Author: Christopher Ram

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Destroying the Integrity of the Presidency

Dear Editor,

The presidency is the most sacred office in our Republic – its occupant sworn to uphold the Constitution and to serve all the people without fear or favour. Under President Ali, that office has been diminished – through evasion, manipulation, and a style of governance that rewards loyalty over merit, secrecy over transparency, and partisanship over national unity. It is a presidency that serves first the Party, then its leaders, its loyalists, and finally, their families and friends.

The recent exchanges between President Ali and Azharuddin Mohamed are a symptom of the reliability of his (Ali’s) words and his personal credibility. When confronted with documented evidence – via WhatsApp messages – that he facilitated the undervaluation for customs purposes of a high-end vehicle, Ali ridiculed the source. Pressed further, he hid behind the standard “I cannot recall,” blaming it on receiving too many messages. Ali, a borderline Generation X and Y leader – who wants to position Guyana as a global IT and AI hub – expects Guyanese to believe he does not know that WhatsApp messages do not overlap but scroll, that they do not disappear but are stored in the Cloud. Is that the best President Ali can do?

But this evolving posture of duplicity and convenience, denial and indifference, is part of President Ali’s playbook. He campaigned on a promise to renegotiate the 2016 oil agreement – by far the worst in modern oil deals. Once elected, “unable to recall”, he hid behind the doctrine of sanctity of contract. His Party’s pledge to investigate the circumstances into that agreement, has morphed into a refusal to release the Clyde & Company report on the agreement. Groveling to his new masters, he refuses to exercise the government’s rights to apply ringfencing, enforce relinquishment, and conduct serious audits. Audits are delayed, cost claims go unchallenged and published information by the oil companies are deceptive and misleading. Is that truly what the President thinks Guyanese deserve?

And most disturbingly, the government refuses to disclose who issues tax certificates to the oil companies – allegedly used to claim foreign tax credits in the United States. This refusal shields the process from public scrutiny and makes the state complicit, perhaps even an accessory, in facilitating offshore tax evasion. Worse still, the recently passed Oil Spill Liability Bill completely ignores the environmental risks to our neighbours – including one waiting for an excuse to pounce, should an offshore spill affect its territory. Not to mention the government’s complete dismissal of citizens’ right to have a say in the Bill. Is that the responsible and patriotic act, President Ali?

At home, when twenty children perished in state custody at Mahdia, President Ali appointed a commission of inquiry designed not to pursue the truth, but to control the result. The government also quietly bought off an Amerindian child victim of serious sexual misconduct. And then had the audacity to declare – as he did just two days ago – that he would dedicate his life to lifting the children of Guyana. Does our President not realise that this smells of hypocrisy?  

His commitment to the administration of justice is no less duplicitous. His long and oft-repeated promise to address the confirmation of the Chancellor and Chief Justice is as clear a signal as any that judicial independence remains hostage to political expediency and subject to retribution and weaponisation. His tolerance for unprincipled and even lawless conduct is equally evident. His government openly rewards those who cross the floor and punishes those who dissent. The case of Dr. Tara Kissoon – who unlawfully overstayed her time in the National Assembly and was warmly welcomed into the PPP – is further evidence of the culture of reward for improper conduct. President did the same with Charrandass Persaud, who betrayed the APNU+AFC Government and was rewarded by Ali with a top-level diplomatic posting.

He is comfortable using public funds to pay officials not for what they do, but for what they are willing not to do. The Commissions of Information, Public Procurement, and Integrity are classic examples – offices reduced to sinecures, betraying their constitutional mandates and the public trust. Instead of embracing the rule of law, the President is content to reward donors of dark money to his campaign coffers, refusing to consider any form of campaign finance reform. His PPP/C operates entirely outside of any legal framework and is almost certainly in violation of anti-money laundering rules – as do the Opposition parties. In ignoble acts, he is at one with the opposition.

The structure of his administration is built not on law, but on favours and fear –  a deliberate strategy of reward and punishment. In his distorted economic order, the poor survive on occasional handouts of $100,000, while those with connections benefit to the tune of millions – through contracts, tax concessions and sweetheart deals. One example close to him is the Silica City project, which is not accounted for or disclosed anywhere in the national Budget or the public records. The project is run by the Ministry of Housing, of which he was once Minister and which has, since then, been mired in allegations of corruption. Let us not repeat the past.

The public has also taken note of the now-revealed relationship between President Ali and businessman Mohamed. But what began as concern over a personal association has evolved into something deeper. The episode exposed a culture of proximity and privilege -where access to the President silences scrutiny, stifles competition, and reaffirms that in Guyana, political interests and connections trump transparency. Through all this, the state-funded media -which falls under President Ali – remains closed to opposition, independent and civil society voices. Citizens are denied a platform for response, even as they fund the very institutions that attack and exclude them.

Perhaps most revealing is that President Ali was quite prepared to accept Mohamed’s largess until Mohamed announced political ambitions – exposing the transactional nature of Ali’s associations and improper motives.  

President Ali’s actions constitute a grave betrayal of the Guyanese public who gave him the privilege of being their leader. When concerns were raised over the nature and speed of his academic qualifications, the public chose to look past them. And when the APNU+AFC coalition attempted to subvert the electoral process in 2020, Guyanese of all backgrounds defended Ali’s constitutional right to assume office. That trust has been repaid with secrecy, arrogance, betrayal, and deception.

In an enlightened country driven by truth, principle and integrity, that betrayal should be cause for his resignation. By the same yardstick, he ought not to be re-elected. Unfortunately, the several persons I spoke with this past week have all expressed pessimism about the future of the country. September 1 will tell us whether those fears are well founded.

Yours faithfully, Christopher Ram

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Business Commentary: Sugar Dreams and Capital Nightmares – A Response to Paul Cheong – Part 27

By Christopher Ram

Introduction

Paul Cheong, appointed Chief Executive Officer of GuySuCo just over a year ago, has been pitching a vision for the sugar industry that sounds remarkably familiar: more investment in machinery, expanded packaging facilities, upgraded logistics, drone technology, and greater mechanisation to make up for a shrinking labour force. It all sounds promising: until we go behind the numbers.

Mr. Cheong does not come to the job with a record of high-level managerial experience in agribusiness or complex state enterprises. In fact, his most recent outing was as Chair of the Private Sector Commission, during a period marked by accelerating dysfunction and declining public credibility in that organisation. That track record does little to inspire confidence in his ability to navigate the far more challenging terrain of GuySuCo.

While he cannot be blamed for the more structural issues at the Corporation, he does not escape responsibility for some of the poor results. Undeterred by reality, he now has even more billions to be poured into capital works, as though the problem were a lack of equipment rather than failed leadership and flawed strategy.

Dream on

This is a rerun of the same movie.  New CEO promising transformation but leaving a final scene worthy of cinematic metaphor: not a triumphant turnaround, but a graveyard of expensive, inappropriate equipment. Rerun the cycle. If this is Paul Cheong’s plan for GuySuCo’s revival, it is not a business strategy – it is wishful thinking dressed up in technical jargon. This journey into fantasyland costs the country huge sums. According to Agriculture Minister Zulfikar Mustapha, since the return of the People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) to power in 2020, over $28 billion to improve productivity across the sector, including $13.3 billion for 2025 alone. That is a staggering number and suggests caution. But then Cheong was on the PPP/C list that had the crazy idea of reopening the shuttered estates.

Mr. Cheong speaks of progress: of drones, of predictive maintenance, of Brazilian partnerships. But GuySuCo’s past is littered with announcements just like these, each one arriving with a price tag and disappearing into the black hole of unmeasured outcomes. He cannot explain what portion of the 2025 Government subsidy has been spent and the expected returns. But he sails on: no one to account to.

GuySuCo does not suffer from a lack of equipment. It suffers from a lack of accountability, transparency, and leadership grounded in agronomic and financial reality. Every season of mismanagement, every dollar wasted on ill-timed or ill-considered machinery, moves us further from viability and deeper into a pit of public debt.

At what point does a government say “enough”? When will taxpayers, especially the unemployed, underpaid, and underserved in other sectors – demand a stop to this endless bail-out of an industry whose cost of production exceeds the world market price by a factor of two times? To put this in stark terms: it would be cheaper to import sugar than to continue producing it under these circumstances.

Not my first run

This is not the first time I have spoken out on the state of the sugar industry.

In 2010, I wrote a five-part series titled GuySuCo Needs Drastic Surgery to Ensure Survival, dissecting the corporation’s finances, its bloated costs, and the strategic failures behind the Skeldon debacle. Then Agriculture Minister Robert Persaud took objection. Then in 2015, I appeared before the Parvattan Commission of Inquiry, urging a rational, evidence-based approach to reform – one that acknowledged the industry’s structural weaknesses rather than papering over them with politics.

And here we are again in 2025 – fifteen years later – confronting the same old story: poor decision-making, political interference, the appointment of the wrong people, and the removal of those who dared to speak the truth or ask the hard questions.

GuySuCo has become a theatre of dysfunction. The PPP/C government, which campaigned on the promise to reopen shuttered estates, has in fact overseen their further decay. That promise was never rooted in economic realism – it was a political slogan, not a viable plan. What followed has been an even greater politicisation of the industry, with President Irfaan Ali taking a direct hand in operations and appointments. Square pegs have been forced into triangular holes, and capable professionals have been sidelined in favour of loyalists. Promises are recycled. Excuses are reissued. Capital is burned. And accountability is nowhere in sight. Losses mount.

Conclusion

The sugar industry once built this country. It was the backbone of our economy, our employment, and our exports. But it must not now become the millstone around our necks – dragging down our national finances, distorting our development priorities, and draining our public resources.

But it secures the PPP/C electoral support. That is the only thing that matters.

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Public Procurement Commission and Commission of Information: How Constitutional Bodies Betray Their Purpose

Introduction

As Guyana’s economy expands at an unprecedented pace, driven by transformative oil revenues and ambitious infrastructure development, hundreds of billions of dollars in both recurrent and capital budget expenditures annually fall within the purview of the Public Procurement Commission (PPC). This massive scale of public spending, coupled with citizens’ constitutional right to access information about these procurement decisions through the Commission of Information, makes the oversight role of both bodies more critical than ever.

Unfortunately, the current PPC has failed to meet even the minimum standards of competence, accountability and integrity. They are made worse by a web of conflicts that undermine the very foundations of constitutional governance. This failure is particularly damning when contrasted with the exemplary work of the previous Corbin-Gopaul PC which included two persons with earned PhD’s, two with Masters – one in finance and one in Procurement – and the fifth person with both engineering and legal professional qualifications. They produced a comprehensive body of work, including a strategic plan, detailed investigation reports, policy guidance to procuring entities, an employee handbook that any organisation in Guyana would consider exemplary, and proactive correspondence addressing systemic procurement issues. They demonstrated courage and independence by compelling a senior Minister to appear before them in their investigation into drug purchases at the Georgetown Public Hospital Corporation.  

PPP/C’s failure

Fifteen years after the Constitution mandated a Procurement Commission and 13 years after the Procurement Act during which oversight under successive PPP/C Administrations was troublingly inadequate, the first Commission was appointed by President Granger in 2016, comprising the persons identified above. Mrs. Carol Corbin gave up a secure position at the CARICOM Secretariat and, supported by a team that met all the Constitution requirements, began discharging their constitutional duties. Commencing with no fixed place of abode, the Commission’s legacy includes strengthening Guyana’s entire public procurement framework and establishing proper rules of procedure, work that demonstrated the transformative potential of competent constitutional oversight.

The current Commission, headed by Ms. Chase and Vice-chair Berkley Wickham, a former Head of the National Procurement and Tender Administration (NPTAB), represents this standard’s complete antithesis. NPTAB was the subject of adverse criticisms during Mr. Wickham’s tenure there.

Egregious conflicts

At the centre of this institutional failure lies an extraordinary conflict of interest that spans both the Procurement and the Information Commissions. Ms. Chase continues to engage in private legal practice despite holding a full-time constitutional post, most troublingly serving as legal counsel for the Commissioner of Information in both his official and personal capacity. This interlocking relationship creates obvious consequences for the independence and effectiveness of both bodies, even if they were otherwise operating competently.

Under the Access to Information Act, the Commissioner exercises certain functions over the PPC. Without compromising both offices, the Chairperson cannot act as legal counsel for the very official to whom her Commission is answerable in a statutory relationship. Indeed, the PPC is also subject to the Commission of Information, exacerbating the conflicts and effectively neutering both institutions’ capacity to meet their intended purposes.

Ms. Chase’s position seems irretrievably egregious. Her relationship with Ramson appears to breach the PPC’s Code and the Code of Conduct under the Legal Practitioners Act, which prohibits attorneys from engaging in behaviour that undermines the dignity of the profession or the administration of justice.

This raises serious doubts about the judgment of both these senior lawyers.

Performance

The investigative record of the current PPC in its first year is equally indefensible. Only two of the ten complaints noted in its first-year report tabled in the National Assembly seem to have been satisfactorily concluded. The procedures for one were not followed, and there was no evidence of procedures being followed in another. Two were awaiting further information, and four were stalled pending the receipt of legal advice. Not only was the advice received several weeks before the end of the reporting period, but it was also months before the report’s submission date.

The Commission’s failure to act on these seems to evidence a high level of dysfunction. Even more astonishing is that legal advice was sought on a foundational issue: whether the Commission could investigate matters that predated its appointment. Any competent body or legal professional should resolve this basic jurisdictional point without external input. This contrasts with the previous Commission’s proactive investigations into major contracts like the New Demerara River Bridge feasibility study, their oversight of pharmaceutical procurement, and their systematic approach to addressing procurement irregularities across government agencies.

The report fails to note critical information, including contract values, procurement methods and the basis of selection. A separate compliance review of twelve projects is similarly limited, omitting the names of contractors, values and timelines. I would not wish to bore readers with another set of contrasts except to state that those set the benchmark for thoroughness and transparency.

Beyond these procedural and ethical failings, the Commission’s internal structure appears designed to obstruct functionality. The offices once assigned to Commissioners were repurposed, leaving Commissioners without a dedicated workspace. It is unacceptable and confidence-destroying for a constitutional body to operate in this manner, notably when the previous Commission had established proper operational procedures and professional standards, which the current Commission bizarrely sought to criticise in its first annual report. 

Conclusion

The current Commission’s term expires in about six weeks. We look forward to seeing the reports for the twelve months to July 2024 and 2025 to measure the decline. Commissioner Ramson appears entrenched for life – or at least as long as the PPP remains in power. There is little to look forward to there.

The previous PPC proved that this institution could excel. The current Commission’s standards represent institutional decline and a betrayal of constitutional principles. The vast resources over which they exercise constitutional and statutory functions make their poor performance too essential to ignore.

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Critical Review of the ExxonMobil Guyana 2024 Annual Report

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 159 – June 6,  2025

Exxon’s 2024 Financial Statements

1. Overview

Earlier this week ExxonMobil Guyana Limited (EMGL) summoned the Guyana press to the launch of its2024 Annual Report. Two conditions: only questions on the financial statements would be entertained and the number of questions strictly restricted. Like one of its junior partners Hess, the results for 2024 are staggering, and its profitability measures more that double the Exxon group as a whole. Guyana’s Stabroek Block now joins Kohinoor (India circa 1300) and the Cullinan (South Africa 1905) to create an imperial trinity of exploitation of plunder acquired under unequal terms, adorned as triumph and defended by the exploiter and the exploited.

Unusually for a branch or what is called an External Company incorporated in The Bahamas, Exxon publishes a glossy annual report with more photographs than our own public companies. It presents a glowing picture of economic transformation and partnership with the people and the Government of Guyana. However, beneath the positive narrative, the report glosses over – or buries – critical details about the tax treatment under the 2016 Petroleum Agreement, including the government’s controversial obligation to pay Exxon’s taxes.

One cannot help but describe Exxon’s statements as a deliberate web of deception – as they have been since the overstating of pre-2016 costs. The Business Service Manager announced a 60% increase in revenue while the actual figures show 56%, a result of how far they will go to conceal the fact that they do not pay taxes – Guyana pays it on their behalf. The difference between the 56% shown above and the 60% announced is as a result of adding the tax shown as deducted – which they do not pay – to the revenue which in 2023 was shown as “includes] non-customer revenue related to Article 15.4 of the Agreement”. SHAME on the Company, SHAME on the Government and SHAME on our accounting profession which never calls them out.

As a percentage Production cost has remained at 4% of revenue, Exploration cost 1% of Revenue, Lease Interest 3% and Royalty 2%. The big cost is Depreciation and Amortisation of $301,849 Mn which makes up 17% of Revenue.  

One titillating statistic: Exxon’s total comprehensive income for the year – after accounting for taxes which the Government pays – is close one and a quarter trillion dollars. It took Guyana fifty-nine years before its budget reached one trillion dollars. Exxon earns in income for its foreign shareholders substantially more in less than ten years.

Thank you Trotman, thank you Jagdeo and thank you Ali!

The Balance Sheet

The Balance Sheet is sometimes called the Statement of Affairs or Statement of Net worth or simply Statement of Assets and Liabilities. The table below is a (slightly) summarised restatement of the audited financial statements. The figures are stated in Guyana Dollars but for convenience, the table is prepared in millions of Guyana Dollars.

 

Highlights

Expenditure on Wells and Production facilities accounts for $605,000 Mn, of which a significant portion comes out of Work in Progress. Deferred and Trade Receivable has increased by 90% and requires some explanation. Deferred Receivable represents amount due from Joint Venture Partners from cash calls and also non-customer revenue which is probably the amount it expects to receive from the Government of Guyana to meet its tax obligations. An amount that will be cleared in four months’ time is hardly a deferred receivable but that is how flexible and creative Exxon is.  

What is even more astounding is the amount of $352,681 Mn. described as amounts due from the Home Office to fund Petroleum Operations. The average amount due from the Home Office over the year is just short of $400,000 Mn. That’s an embarrassment of wealth.

What makes this situation even more incredible, is that in 2024, this 45% interest in the Stabroek Block – our Stabroek Block – earned Exxon’s 45% interest a whopping $1,255,300 Mn, or $1.2 Trillion. That is more than 150% that Guyana is likely to earn by way of income through the Consolidated Fund.

The tax mystery

The mysterious tax arrangement is causing all kinds of contortion and deception among the oil companies. Here is a comparison of the note on tax charge in 2024 compared with 2023.

20242023
  Note 7 – INCOME TAX EXPENSE Income Tax Expense is recognised in respect of taxable profit calculated on the basis of the income tax laws of Guyana that have been enacted as of the date of these financial statements.
Note 7 – INCOME TAX EXPENSE Under Article 15.2 of the Petroleum Agreement, the Branch is subject to the Income Tax Laws of Guyana with respect to filing returns, assessment of tax, and keeping of records. Under Article 15.4 of the Petroleum Agreement, the sum equivalent to the tax assessed on the Branch will be paid by the Minister responsible for Petroleum to the Commissioner General, Guyana Revenue Authority and is reported as non-customer revenue.

Conclusion

ExxonMobil is the first Branch entity that produces an Annual Report. It is shiny, designed to present an image of corporate responsibility and national partnership. That is a trap. Exxon knows how to play gullible politicians like those they have met in Guyana. In the Coalition, they met amateurs, dazzled by oil, eager to please and out of their depth. In the PPP, they confuse the bright ones out of renegotiation, ring-fencing, an independent Petroleum Commission and into insider dealings, fears and cowardice. Exxon did not need to change its strategy. Just the faces across the table.

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The Oil Spill Bill – Unfit for presidential assent

Every Man, Woman and Child Must Become Oil-Minded Part 158

Introduction

On May 17, 2025, the National Assembly passed the Oil Pollution Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Responsibility Bill on a voice vote. The bill’s thirty-seven clauses and three schedules were considered en bloc, meaning that no clause-by-clause examination was conducted. One wonders whether the Speaker or the Mover of the bill wanted to avoid a critical analysis of the Bill’s provisions.

It may be coincidental that the architects have incorporated the ubiquitous PPP into the title. In any case, a Bill should be judged not by its title or acronyms, however unique, but by its contents. On that basis, when evaluated against international standards, this law collapses under its own inadequacies. In coming to this conclusion, I assessed the Bill against ten criteria drawn from international best practice, including the experience of countries like the United States, Canada, and Norway, as well as the principles set out in global instruments such as the IMO’s Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention (1990). These criteria are not academic – they reflect solid, real-life experience.

Each has been forged in the crucible of real oil spills, corporate denials, and costly public clean-ups. They cover the core elements of effective legislation: scope, prevention, monitoring, financing, preparedness, liability, penalties, public participation, institutional design, and legal coherence. Although a senior Minister ruled out any input from me in the discussion on the Bill as “unhelpful”, what follows is not a partisan view – it is a professional assessment based on years of studying and writing on Oil and Gas.

Poor grade

The analysis reveals that the Guyana Bill falls short of meeting objective standards: it is non-compliant with eight of the ten standards, partially compliant with two, and fully compliant with none.

“Strong” = Fully or substantially compliant; “Moderate” = Partially compliant or significant compliance with notable gaps; “Weak” = non-compliant or largely deficient

Structural weaknesses

There is no definition for the critical term “petroleum operations” in the Bill. The term is defined in the 1986 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, adopted in the 1999 Agreement, and defined differently in the 2021 Petroleum Activities Act. Littering the Bill with undefined, critical terms like pipelines, transportation systems, subcontractors – often the source of actual pollution – is not just poor drafting, but an open invitation for litigation. The “helpful input” from relevant industry experts is woefully lacking. And that is not one of the ten criteria!

While Clause 12 imposes a general duty to prevent pollution, it delegates sweeping regulatory powers to the Minister, without prescribing scope, principles, or limitations. Even more troubling, the Minister is authorised to amend all three Schedules to the Bill by negative resolution, which avoids parliamentary scrutiny. In the context of a largely dormant National Assembly, this backdoor lawmaking is inappropriate and dangerous. Further, the Bill defers critical technical standards to future regulations, effectively legislating in blank. And while it references substantial penalties, it is silent on enforcement architecture: no inspectors, timelines or triggers.

Notable absences

Despite its ambitions, the Bill stops short of establishing a proper licensing regime for oil spill preparedness and response. Instead, it requires only the approval of contingency plans — an administrative hurdle rather than a substantive regulatory gatekeeping mechanism. This means that an operator may legally function without ever being granted or held to a formal licence under this Act. Compounding this shortfall is the Bill’s treatment of financial responsibility. While it nominally requires responsible parties to maintain financial assurance, it defers the standard by allowing coverage only “as far as practicable.” This vague qualifier erodes the principle of strict liability. It opens the door to discretionary interpretations and potential evasions – a troubling prospect in a country exposed to high-risk petroleum operations and limited enforcement capacity.

On liability and obligations, the Bill makes any director, manager, or secretary personally liable only if the offence is proved to have been committed with their consent or connivance. These are high thresholds for a prosecutor to overcome. If the framers were serious about prevention, they could have made the more egregious cases strict liability offences, shifting the burden onto those responsible for compliance, rather than requiring the prosecution to prove mental elements like intent or collusion.

Monitoring obligations fare no better. Operators must report pollution as soon as it occurs (Clause 14). Responsible parties must submit an oil spill contingency plan to the CDC, and Clause 29 requires them to conduct periodic inspections following that plan. But notably, it is empowered to audit only the records, not to conduct a physical or other inspection.

To be continued

In the next column, we will examine the special case of ships, funding, the relevance of the 2016 Agreement and guaranties and indemnities.