Author: Christopher Ram

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Business & Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram

Mr. Deodat Sharma, Auditor General, is reported to have applied for a two-year extension of his tenure. It will be recalled that Mr. Sharma was confirmed many years ago in circumstances best described as accidental, following the absence of an AFC member from the Public Accounts Committee on the day of confirmation. It should also be recalled that the office of Auditor General carries the same constitutional status and security of tenure as the Chancellor of the Judiciary and the Chief Justice.

Approval and any extensions rest with the Executive President.  At the same time, President Irfaan Ali has retained the portfolio of Finance and is therefore constitutionally the Minister of Finance, with Dr. Ashni Singh serving as Senior Minister with responsibility for finance within the Office of the President. It is difficult to find a word that adequately captures this anomaly without offending editorial modesty.

The appointment of the Auditor General is made formally on the advice of the Public Service Commission. That safeguard is illusory. The Commission itself is appointed by, and remains effectively controlled by, the President and is chaired by a close associate of the governing party. This executive-centred circularity, embedded in the 1980 Constitution, is not treated by the ruling party as a flaw but exploited as a feature.

Such a framework is structurally incapable of producing independence. What-ever autonomy exists must come entirely from the personal courage, professional standing and institutional assertiveness of the individual appointed. When those qualities are absent – or discouraged – the office becomes an extension of executive convenience rather than a check upon it. It is in that context that the present request for an extension must be understood: not as a question of continuity, but as a measure of how thoroughly independence has been eroded.

Mr. Sharma is not a professionally qualified accountant and does not meet the statutory requirements ordinarily associated with the office. More troubling than qualification, however, is performance. During a period marked by explosive growth in public expenditure running into tens of billions of dollars, the proliferation of discretionary funds and persistently weak financial systems, the Auditor General has shown zero appetite to challenge, interrogate or even issue timely and meaningful warnings.

A review of the 2020 – 2025 Estimates under the Ali Administration shows an annual expansion of discretionary payments. In addition to the 40-hour part-time employment programme, cost-of-living buffers, community policing stipends and contract employment arrangements, Budget 2026 introduces yet another discretionary initiative, the house repairs programme.

Each of these programmes demands extensive systems audits, rigorous beneficiary verification, reconciliation testing and post-payment forensic review. None has received that level of scrutiny. Taken together, they signal a decisive shift away from rules-based public finance contemplated by the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act toward political control of public funds, with the Auditor General content to observe rather than object.

At the same time, Dr. Singh, as de facto Minister of Finance, has failed to modernise or implement systems capable of tracking, controlling and reporting such spending. This is precisely the environment in which an Auditor General should be demanding additional resources, specialist staff and forensic capacity. Instead, the response has been institutional quiet. Reports are produced on schedule, photographs are taken and deadlines are met – but audit quality, thematic analysis and systemic challenge are absent.

The handling of the Auditor General’s Report for 2024 illustrates the point. It was presented around 30 September 2025 with ceremony. Less than two months later, an “updated” report was delivered on a flash drive, without errata, reconciliation or explanation. This is unprofessional and grave. At best, it signals form over substance; at worst, it raises questions too serious to ignore.

More serious still is what has not been done. Despite clear statutory requirements, the Auditor General has failed year after year to conduct and present annual audits of tax concessions granted under the Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Act. Billions of dollars in foregone revenue remain effectively unaudited. This is not a marginal omission; it goes to the heart of fiscal accountability and ministerial responsibility.

Parliamentary oversight has fared no better. The Government has made a mockery of the work of the Public Accounts Committee by cynically adjusting quorum requirements and repeatedly failing to attend scheduled meetings. Meetings were cancelled not occasionally but serially – some three, four, even five times in succession, including the 54th Meeting in 2023 and the 68th Meeting in 2024. The result is unprecedented: none of the audit years from 2020 to 2024 has been examined. The Committee’s last Chairman left office publicly regretting that the PAC was unable to discharge its constitutional function for a single year of the Ali Administration. An Auditor General serious about accountability would have raised alarm. Mr. Sharma did not.

What makes the present situation especially corrosive is that fiscal power and audit influence now sit within the same household. The de facto Minister of Finance presides over unprecedented discretionary spending, while his spouse exercises effective authority within the Audit Office as the de facto Auditor General. That arrangement is incompatible with any serious conception of independence. It would be unacceptable if formalised; it is scarcely less objectionable because it is informal.

The Constitution does not contemplate that the power to spend and the power to audit would be consolidated so intimately, nor that the country would be asked to pretend that this is normal.

It now appears that Mr. Sharma’s request for an extension will be granted by default, not on merit, because of a total absence of succession planning. The alternative would be the formal appointment of the current de facto Auditor General, who is also the spouse of the de facto Minister of Finance.

That situation is only marginally better than formal appointment. Whether the conflict is acknowledged or merely tolerated makes little difference in substance. In either case, audit authority would be exercised by a person whose proximity to the centre of fiscal power fatally compromises independence. The distinction between de facto and de jure becomes one of optics rather than principle.

This is not a justification for extension. It is an admission of deliberate, inexcusable and unacceptable governance failure. Succession planning in a constitutional office is not optional; it is a duty. Its neglect has produced a false and manufactured choice: retain an Auditor General who has failed to assert the office in the public interest, or formalise an arrangement that would extinguish even the appearance of audit independence.

Neither option is acceptable.

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Force majeure, shareholder messaging and a history of accommodation (Part II)

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 175

Introduction

Today’s column concludes a two-part piece arising from comments made by ExxonMobil’s Chief Executive Officer during the company’s fourth-quarter earnings call. When Darren Woods spoke of force majeure “pausing the clock,” he was addressing shareholders and the wider investment community, not the Government of Guyana, a regulator, or an arbitral tribunal.

That context matters. In describing Guyana’s offshore acreage as something Exxon can count on “in the short term and in the longer term,” Woods was signaling future opportunity and growth. Guyana’s petroleum resources were being presented as deferred value — assets temporarily unavailable but nonetheless expected to be realised. In practical terms, Guyana’s natural resources were being used to support ExxonMobil’s forward-looking narrative to American and international shareholders.

What makes that possible is not bravado. It is experience.

Poor history

Guyana’s past treatment of force majeure has been notably permissive. On previous occasions, force majeure has been accepted by the Guyana authorities under expansive and accommodating conditions, with little public explanation and no visible demonstration of strict scrutiny. The practical effect has been repeated extensions of time, prolonged retention of acreage, and the suspension of contractual obligations without a corresponding showing that performance was genuinely prevented.

Over time, that practice shapes expectations. When force majeure is treated as something that can be obtained by request rather than established by proof, it ceases to be exceptional. It becomes routine. Contractors learn that delay carries limited cost and that contractual clocks can be paused with minimal resistance. In such an environment, it is hardly surprising that force majeure is spoken of as an advantage rather than an excuse.

But as we said last week, force majeure is not self-proving, and it is not unilateral. The determination lies with the Government of Guyana, subject to the dispute-resolution and arbitration mechanisms provided for in the Agreement. Where that determination is approached loosely or informally, the legal balance of the contract shifts from the Government.

But Woods is clever. He knows that statements made on international earnings calls shape analyst reports, investor expectations, and perceptions of future reserves. When Guyana’s petroleum acreage is publicly framed as future opportunity awaiting activation, it implicitly assumes State acquiescence. Silence or passivity by the Government in such circumstances risks being interpreted as confirmation.

Government must act

This is why the Government should not treat force majeure as a purely technical footnote. Once it is publicly invoked in a manner that carries market implications, the Government has a duty to engage. Engagement does not require confrontation, but it does require clarity: clarity that force majeure is not automatic; clarity that it is not indefinite; and clarity that it does not confer a future option over national resources.

That duty to engage is heightened by the Government’s own repeated reliance on sanctity of contract as the reason for refusing renegotiation of the 2016 Agreement. That principle cannot operate selectively. If the Agreement is to be respected, it must be enforced in full – including the limits it places on force majeure. Liberal accommodation today undermines contractual discipline tomorrow.

It also weakens Guyana’s position over time. Each unexamined extension – or non-relinquishment or partial relinquishment – becomes precedent in practice, even if not in law. Each accommodation reinforces the perception that even simply asking is more than sufficient. That perception, once entrenched, is difficult to reverse.

None of this is to deny that force majeure may arise in genuine cases. It can. But the history of permissive application explains why force majeure is now spoken of as a benefit to be managed rather than a disruption to be overcome. That is not where Guyana’s petroleum governance should be.

Conclusion

This issue now sits squarely with Cabinet. Continued silence or routine accommodation is no longer neutral; it carries legal and governance consequences. Once force majeure is asserted, the Government’s response becomes an administrative decision affecting public resources and is therefore subject to scrutiny. A history of permissive treatment does not protect such decisions; it weakens them. Cabinet cannot credibly invoke sanctity of contract while allowing force majeure to function as a default extension mechanism.

The choice is between reasserting contractual discipline now, or defending it later under judicial review.

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Speaker’s interruption of Nandranie Singh was out of order

Dear Editor,

In the course of her presentation on the 2026 Budget as shadow Minister of Labour, WIN’s Ms. Nandranie Singh was interrupted by the Speaker, who purported to correct her. Ms. Singh had pointed out that the largest item shown under the Ministry of Labour was not expenditure controlled by the Ministry but a subvention to the Board of Industrial Training. The interruption was out of order. It is not the Speaker’s role to rebut a member’s argument; that responsibility lies with the Government benches whose estimates are under scrutiny. By intervening in this manner, the Speaker crossed from presiding over debate into participating in it.

The intervention was also ill-informed. Mr. Nadir previously served as Minister of Labour and ought therefore to know that the Board of Industrial Training is a creature of statute (Industrial Training Act Cap. 39:04), not a department of the Ministry. And that a subvention does not make its expenditure ministerial spending.

If Mr. Nadir’s tenure as Minister blurred those distinctions, it is not too late for him, as Speaker, to respect them.

Yours faithfully,

Christopher Ram 

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I have not received any payment from Mr. Mohamed, WIN or any sanctioned individual

Dear Editor,

A group photograph I appeared in two days ago, following a two-hour session with the new political party, We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) led by an OFAC sanctioned individual has triggered irrational reaction in certain quarters. The most irrational reaction published as a Breaking News alleges that I was paid $50 million “to prepare Budget Debate” which I thought had been done by the finance minister. That allegation is entirely false, reckless, and malicious.

I have not received, nor have I ever sought or accepted, any payment from Mr. Mohamed, from WIN, or from any sanctioned individual or person acting on behalf of such an individual. The post is plainly designed to create mischief by implying that I have breached Guyana’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws. That implication is wicked, malevolent and unfounded.

Guyana operates a system of parliamentary democracy in which citizens participate in national decision-making through their elected representatives in the National Assembly. Following the presentation of the 2026 Budget, I was approached by the Prime Ministerial candidate of WIN, which secured sixteen seats in the National Assembly, and asked whether I would meet with the Party’s elected members to offer general guidance on the Budget Debate and the Estimates process.

I agreed to do so entirely pro bono.

In addition to the publication of a flagship Focus on Budget published for the past 36 years, our accounting firm consistently provides technical guidance on budgetary, fiscal, and governance matters without charge to representatives of almost every major political party in Guyana, across administrations and across the political spectrum. This is neither novel nor partisan; it is part of my longstanding contribution to public discourse.

As a social and economic commentator, I have a vested interest in ensuring that the Budget Debate is informed, robust, and grounded in fact, regardless of which party occupies the Treasury benches. Parliamentary scrutiny of public expenditure is central to democratic accountability, and engagement aimed at improving that scrutiny is both legitimate and necessary. I will always support and participate in making a modest contribution.

For the avoidance of doubt, I expressly invite my bankers and the Financial Intelligence Unit to review my accounts and deposits. I have nothing to hide.

Finally, the allegation collapses under its own absurdity. If I commanded a fee of $50 million for two hours of work, I would not need to be practising at the age of eighty.

I reserve all my legal rights in relation to this matter.

Sincerely,

Christopher Ram

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Force majeure is not a pause button (Part I)

Every man, woman and child must become oil-minded

Introduction

On 31 January 2026, Stabroek News carried a story that exposes how surreptitiously Exxon seeks to draw every drop of blood – sorry, oil – from Guyana. The report once again brings the issue of force majeure sharply into focus.

Force majeure is a contractual mechanism intended to grant additional time where performance has been genuinely and adversely affected by defined events beyond a contractor’s control. Speaking during ExxonMobil’s fourth-quarter earnings call, the company’s Chief Executive Officer, Darren Woods, stated that portions of the Stabroek Block remain under force majeure because of the Guyana–Venezuela border controversy, adding that one of its advantages is that it “pauses the clock” until the affected acreage becomes accessible.

Force majeure 

In recasting force majeure not as an inability to perform, but as a benefit derived from delay, the formulation matters. But the statement is even more dangerous. First, it ignores Guyana’s permanent sovereignty over its own resources. Second, it treats force majeure not as a temporary legal cause for non-performance, but as a mechanism for preserving future access to Guyana’s petroleum acreage. The language assumes continuity of entitlement, subject only to timing. The sheer arrogance of Exxon and its disregard of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement, of which force majeure is an integral part. 

This concept which traces its origin to the law of contract, is narrow and exceptional, applying only where an event is beyond the reasonable control of one party to an agreement is unable to meet his performance obligations because of an event – an “act of God” – not reasonably foreseen at the time the agreement was signed which genuinely prevents the performance of contractual obligations. It is not designed to suspend contractual time while a contractor waits for more favourable political or legal conditions. That is part of the risk of contracting.

Force majeure is not self-proving and is certainly not unilateral. While one party may assert it, that party does not determine force majeure. Neither Exxon nor its Chief Executive Officer is the arbiter. The determination lies with the Government of Guyana, subject to the Agreement’s dispute-resolution and arbitration provisions.

Questions

Measured against that standard, Exxon’s own account raises questions. The controversy over Guyana’s western border is neither new nor unexpected. It predates the 2016 Agreement by two centuries and was widely known internationally long before Exxon applied for the blocks which it now claims are subject to force majeure. Those blocks formed part of the geopolitical risk environment against which the investment decision was made. Let us not forget that Texas bullied the GGMC team into signing the Agreement. 

Foreseeability matters. A risk that is long-standing and openly acknowledged at the time of the contract cannot later be repackaged as force majeure simply because its resolution has been delayed or its consequences have become inconvenient. Remember too, that devious Exxon partly financed the ICJ case in the matter, in the form of a signing bonus which they and the Coalition sought to conceal.  

Conclusion

Under Guyana’s constitutional and international law framework, including the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, access to petroleum acreage is not suspended property awaiting reactivation by any private contractor. It remains subject at all times to contractual compliance and lawful State decision-making. Force majeure does not confer a future option over national resources; it merely exempts performance where strict conditions are proved to have been met.

Having chosen sanctity of contract over sovereignty, the Government will have to explain why it would now not enforce the Agreement. That principle cannot now be applied selectively. Sanctity of contract means enforcing the Agreement as written, including the limits placed on when performance may be excused.

Whether those limits have been met in the present case is a question that cannot be answered by assertion or optimism of Exxon. It requires careful, independent scrutiny by the State.