From Destiny to Prosperity Part 1.
Introduction
Today’s column begins the review of Trotman’s book From Destiny to Prosperity – the names of two of the first three Floating Storage and Production Offshore vessels (FPSO) in the petroleum operations conducted by the Contractors in the Stabroek Block, the other being Unity. The book explains that the choice of names was intended to reflect Trotman’s assessment of Guyana’s trajectory as a petrostate.
The book has 10 chapters and six appendices over 187 pages, each chapter representing an “individual episode in time and circumstance”. Appendix C is a report submitted to Trotman by Mr. Newell Dennison, the head of the GGMC, of a meeting he and his deputy attended in Texas at Exxon ‘s offices, a couple months before the signing of the 2016 Agreement. While the meeting was intended to be a technical meeting, Exxon not only raised contractual matters, but it also resisted reasonable points raised by the Guyana team. Whether or not it had any instructions to do so, the report by the GGMC team suggests that the team did not clarify that contractual matters were not part of the team’s remit.
Appendix D reproduces a statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Greenidge delivered on 14 December 2017 in the National Assembly on the issue of the signing bonus. Trotman’s narrative on the signing bonus is addressed more fully later in this review. Interestingly, Greenidge’s speech was delivered two weeks before the government finally released the 2016 Agreement, confirming a signing bonus. That statement is unsparing of this columnist, no doubt for having first exposed the payment of a signing bonus, two months earlier. Because this review is neither about Greenidge nor me, I leave the matter there, for now.
Motive
In a nine-page Preface to the book, Trotman sets out as his motive for writing it, the need for Guyanese to hear from him definitively on certain matters, that he does not set out to apologise but to explain, to give his side, his context, and even his defence to the “lies, half-truths, misunderstandings, misinformation and vile accusations that have been uttered”. In more restrained language, he explains that much of what he wrote is meant to provide the context surrounding the signing of the 2016 Production Sharing Agreement.
Describing his twenty-eight years in public life as both exciting and gut-wrenching, Trotman praises Presidents Hoyte and Granger for their patriotism, leadership and greatness. He explained “The Bahamas encounter” as a brief conversation in that country with Granger in which the latter set out his vision for Guyana and they shared their collective hope of a change from the “dark, divided and dystopian body politic of Guyana”.
Trotman also recalled that at a meeting at the Public Buildings after the 2011 election results had been declared, Granger proposed to Donald Ramotar, president-elect, that all the parties should come together and form a government of national unity. Ramotar recalls such a meeting but not the specifics of such a call.
Trotman acknowledges two mistakes by him that can prove fatal in politics – expecting others to come to his defence, and his failure to respond to critics.
Chapter 1: Becoming a Minister
In chapter one, the writer traces his political pedigree to his maternal grandfather and recounts his own career in public service covering city council, Member of Parliament, Speaker of the National Assembly and leader of the Alliance for Change, which in coalition with the A Partnership for National Unity won the 2015 elections against considerable odds. Describing Guyana’s democracy as poisoned by ethnic tensions and suspicions, Trotman considers himself as fortunate and blessed to have worked with two presidents, Desmond Hoyte and David Granger, who both possessed qualities of humaneness and greatness and from whom he learnt valuable lessons. While crediting David Granger’s integrity, intellect, and deep love for country, he stated that Granger was definitely not a politician.
Trotman acknowledges that it was Moses Nagamootoo who as a fellow UG student, first stirred his latent interest in politics. He also claims that despite having successfully managed the 2015 alongside Joe Harmon, his name was not submitted for a ministerial position under the terms of the Cummingsburg Accord between the APNU and the AFC. Instead, he was tipped to be named as an advisor and then, to his confusion and surprise, he learnt via a telephone call from a secretary that he would be named a cabinet minister with responsibility for the “national patrimony”, a term no doubt the brainchild of President Granger. Yet, by then, he had no call or conversation with the President, and it was Trotman who subsequently asked for a meeting with Granger.
It was only after several months of confusion that he learnt that he was also be responsible for governance issues, part of which was the writing of the code of conduct for ministers and members of cabinet. In a subsequent cabinet reshuffle, the portfolio of governance was transferred to Prime Minister Moses Nagamootoo while Trotman was re-designated Minister of Natural Resources, handing him what he describes as the “poisonous petroleum chalice.”
Chapter two: The Vision
In this , Trotman sets out the APNU+AFC’s vision for the natural resources sector which he credits entirely to President Granger. Granger had defined the Ministry’s role to be “ensuring the responsible exploration and exploitation of natural resources, land management, rivers and the sustainable mack, management of mines, forests and other natural assets.” In a nod to the political culture of Guyana, he discloses that he lost friends and valuable family relationships because of his inability to grant jobs to people without requisite qualifications and those who sought preferential treatment for the award of contracts and mining and forestry concessions.
Trotman claims as two areas of success Guyana’s signing on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) for which he gave kudos to Mike McCormack, the GHRA head, and the Youth in Natural Resources programme. In respect of the EITI, he expressed the belief that there were many then who opposed transparency, some of whom “still linger” and are now “more emboldened.” Such serious accusations without examples do an injustice to those who supported transparency.
Chapter 3: Putting Systems in Place
The writer lists the several government agencies for which he had ministerial responsibility, including Forestry, the Gold Board, the GGMC and the EPA, described by him as a” massive responsibility, and admittedly, unwieldly at times.” Of these, he described the GGMC, under which there has long been a Petroleum Unit, as the most difficult to oversee, functioning “almost with a mind of its own”. While claiming that senior officers of the GGMC were capable, he makes the not-too-subtle point that they were also suspicious of, and marginally resistant to change. Trotman also relates his concerns about rumours of impropriety in the GGMC, citing a specific example when he threatened the head of GGMC of calling in the Police over reports of corruption by “some misguided and unscrupulous GGMC officer.”
Another major challenge identified by him as “managing” the miners – over the tension between large and small miners, insufficient land for mining, raiding and illegal mining, and pollution and environmental degradation. The waning influence of the big miners following the discovery of oil was not in any way helped by President Granger’s description of the mined landscape in the hinterland as “abscesses”, and the efforts to assist small miners owing to the influence of Minister Simona Broomes.
Trotman recounts fewer problems with forestry and the gold and diamond sectors, noting the independence he gave chairpersons Mr. Stanley Ming at the GGMC, Ms. Jocelyn Dow at the Forestry Commission and Ms. Jocelyn Williams and later, Mr. GHK Lall at the Gold Board.
Next week’s column will focus on Chapters 4 and 5 – Interaction with Exxon and the 2016 Production Sharing Agreement.
