. The question is whether the Head of State, exercising enormous constitutional authority while simultaneously pursuing substantial private commercial interests, should be subject to disclosure standards more exacting than those applicable to ordinary citizens. The answer must surely be yes.

That is particularly so because the Presidency does not end when a President leaves office. The law provides substantial continuing benefits, recognising the enduring dignity and importance of the office. Those public privileges reinforce the need for rigorous conflict-of-interest rules and comprehensive disclosure obligations. Private commercial interests must never be allowed to collide with public office and authority, without transparent safeguards protecting both the office-holder and the public.

The issues raised in these two columns concern the architecture of constitutional government in a country rapidly developing by oil wealth. While the general rule is that every administration builds projects, only some leave behind stronger democratic institutions than they inherited. Future Presidents will inherit the institutions being shaped today. If those institutions are independent, resilient and capable of scrutinising executive power without fear or favour, President Ali will have made a lasting contribution to Guyana’s democracy. If, however, they emerge weaker, more dependent or less capable of holding the Executive to account, that too will become part of his legacy.

History’s verdict on President Ali will rest not only on the prosperity generated during Guyana’s first oil boom, but on whether he strengthened the institutions that protect the Republic or weakened them when they were most needed. If the verdict is the latter, Long Creek will be remembered not as a controversy over a farm but as the moment when Guyana’s Resource Curse ceased to be a theory and became both a constitutional and an institutional reality.

Finally, obvious as it is, it is still worth noting that a President governs not only by constitutional authority but by personal example. If legitimate questions about his own conduct remain unresolved through independent institutional scrutiny, his moral authority to demand the highest standards from Ministers, public officials and the wider public is inevitably weakened.

That is not only sad. It will be self-inflicted.

The Resource Curse has arrived – on a Farm Part I

The story of the month, and perhaps of the year, has been President Irfaan Ali’s farm at Long Creek, an area off the Soesdyke-Linden Highway. Readers may well ask what a farm has to do with oil and gas and the Resource Curse. The answer is simple: everything. Not because the farm produces oil, but because every oil-producing country eventually confronts the same question: are its institutions stronger than its politicians? Guyana is confronted with that question much sooner than expected. Ironically, the first real test has come not from the Stabroek Block, the Natural Resource Fund or ExxonMobil. It has come from a farm.

Let me say too what this column is not about. It is not about whether President Irfaan Ali is entitled to own a farm. He is. Nor is it about whether agriculture deserves encouragement. It does. Any sensible person would welcome greater investment in food production and agro-processing if Guyana is to avoid becoming hopelessly dependent on oil. But President Ali needs to appreciate that he is no ordinary investor, let alone farmer.  

Following his return from St. Lucia, President Ali issued a lengthy video presentation in which he denied wrongdoing, spoke of bank loans, insisted that he had received no special treatment and sought to discredit the source of the allegations, Azruddin Mohamed, Leader of the Opposition. He was entitled to answer Mohamed, a former political ally and financier turned political nemesis. Indeed, public office imposed a duty on him to do so. But he and his defenders appear to believe that a 12-minute video constituted a verdict of innocence. It did not.

Even a President’s fact-based explanation is not an investigation. Nor can it be. The President cannot be investigator, witness, advocate and judge in the same cause. Public confidence is strengthened not when questions are answered by the person whose conduct is in issue, but when those answers are independently tested and verified.

The President says that the farm was financed by bank loans. Fine. Then let the documents speak. Was he using the term “bank” loosely to include the PPP-leaning New Building Society? When were the loans approved? To whom were they granted? Were they made to the President personally or to a company? What security was offered? When was each parcel of land acquired? Was it purchased, leased or allocated? Where is the evidence that public resources were not employed, or that the authority of the Presidency was not invoked to facilitate, if not finance, the project? These are not hostile questions. These questions are not being asked by an investigator, auditor or banker but by ordinary citizens and they have a right to answers.

If the President is right, independent scrutiny will vindicate him. If he is wrong, the country has as much a right to know as he has a duty to disclose. The video proved neither innocence nor misconduct. But for the holder of the highest office in the land, sworn to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law, it fell well short of the standard any constitutional democracy is entitled to expect. In a democracy, Presidents do not certify their own conduct. Independent institutions do.

That brings us to the issue of oil and gas governance.

Oil has changed everything. What once passed as ordinary political controversy has become a test of institutional strength and public accountability. The 2026 Budget granted generous tax concessions to agriculture and agro-processing. Once the Head of State owns a substantial agricultural enterprise, the issue ceases to be merely economic. It becomes one of governance. How are conflicts of interest identified, disclosed and managed? How does the public know that national policy was not a cloak for private benefit?

International examples show that the Resource Curse does not begin with missing billions, corrupt petroleum contracts or white-elephant projects. Those are its later symptoms. It begins when institutions yield to power, transparency gives way to official assurances and presidential videos replace independent verification.

South Africa offers a useful contrast. President Cyril Ramaphosa denied wrongdoing over the Phala Phala farm controversy. His denial settled nothing. Parliament, independent constitutional processes and law-enforcement agencies all became involved. Whatever one’s view of the outcome, South Africa reaffirmed a principle Guyana should embrace: a President’s explanation is never a substitute for independent scrutiny.

Guyana has yet to demonstrate the same constitutional, political and institutional maturity. That is why the controversy over the President’s farm belongs in an oil and gas column. It is no longer about agriculture. It is about whether Guyana’s institutions, and those who lead them, are keeping pace with the demands of oil wealth. It is about whether constitutional office holders are sufficiently independent to place country above party, the Constitution above political convenience, the public interest above partisan loyalty, and yes, a stipend above their integrity.

In his video presentation, President Ali repeatedly invoked the Integrity Commission as if its mere existence answered the concerns that have arisen. It does not. An Integrity Commission is judged not by its statutory existence but by its credibility, its independence and the confidence it inspires. A commission that is neither seen nor heard, and whose work rarely informs public debate, cannot resolve questions of this magnitude simply by being invoked. Institutions earn public confidence by what they do, not by being invoked from the podium.

That is the larger issue confronting Guyana. Oil wealth does not merely test governments; it tests institutions. It asks whether they possess the independence, courage and authority to examine those who exercise power, including the President himself. If they do not, political confidence replaces constitutional accountability, and the Resource Curse ceases to be an academic theory and becomes a national reality.

Too much is now at stake for Guyana to rely on trust alone. Oil has raised the value of public office. It has also raised the price of weak governance. Every major decision involving those who exercise public power will now be examined through the lens of conflicts of interest, institutional independence, and yes, misuse of public office.

Whether intentionally or otherwise, the Ali Administration is helping to define the kind of oil-producing country Guyana will become. Long Creek is not the beginning of the story. It is merely the latest chapter. The earlier chapters lie in the administration of State lands, the concentration of executive power and the weakening of institutions.

This will continue in the next column.

Six -to – one is not 50-50 Part 3 – Government’s Litany of Failures

The financial, audit and regulatory weaknesses highlighted in this mini-series make for disturbing reading and raise serious concerns. Matters might have been very different had both the external auditors and the ministerial auditors taken a firmer stance on compliance with accounting standards, the Companies Act and the Petroleum Agreement. Yet these failures pale in comparison with the absence of adequate contract administration by successive administrations. As trustees of the nation’s resources, they have a duty to safeguard them for the benefit of both present and future generations – a responsibility that is consistently neglected.

While the Granger Administration has attracted most of the criticism for saddling Guyana with this deeply flawed contract, the record shows a chain of failures stretching from the 1999 Agreement signed under President Janet Jagan, through its 2016 revision, and into its ongoing administration. These are not isolated errors. They reflect a persistent pattern of weak oversight, lax enforcement, poor transparency, and an undue deference to foreign oil companies at the expense of the national interest. We now turn to the specifics.

First, the excessive acreage granted (Janet Jagan), the questionable acceptance of force majeure (Jagdeo) and the resulting licence renewal (Granger) show there is no single bad decision resulting in our current plight. On the other side of the coin is clear evidence that Exxon has been granted every concession it has sought, undermining the safeguards built into the petroleum legislation, all at the expense of the country.

Second, following the discovery of oil, Exxon secured a new agreement in 2016 as the 1999 Agreement approached expiry. Its legal difficulties were then “resolved” by a Bridging Deed that effectively transformed 2016 into 1999. In the process, Janet Jagan’s 1999 Agreement and David Granger’s 2016 Agreement became conjoined twins, politically and legally inseparable, binding both the PPP/C and the PNC-led Coalition to a petroleum regime that has disproportionately favoured the operators at Guyana’s expense.

Third, the 2016 Agreement included a commitment to pass certain tax exemptions, including a permanent tax concession. Raphael Trotman, then Minister of Natural Resources wrote in a tell-all book that he was assured by the Chief Government Whip that the Opposition Leader would raise no objection. In the event, he did not. The PPP/C is as culpable at the PNC/R in its various incarnations. 

Fourth, after its return to power in 2020, the PPP/C reneged on its repeated commitment to renegotiate the 2016 Agreement and to set up an independent Petroleum Commission.

Fifth, the entire team at the Ministry of Natural Resources appears to lack the commitment, the capacity or the expertise required to oversee the Petroleum Agreement effectively. With any of these qualities, it would not permitted the persistent deficiencies in accounting, reporting, auditing and operational compliance that have marked the Agreement since its signing under the PPP/C and its re-signing under the APNU+AFC Coalition.

Sixth, the Government has been a co-conspirator in non-disclosure with regard to the gas-to-shore project. In 2024, CNOOC volunteered in its financials that it was meeting some of the expenses of that project. When this was highlighted in column #121, such a note was not repeated in 2025. The 2016 Agreement does not allow this. Any gas-related project should be the subject of a separate Agreement.         

The errors of omission and commission are pervasive and systemic. They include:

A. Institutional and governance failures

i) Failure to establish an independent, professional Petroleum Commission.

ii) Failure to maintain a proper institutional separation between regulator and regulated entity.

iii) Failure to learn from the experience of other petroleum-producing countries where weak oversight, cost inflation, regulatory capture and information asymmetry have transformed a blessing into a curse.

B. Contract administration and regulatory enforcement

iv) Failure to scrutinise and transparently approve the pre-contract costs claimed by the contractor.

v) Failure to deal transparently with costs that are not automatically recoverable under the Agreement.

vi) Failure to impose ring-fencing protections when opportunities existed.

vii) Failure to enforce relinquishment provisions.

viii) Failure to ensure full compliance with statutory requirements governing petroleum operations.

ix) Unwillingness to seek adjustment of rental and other nominal annual charges.

C. Reporting, auditing and transparency

x) Failure to establish and enforce adequate standards of petroleum-sector financial reporting. Column 191 highlighted several serious deficiencies in accounting treatment, presentation and disclosure.

xi) Failure to modernise reporting and disclosure requirements as petroleum production, expenditure and revenues expanded exponentially, resulting in a regulatory framework no longer fit for purpose.

xii) Refusal or failure to publish petroleum reports and other information required under the Agreement.

xiii) Failure to conduct timely and effective ministerial audits. Not a single ministerial audit has been completed in what has become a circus of reckless incompetence. It is as though the Administration is insensitive to the financial benefits of proper audits.    

D. Local content and economic participation

xiv) Delayed implementation of a wholly inadequate local content framework.

xv) Permitting the operator to develop and control major elements of the supply chain architecture.

E. Long-term fiscal and environmental protection

xvi) Failure to understand and address the fiscal consequences of decommissioning arrangements.

xvii) Failure to secure robust environmental and financial assurances.

F. Conduct in public disputes

xviii) A consistent pattern of intervening in litigation on the side of the oil companies rather than maintaining the neutrality expected of a government acting in the public interest.

To Guyanese, the greatest disappointment has been the Ali Administration’s abandonment of its promise to put Guyana first. Having inherited an Agreement it rightly condemned, it has chosen not only to defend it, but in important respects to sweeten rather than reform it – all favourable of the oil companies.

Sadly, the inescapable conclusion is that the greatest threat to Guyana’s petroleum future is no longer the Agreement itself – bad as that is. It is the Government’s continuing failure to act with courage, competence, consistency and integrity. The Granger Administration surrendered too much; the Ali Administration is on course to surrender what remains.