Posts

Posted on

On the Line: Demerara Distillers Limited Annual Report 2008

Introduction
In what Dr Yesu Persaud, Chairman of the beverage giant described as one of its most difficult and challenging years the group has experienced in recent times, the Demerara Distillers Limited (DDL) group reports a decline in pre-tax profit of 8.8% over 2007. For the parent company itself, the decline in pre-tax profit was 8.98% and is a measure of how significant its alcohol and soft drinks operations are to the group. In addition to the parent, the group comprises a mix of operating companies in Guyana, the Caribbean, Europe and India. It also has a 30% stake in BEV Enterprises Limited, 33.33% in National Rums of Jamaica Limited and 19.5% in Diamond Fire and General Insurance Company Limited. The parent company accounted for 73% of the group sales but 87% of profit after tax. Correspondingly, the subsidiaries accounted for 27% of revenue and together with the applicable share of profits of associated companies accounted for 13% of after tax profits.

The Chairman attributed the performance of the company and group to the problems facing the global economy and the impact on consumers “burdened by the Value-Added Tax introduced in 2007.” The directors of the company are however confident about the future and in June last year announced a $4.5Bn expansion programme extending into the first quarter of 2010, which has already caused a significant increase in the long-term debt of the company. In fact with the total debt for the company increasing during the year from $4.2Bn to $7.3Bn, its debt to equity ratio, a measure of a company’s ability to borrow and repay money, has jumped from 0.48:1 to 0.82:1. Capital expenditure in 2008 was $1.8Bn and much of the increased borrowings by the company went into financing a 17% build-up in inventory and a 75% increase in receivables. Such borrowings have come at a cost, and finance cost increased during the year from $490Mn to $561Mn. This equates to one out of every three dollars earned before interest and tax being used to pay interest. A further $56Mn of interest paid was not charged to the income statement but was capitalised as a cost of the related asset.

Falling returns
The further expansion in plant and machinery will of course lead to additional interest cost which has increased since 2002 when the Chairman announced a financial restructuring including a share issue to minimise financing cost. That has not materialized, and financing cost has continued to rise. In fact interest cover which measures the number of times interest is covered by profit before interest and tax is now 3, when at the time of the announced financial restructuring it was 5.6 times.

While the gross assets employed by the group have more than trebled in the past ten years, the return on those assets has fallen from 29.1% in 1999 to 9.4% in 2008 – the lowest it has ever been. Despite the decline in after-tax profits by 10.9% the directors are proposing to maintain a dividend of $0.40 per share, jarringly referred to as cents per share, which of course went out of existence in 1998. The total dividend payout for the year is approximately 39%.

‘What if’ reporting
An interesting and innovative inclusion in the Chairman’s report was what may be described as a ‘what if’ statement, in which the company suggested that had it not been for some global factors affecting fuel, net exchange loss movement and increase in provision for impairments the company’s profits would have been $903Mn higher, and that profit before tax would have been an implausible $2,585Mn, an increase of 14% on decreased sales of 10.38%. These are however real costs, and reflect the challenges which directors are expected to confront and mitigate.

The composition of the net exchange loss reflected in note 6 to the financial statements is itself interesting, as it is made up of Exchange losses of $488Mn and Exchange gain of $296Mn. This emphasises the inevitable risk of dealing in international currencies such as the euro and the pound sterling, which often move one way and then the other, the negative impact of which may be avoided by what is referred to as hedging.

Liquidity strains
The company and the group have also seen a substantial reduction in cash with the company’s cash resources reduced to $79Mn from $235Mn at the beginning of the year, and for the group from $298Mn to $107Mn. Current liabilities on the other hand, skyrocketed from $3.7Bn in 2007 to $6.7Bn in 2008, partly due to two major short-term loans taken as bridging finance for the capital expenditure in 2008. The position will abate in 2009 with the conversion of those loans into long-term facilities, but will continue to remain high with trade payables and bank overdraft exceeding $6Bn. Included also in Trade and other payables for the company is a huge amount of $2.242Bn, bringing total interest bearing borrowings to $8.354Bn. If this trend continues without compensating returns on investments, they will become a real drag on the company’s development.

One continuing concern about this company is the high level of its inventory and receivables. The company’s sales for the year declined by 11%, but its level of inventory which includes finished goods, raw materials and spares increased by 17%. And for the group the position was only slightly better. Revenue increased by 2.3%, but its inventory increased by 20%. Expressed another way, the company and the group have in stock at their written down value the equivalent of sales value of 14 months and 20 months respectively! Intuitively one would expect the company to have had a high level of inventory because of the aging of alcohol, but these numbers lead one to wonder seriously about the quality of the inventory held by the subsidiaries.

Sales too have come with hidden financing cost. While sales for the company show a decline of 10.4%, trade receivables went up by 46%, and for the subsidiaries the increase in sales of 67% was accompanied by an increase in their trade receivables by 34%. This latter position appears better than it really is because a major subsidiary – Distribution Services Limited – operates on a cash and carry basis.

Subsidiaries
The performance of the subsidiaries and associates was mixed, with Tropical Orchards Products Company Limited reporting after tax losses increasing from $6Mn to $50Mn. When the group announced a $500Mn investment in TOPCO in 2004 Business Page pointed out that based on a standard measure of investment appraisal such a level could not be justified. Regrettably that fear is being more than vindicated and since then TOPCO has returned a net loss to the group.

Another concern is the investment in India which continues to show losses, and it takes a certain level of faith to persist with this investment in the face of annual losses having to be carried by the rest of the group. China and South America with which the company flirted for a couple of years appear to have gone off the radar and already the company is learning what a difficult environment Jamaica is with its share of pre-tax profits in the Jamaican company declining from $56Mn in 2007 to less than $4Mn in 2008. On the other hand, bright spots are Demerara Shipping and Distribution Services locally, and the European, St Kitts and US operations.

Belatedly, the directors appear to have accepted that the purchase by the company of the controlling shares in Solutions 2000 was not a good investment after all. The company has lost its entire investment in annual losses and given the performance and outlook for Solutions, the company must consider itself lucky that it did not suffer a bigger capital loss. Interestingly it is only in the year of disposal that the company discloses that the controlling interest in the company was acquired from DDL directors Messrs Komal Samaroo and David Spence in 2000. The identity of the purchaser has not been disclosed.

Governance
One difficulty I have with some of the numbers presented for the subsidiaries is that all the subsidiaries are private companies subject to minimal statutory and governance obligations. In fact some of them operate in jurisdictions which do not require an audit and even locally the subsidiaries do not comply with the law requiring them to file annual returns and financial statements. It is unlawful and unacceptable that the local subsidiaries have not been filing their annual returns and financial statements, and the only financial statements seen in any of the files at the Deeds Registry are the annual reports of the group.

In preparing for the column I sent a note to fellow accountant Mr Loris Nathoo, General Manager, asking for the turnover and the names of the auditors of the subsidiaries. Since it relates to the subsidiaries of a public company this information should not be a matter of secrecy. However, the reply took the form of a letter from the company’s in-house attorney that did not respond to my request, but boasted of the “Company’s 2008 Report [being] incomparable to any other published accounts in Guyana and, indeed, in the region.” One has to wonder whether the writer is familiar with the annual reports of Neal and Massy or RBTT of Trinidad and Tobago or Grace Kennedy of Jamaica.

One might have expected awareness on the part of the directors that their note 22 on Segment reporting is not in compliance with paragraph 69 (a) of IAS 14, which requires that where a company chooses business segments as its primary reporting format it must disclose revenue by geographical location of the customers. That is where the risk lies and that is what segment reporting is designed to highlight.

One change in the financial statements is the inclusion of the insurance arm Diamond Fire and General Insurance Inc as an associated company in the results of the company. Dr Persaud claims that this change was based on the advice of the auditors and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana. Of course that does not reflect the fact that it was a ruling resulting from a formal complaint lodged by this columnist.

New Director
A related issue is that on the last day of 2008 the board appointed Mr Chandradat Chintamani, Chartered Accountant, as a director of the company. This appointment is considered coincidentally unfortunate since a committee of the ICAG headed by Mr Chintamani had very shortly before exonerated certain directors and the company’s auditors from my formal complaint that they had failed to account for a US$1.1Mn discount on a loan buyback from Hamilton Bank, which had gone into liquidation.

Conclusion
Apart from the announcement about the new investment the Chairman’s report is largely retrospective, and nothing is said about the outlook for the company and the group for the current year and beyond. Like with all the companies whose shares are traded on the local stock exchange, the company’s share price has remained steady, and with the recession in the developed economies appearing to have slowed, the group must be hopeful that it will return to growth in 2009.

Posted on

The IMF Consultation on the Guyana economy in 2008

Introduction
Using its stock-in-trade jargon the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund in a Public Information Notice issued on May 19, 2009 gave a very favourable report on the performance of the Guyana economy for 2008. The IMF attributed the maintenance of macroeconomic stability in 2008, despite what it referred to as external shocks and undefined “social pressures,” to the implementation of prudent fiscal and monetary policies by the Guyanese authorities. This assessment came in what is referred to as an Article IV Consultation in which the IMF holds bilateral discussions with member countries, usually every year. For the consultation an IMF staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies.

The website Countryrisk.com/guide/ archives/000309.html considers such consultations to be as “fine a piece of research as you’re likely to find produced by the public sector.” It claims that “the IMF staff economists harangue each country about its weak points on a periodic basis; these reports record this tongue-lashing.” Roles have reversed and it is the tongue-lasher who is in the effusive role immediately juxtaposing a criticism with an overwhelming corresponding achievement. The website also opined that with the recent fashion for good governance the consultation covers not just economic policy but also political institutions. That certainly did not happen with the Guyana 2008 Consultation. To complete the songs of praise of such reports, Countryrisk.com notes that they contain an excellent data section at the end including detailed budget numbers and IMF forecasts. Not even the IMF Public Relations Department could have done a better job.

Insensitive IMF
Today’s column looks at the May 19 statement which has generated practically no comment in the media. The consultation took place just days after the presentation of the 2009 Budget by the Minister of Finance and it is in many ways a restatement of the points made in the speech by the minister, except perhaps for its level of generalisation. If the matters contained in the report are almost identical, so too are the omissions. Nothing, for example, about job creation and unemployment levels, which must be the major poverty issues facing the country, the pervasive underground/parallel/narco-economy which has such a distorting effect on the official economy, and widespread tax evasion which is as much an equity issue as it is a contributor to poverty with the poor paying the taxes for the rich. In fact the reference to taxation said nothing of the punitive tax burden borne by those who have the misfortune to be honest or employed while the report lauds the introduction of VAT as “significant progress in the area of fiscal reform.” That is as insulting as it is insensitive.

In fact if the unnamed official who visited Guyana had taken the time to read the IMF’s own recommendations on tax reform s/he would have noted that many of the recommendations are yet to be implemented. Some of these are: the recommendation for the reduction of the corporation income tax rate for commercial companies from 45% to 40% in 2003 and to 35% in 2004; disallowing the carry forward of minimum tax in excess of corporation income tax; extending the minimum tax to noncommercial companies and the abolition of the threshold; limiting the deduction of interest paid for corporation tax purposes and imposing a withholding tax on payments to local government contractors.

And those locals more familiar with the tax laws and their operations could add several more, including constraints in the tax laws (income, corporation, property and VAT) which inhibit businesses; clarifying ambiguities in the tax laws; modernising the provisions relating to capital allowances in respect of the service and IT industries; thin capitalisation rules; trans-border and operational issues such as set-offs, interest, refunds, etc.

Resuscitating the PRSP
The report describes the attention to poverty alleviation as a medium term issue and notes that the directors “welcomed the upcoming finalisation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” which, however, did not get a mention in the 2009 Budget speech. Other than references to earlier documents, the past three budget speeches paid no attention to the PRSP, leading many to wonder whether the PRSP had been subsumed or abandoned. And the Minister of Finance in his 2009 Budget speech linked poverty reduction and economic development to the mobilisation of external and domestic debt. Not only can debt cause impoverishment, but what about the seventy billion dollars or so paid in VAT and other indirect taxes and PAYE which make many into working poor? It seems that the PRSP is no more than another marketing document to take to donors and the lending community.

Macroeconomic stability holds a special place on the IMF altar of economic performance and rectitude. If that is preserved then for the IMF all is well. But then we seem to have shifting sands when it comes to what the IMF in fact means by macroeconomic stability. Has the meaning changed from the early days when the IMF itself defined its objectives to include a) achievement of an average rate of GDP growth of 4%; b) a viable balance of payments situation in the medium term; and c) the re-incorporation of the parallel economy into the official economy? The economy is of course a long way from these, so the meaning not only changes but when growth decelerates the IMF considers it sufficient compensation that there is a decline in inflation. And after a sharp shortfall in 2008, sugar is expected to contribute to higher growth for 2009 to offset a slowdown in the other sectors of the economy.

Statistics
The IMF seems to accept all statistics at face value. It repeats the official growth in the 2008 economy of “about 3%,” described as a deceleration attributed to the performance of sugar. Even if it is assumed that at the time of its official’s visit in February, the statistics were unavailable, more complete data were available by the time of the report’s publication. The data disclosed by the Minister of Finance show that in 2008 sugar as well as forestry declined over 2007 by 15%, diamond by 37%, bauxite by 7% and manufacturing by 2%. Despite all of this the economy grew by 3.1% – a questionable proposition indeed.

There was not a single comment on the unrestrained excessive domestic spending, but in relation to external transactions the IMF noted that the country’s external current account had widened to close to 21%. The current account is the sum of the balance of trade (exports minus imports of goods and services), net factor income (such as interest and dividends) and net transfer payments (such as foreign aid). Almost as if to soften the impact of the deterioration the report not only seeks to attribute that deterioration to sugar but immediately adds “but was fully financed by concesssional loans, grants, and FDI.” As if one justifies the other.

No mention either of the alarming growth of the domestic debt which has quadrupled since 1992. As debt – domestic or foreign – rises so too does debt-servicing. The interest cost of servicing the domestic debt in 2008 was $2.98Bn while the interest of the external debt was $1.7Bn. Total debt service inclusive of interest cost is 14.4% of the total non-interest expenditure compared with 11.7% in 2007. Instead of seeking to address poverty reduction through incurring further debts policy-makers should be concentrating on job-creation to save our citizens from the indignities, cruel treatment and even death as they seek jobs in neighbouring countries.

Job creation
Even with all the limitations of our national statistics the evidence is overwhelming – we are not creating an adequate number of jobs to serve the population. That is the essence of the problems our citizens face. To blame Barbados for enforcing their immigration laws is counter-productive. Every government is sworn to uphold its laws even where there is a common economic space, and one only has to think of the illegal Mexicans who are routinely held by the US and returned to their country. To use Obama’s word it is “ignorant” to threaten to pull out of Caricom when we are certainly a major beneficiary. Or to hark back to the days when Bajans were welcome into our country, as if the traffic was all one-way.

For all the constant criticism about the economy inherited from the PNC and the boast about growth in the economy, since then the active number of employed persons in 2008 is less than it was in 1990, 1991 and 1992. NIS is a poverty issue and the failure by the scheme to insure persons is a failure of poverty management. It means that those persons would have no NIS pension when they turn 60.

Conclusion
Guyana is by far the largest country in Caricom and has one of the lowest population densities. We need our citizens – artisans and professionals – to stay and help build the country by exploiting the country’s vast potential, also the greatest in the region. We need imaginative economic and social policies; we need local and foreign investors who create jobs and make a net contribution to the country, and who do not just reap benefits and leave; we need a society that is as favourable to the poor as it is about the rich. We need a tax system that is fair and equitable.

At best the IMF sees poverty as a subscript to their macro-economic fundamentals. They seem neutral whether it is the parallel or the formal economy that makes the economy stable or how many persons are put on the breadline to achieve that stability. We need to make the elimination of poverty as much part of the equation as macro-economic stability. It is time to reject trickle-down economics.

Posted on

On the Line: Guyana Bank for Trade and Industry Annual Report 2008 – revisited

Guest business column by Robert V McRae, CPA

Background
Several weeks ago the Bank of Guyana (BoG) publicly and the Guyana Bank for Trade and Industry (GBTI) management privately in a letter to me, responded to a guest Business Page published in Stabroek News of April 12, 2009 under my name. Unfortunately, personal commitments precluded me from addressing this matter earlier and for this I apologise.

Of specific concern to both entities were two paragraphs under the caption ‘The blog and the BoG.’ The two paragraphs contained information derived from the Annual Report of the bank and merely raised legitimate questions over the original response to the blog, particularly why it did not acknowledge the overnight borrowing by the bank or the deficiency in the statutory reserve requirement of more than $4B at December 31, 2008. After the column had raised the matter the Bank of Guyana advised that the shortfall was “authorised,” a fact that was not evident prior to its public statement.

Overnight borrowing
While the BoG must be commended for its prompt dispelling of any doubt surrounding the bailout claim, it should have at the time acknowledged the approach for the overnight facility while asserting that transactions of a similar nature were not unusual. This was clearly an unnecessary and unfortunate omission that did little to help the cause it was seeking to promote.

In its direct response to me, the management of GBTI has correctly made the point that the BoG’s half year report 2008 reveals sixty-three trades in the inter-bank market with the value of funds traded totalling $20.4B. It is of interest to note that the average value of these trades is approximately $324M, so in terms of its magnitude, that specific transaction of $1.5B by itself must be considered unique and therefore warranting more explanation than was provided.

Reserve requirement deficiency
The second issue and the reference to the deficiency in the reserve requirement was that maintenance of this reserve is a statutory requirement and nowhere in the financial statements could the reader deduce from what date or why this shortfall had occurred, nor was there any indication whether the situation had been corrected, as was the case in the Bank’s 2007 annual report, (It has since been revealed by the BoG press release that the 2008 shortfall was corrected.)

Indeed, financial reporting standards which specify that, “if the quantitative data disclosed at the end of the reporting period are unrepresentative of the company’s exposure to risk during the period, an entity shall provide further information that is representative,” would seem to make such disclosures mandatory – another unhelpful omission.

Bank of Guyana press release
The press release also refers to discretion which the Bank of Guyana is allowed to exercise in these matters. As far as this writer is aware, discretion exists in the relevant legislation only with respect to the imposition of penalties for deficiency in the reserve requirement, and does not allow for authorisation of what is tantamount to a breach of law. Consequently it appears that the BoG acted without authority.

In the current economic climate the BoG must not only be seen to be acting promptly but it must also act impartially, and if it does engage in a public issue it must ensure it does so fully, fairly and completely.

It would have been extremely helpful and enlightening for BoG to have addressed the following:

1. The number of shortfalls in reserve requirements during 2007 and 2008 and the number of entities involved.

2. The circumstances in which BOG would “approve” a breach of the statutory reserve requirement by a financial institution.

3. GBTI management has indicated that the transactions resulting in the reserve requirement deficiency at the end of 2007 and 2008 were similar. The BoG should confirm whether it granted a similar “approval” in 2007 for the breach of the reserve requirement, and cite the specific authority for any such approval.

Conclusion
Nowhere in the earlier column was there any attempt to give credence to the spurious claim by the blog that the GBTI required a bailout, nor any question raised about the financial soundness of the bank.

As a public company, whether the management of GBTI disapproves or not, any member of the public is entitled to seek clarification of any matter on which there is inadequate or no information. Financial statements are only as good as the information they contain and the users can only draw conclusions based on what is disclosed. Rather than leave unanswered questions, the management of all public companies and most especially financial institutions should lean towards more helpful rather than less disclosure unless confidentiality or competitiveness will be compromised.

The questions raised in the article go to the heart of transparency, accountability and fairness. The BoG must avoid any appearance that it favours one institution over others and ought not to overlook, in matters of this nature, the implications for its role as an independent, supervisory watchdog over the sector.

Posted on

The minister responsible for NIS is not the President but the Finance Minister

I applaud the initiatives in Friday’s Stabroek Business for persisting with certain issues that do not seem to receive much attention in the other sections of our newspapers. I must however take issue with the editorial in the Stabroek Business of May 8 in which the writer called on the President “to make clear his personal concerns over the particular transgression” regarding the non-deduction/payment by employers of NIS contributions for their employees.

Such a call is not only ill-informed but is also dangerous. Why do we need the President’s “personal concerns” when the minister responsible for the National Insurance Scheme is the Finance Minister? And the writer must surely know that the Attorney General, who just shifted chair back into Cabinet, can with proper respect for the principle of separation of powers among the arms of the state, raise the concern with the Chancellor.

It is also dangerous because as a paper of record Stabroek News should avoid endorsing the improper but regular practice of having the President interfere in matters completely outside his portfolio. We have seen what a mess he makes even when he speaks of matters within his portfolio, such as the Integrity Commission affair. Let me mention an example of the President speaking on the NIS. In 2007 before I resigned as a member of the NIS Reform Committee I wrote the President asking for particulars supporting an announcement he had made in Berbice that “thousands of persons” were being deprived of their pensions because of the state of the records in the NIS. After several weeks, the list I got back had just over 20 names, and on investigation, many of them did not qualify and were therefore properly denied.

While non-deduction/payment is indeed a problem, the NIS faces real and disastrous consequences from Cabinet’s failure to act on the recommendations contained in the 2001 and 2006 Actuarial Reviews and the unlawful and high-risk investments in Clico and the Berbice Bridge, apparently made under a paper baptised by Cabinet. The Head of Cabinet of course is the President himself, while his chief-of-staff Dr Roger Luncheon is the Chairman of the Board of the NIS.

Finally let me say that the scheme continues to act unlawfully or not act as the law requires with its misguided Ministry of Labour/NIS Memorandum of Cooperation. That seems to be the brainchild of someone who has not read the National Insurance Act or who does not have real work to do. Ironically any otherwise delinquent employer could challenge any action by this “inspectorate team” as being unlawful. Oh, what a mess we make!

Posted on

The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009

I note that the Minister of Finance Dr. Ashni Singh has introduced legislation [The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009] that will bring the functions of the Commissioner of Insurance (CoI) under the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The Explanatory Memorandum states that the “Bill seeks to pave the way for the Bank of Guyana (not the Commissioner of Insurance) to administer the Insurance Act and for a person nominated by the Bank to be appointed by the Court as judicial manager.” Because it was the first reading of the Bill, the Minister was not required to nor did he otherwise give any reason for this move which is not without considerable significance. Such a move would however have been helpful in alerting parliamentarians and the public of the thinking behind the legislation and directing their minds to the kind of preparation they should begin in order to contribute meaningfully to the progress of the legislation.

The Clico meltdown exposed in a rather dramatic and disastrous fashion some of the weaknesses of the existing legislation and its operations. But it also emphasised the need for a more exhaustive examination by an impartial body of the causes of the debacle and the steps necessary to better regulate the insurance sector and prevent similar failures in the future. Without the benefit of that exercise, I can only rely on my experience of the Insurance Act in relation to audits, revelations about Clico as well as – let’s not forget – the GuyFlag/Fidelity story in offering any opinions. Those suggest that what we need are fundamental changes both to the regulatory framework as well as how it operates. The proposed Bill falls very short.

The only change being made by the Bill is the transfer of responsibility for the supervision of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance from the Commissioner of Insurance to the BoG. This raises the obvious question whether the Minister really believes that that is all that is necessary to fix the system that certainly failed us in the case of Clico and serves us poorly in the case of GuyFlag/Fidelity. One assumes that the Minister would have been kept fully informed by the Commissioner of Insurance that the breaches of key provisions of the Insurance Act by Clico were putting policyholders and depositors at considerable risk. Are those addressed by this Bill? I think not.

There is only one Commonwealth Caribbean country that I know of where the insurance industry is supervised by the Central Bank – Trinidad and Tobago which coincidentally has also had the biggest failure to stakeholders, other than Guyana. In Barbados and Belize the sector is supervised by a Supervisor of Insurance operating under the Ministry of Finance. Jamaica has what I consider to be the best model and one which was recommended in Ram & McRae’s Focus on Budget 2009, i.e. a Financial Services Commission. Under that umbrella can fall responsibility for the supervision of such sectors as insurance, securities, prevention of money-laundering and even the financial institutions. That would allow the central bank to deal with its core objectives, namely “the fostering [of] domestic price stability through the promotion of stable credit and exchange conditions, as well as sound financial intermediation conducive to the growth of the economy of Guyana.”

While the Commissioner of Insurance has had to take responsibility for much of Clico’s regulatory failure, the Bank of Guyana too failed to detect that Clico was engaged in deposit-taking which required Clico to apply to the Bank for a licence under the Financial Institutions Act. In fact the disclosures surrounding financial/quasi financial institutions including Clico, the Hand-in-Hand Trust, the New Building Society and the National Insurance Scheme suggest that the Bank of Guyana has its own problems. To add to its mandate supervision for the insurance sector can compound those problems.

I hope that the Bill is a mere temporary measure until the President’s promised investigation into Clico makes more extensive and meaningful recommendations. I hope we do not have to wait too long.