Column 182 (Part 2 – April 25, 2026): The Prime Minister’s unlawful invitation for US millions
Introduction
Some research carried out this week revealed that the big investment offered Guyanese into the Gas Bottling and Logistics Company in which the Office of the Prime Minister has invited interest of US$1Mn for a total of US$40 million, is barely more than a shell company. In fact, the company has been incorporated with a share capital of G$500,000 under the direction and control not through NICIL, the State’s established holding company, but directly by the Cabinet of Guyana.
That decision must arouse suspicion and concern. NICIL exists to hold and manage State investments within a recognised framework of governance and accountability. To bypass it and create a company by Cabinet introduces a parallel structure with no track record, no clear oversight, and no obvious rationale. It is not a technical variation. It is a fundamental departure. Moreover, the imbalance between the government’s indicated financial input and that of the public is unheard of even if the government as a miniscule shareholder, did not seek to exercise total control.
Any person who might have been thinking of investing in the company should exercise great caution. Such an investment is dangerous and frankly, insane. No serious investor should ignore that asymmetry. When things go well, control determines decisions. When things go wrong, it determines accountability. Here, the public bears the financial exposure without the protections that ordinarily accompany such investment – regulatory protection, clear and independent oversight, clear governance, and enforceable rights. Instead, what is offered is a “guarantee” of return unsupported by the disclosures and safeguards required under the law. This is not how capital markets function.
That development reinforces what was already evident last week. The invitation by the Office of the Prime Minister is unlawful. It runs counter to both the Companies Act and the Securities Industry Act, which regulate public offerings and exist to protect investors.
What is worse is that this investment is in a company arising from the grossly mismanaged gas to energy project which itself arose out of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement. The scale and frequency of bad news, no planning, gross incompetence, and poor and costly judgment, appear to have no end. There is no review, no personnel change and no accountability. Worse, no one has been held responsible and it is business as usual. Surely it is time to ask the head of the project for his resignation, on pain of being fired.
This Government came to office promising to renegotiate the 2016 Petroleum Agreement. It did not. It retreated instead to “better contract administration.” Then it traded the country’s sovereignty for sanctity of contract. Yet years into production, it has not even managed that. What we are witnessing is not administration. It is misreading, misapplication, and abdication, not only in relation to petroleum, but also totally in relation to gas.
The Agreement says what it is: a Petroleum Agreement. Article 11 of the Agreement limits cost recovery to petroleum operations. Article 12 deals with gas, but within a system of plans, approvals, and, where necessary, separate terms. The line is clear. Government gas infrastructure outside an approved Development Plan must be paid for by the Government and must not reduce profit oil. What is being done now is wrong.
The position on gas is set out clearly in the Agreement. Associated gas comes with oil. It forms part of petroleum operations and must be included in an approved Development Plan. If properly approved, its costs may be recovered. Non-associated gas is different. It does not arise from oil production and is not part of petroleum operations. It requires its own plan, and possibly its own agreement. It cannot be treated as part of the petroleum project. That distinction matters because it determines what costs may properly enter the cost recovery system.
When gas-to-energy costs are applied to the petroleum revenue, the system is being misused. Those are national infrastructure costs to be borne by the State. If properly treated, they would not reduce profit oil, but would instead fall directly on the Treasury, increasing Government outflows.
There is, however, a further and equally troubling possibility. The State may bear the capital cost of the infrastructure, while the contractor secures a share of the gas revenues once the system is operational. In that case, the country pays twice – first through the upfront investment, and again through the sharing of the returns. Exxon understands these outcomes and is content with a loose application of the Agreement that leaves these issues unresolved, and exploitable.
That is precisely why the treatment of gas cannot be left to assumption or convenience. Associated gas must be governed strictly within an approved Development Plan under the Petroleum Agreement, while non-associated gas requires its own clear framework, whether by plan or by separate agreement. Without that clarity, the risk is not only misapplication, but a structure in which the State funds the capital cost but shares the revenue.
This is why the Government’s failure is no small matter. We continue to misread and misapply the 2016 Agreement, with consequences that are immediate and irreversible. Like the gas-to-energy project, failure here is not abstract. It is measured in lost revenue, weakened public services, and missed opportunities for development. The country has the resource. What it lacks is the discipline and competence to manage it.