Category: Business and Economic Commentary

Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram

Introduction

This is the second and concluding part of a two-part commentary on the underground economy. Part I, published on August 18, 2025, was prompted by the revelations of Azeem ‘Junior’ Baksh in an interview with online reporter Travis Chase – although Baksh has since distanced himself from some of the statements made. The continuation was delayed by intervening elections and a shift in national attention.

Part I explored the origins of Guyana’s underground economy – born of shortages and import substitution – but did not address the criminal economy, which operates alongside, and increasingly, within it. That sphere includes narcotrafficking, illegal mining, smuggling, and other activities that are not merely informal, but outright illegal. Unlike the earlier underground economy, driven by necessity, today’s criminal enterprises rely on laundering, political cover, and networks of protection, often intersecting with official complicity.

Overlap

Before proceeding, it is useful to distinguish the three overlapping spheres. The underground economy lies outside the tax and regulatory net – informal, unrecorded, or under-declared. The criminal economy includes activities that are illegal by definition. The corrupt economy operates within legal structures but subverts them – through bribery, procurement fraud, kickbacks, and abuse of state power for private gain. When they co-exist as they now do, they are more dangerous and detrimental.

The contrast with “underground economy one” is stark. Then, Guyana was one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, behind only Haiti. It was a pariah state, burdened by unsustainable debt, currency shortages, crumbling infrastructure, and mass emigration. Today, the country boasts of the world’s fastest-growing economy and a per capita GDP that rivals developed countries – a transformation estimated at over a 100-fold increase.

As oil catapulted the formal economy past the trillion-dollar mark, the underground was overtaken by a corrupt economy thriving within formal systems but beyond accountability. That wealth thus obtained is now flaunted openly, its source unchallenged. Enforcement agencies – politicised at the top and underpaid below – either look the other way or target only the powerless. In this environment, connections and privilege, not legality, decide who are held to account.

The consequence is that the lines between the underground, the criminal and the corrupt have blurred into convergence. What follows are key segments of the economy where shadow activity now thrives in plain sight.

Gold: More than worth its weight

Gold remains the underground economy’s preferred medium of exchange. With its high value-to-weight ratio, liquidity, and resistance to tracing, it is ideal for discreet transactions. But the issue goes deeper. Guyana is widely believed to serve as a laundering route for gold smuggled from blacklisted jurisdictions like Venezuela and parts of Africa. This gold is exported under Guyana’s name, cloaking it in legitimacy while draining the country of credibility – and revenue.

Narcotics: A Persistent Foundation

The drug kingpins are no longer as conspicuous, but the narcotics trade has not disappeared. Ongoing busts, unexplained wealth, and suspicious transactions point to its continued presence. Guyana’s location keeps it central to transshipment routes between South American producers and North American and European markets. Proceeds still seep into the economy – undeclared, untraceable, and dangerous.

Procurement: The Golden Goose of Corruption

With massive increase in public spending, generous budgeting and poor audit and oversight, public procurement is now a rich source of high-level corruption. The model is familiar: inflated contracts, padded pricing, and poorly supervised improperly executed work with rewards through third parties. Kickbacks appear in various forms, including political payments serving the dual purpose of a reward, and deposits on future state contracts.

Gambling

Gambling, once a vice, is now development policy. A “lucky” night at the slots can explain sudden wealth – real or invented. Online betting in various forms, is almost untraceable. Horseracing, casinos, and digital platforms now serve as ideal channels for laundering illicit income under the guise of entertainment.

Retail and VAT Evasion

The old contraband model – suitcase traders and street forex – has been eclipsed by more complex systems. Large importers, often doubling as wholesalers and retailers, under-invoice imports, move currency off-market, and under-declare VAT. With undocumented foreign workers in retail, security, and construction, evasion extends beyond goods to wages, payroll taxes and social security deducted but not paid over.

Real Estate: The Underground’s Vault

Real estate is another favoured avenue of undisclosed value. Properties are acquired via proxies, relatives, or shell companies, with transactions under-declared or settled in cash. High-end developments often shadow public infrastructure budgets. The cycle is clear: illicit funds from procurement are laundered and locked into real assets – invisible to tax authorities, insulated from scrutiny.

Political Protection and Contributions

Corruption at this level thrives not just on evasion, but on immunity. Politically exposed persons (PEPs) offer cover, and political contributions often act as prepayment for regulatory leniency or future contracts. In return, appointees shield benefactors and frustrate enforcement. The line between campaign finance and criminal facilitation grows ever thinner.

Institutional Paralysis and Political Protection

The overlap among the segments means that there is an erosion of institutional will. Agencies meant to monitor, regulate, and prosecute financial crime are themselves weakened – by political interference and under-resourced. Unless the Police, SOCU, the Procurement Commission, the Integrity Commission and the Commission of Information, are insulated from political control and granted stronger investigative and prosecutorial authority, they will continue being more symbolic than substance.

Conclusion:

Though remnants of the original underground economy remain and should not be dismissed, they have been largely overtaken by a more insidious, corrupt economy – one cloaked in legality, yet beyond the line of legitimacy and legality. Its replacement shifts the tax burden to the honest, distorts markets in favour of the well-connected, and shuts out even the law-abiding. Together, they turn enforcement into a tool of the powerful, while corroding public trust in justice, fairness and the rule of law.

Oil money does not solve these problems. In fact, it exacerbates them. Another of the challenges that will define President Ali’s second term.

Business and economic commentary by Christopher Ram

Introduction

Five political parties – the PPP/C, APNU, AFC, We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) and For-ward Guyana Movement (FGM) – have published their September 1 elections manifesto. Last Friday’s Business and Economic Commentary carried a summary of their proposals for oil and gas. An analysis of the other critical sections follows below.

Overview

None of the parties put any numbers to their proposals. Guyana’s 2025 budget is already financed 27% by borrowings and 39% by oil revenues. APNU promises a $400,000 tax threshold, AFC $250,000, WIN a PAYE cut to 20%, and PPP/C and FGM more relief and “tax justice.” These will have a significant impact on the country’s financial capacity and sustainability and would usually require careful consideration, including tax reform, of which WIN makes a single reference.

Welfare payments stand out in the manifestos. Cash transfers, stipends, subsidies, pensions and the loss-making GuySuCo will all be generously financed. None of the parties explain how this army of citizens will be moved off welfare and into high-paying jobs. Without investment in high-value industries – technology, advanced agriculture, services, renewables and the human capital to drive these – the danger is that Guyana risks becoming a society of handouts, propped up by oil until the wells run dry.

Cost of Living and the Minimum Wage

The parties treat the cost-of-living crisis as an auction of handouts. PPP/C points to grants and subsidies; APNU adds free meals and annual transfers; WIN throws in a “Thrive Grant” and scaled salary hikes. The AFC is quieter but more substantive. None tackles the real drivers of high prices: import dependence, monopoly markets, and weak consumer protection.

Meanwhile, Guyana lives with two minimum wages – one higher for the public sector, and the other for the private sector at barely US$300 per month: unacceptably and unlivably low. Without recognising this distinction, APNU promises $200,000, WIN speaks vaguely of engaging the private sector, AFC supports a “living wage,” and PPP/C hides behind tax relief. FGM mentions fairness but offers no specifics. Both sets of workers shop at the same market, ride on the same minibus and face the same household expenses. It is time that Guyana confronts the need for a unified, decent wage floor.

Institutions and Accountability

The PPP/C promises consultations (again) on constitutional reform, digitised registries, and stronger procurement, but says little about freeing GECOM, and the ERC from stifling government control to make them more effective. APNU pledges to “give teeth” to watchdogs, committing to involve civil society, but avoids specifics on their independence. The AFC nods to commissions while WIN is most detailed, proposing new judicial and rights appointments, a new electoral oversight body, and stronger Integrity and Procurement Commissions.

FGM promises to depoliticise the ERC, re-establish SARA, create an anti-corruption commission, and guarantee independent judicial appointments.

Campaign finance is addressed only by WIN, while all are silent on state media independence. But no one, it seems, wants political party regulation.

Article 77A of the Constitution, which obliges Parliament to guarantee resources for local democratic organs, receives minimal attention. Regions and Local councils remain beggars at the gate, dependent on governmental largesse. Electoral reform to allow independents into geographic constituencies is likewise avoided.

State media continue as weapons of the government of the day, taxpayers funding their own exclusion. With its abuse a daily feature, their omission is a major disappointment. 

Crime and Security

Citizens live in daily fear of crime: those who can afford it secure within gated communities. The Guyana Police Force needs not only reform but independence from the politicians. The PPP/C points to more patrols and equipment but avoids the harder issues of trust in the police and corruption in law enforcement. APNU promises “safe communities” while AFC mentions reform, and WIN and FGM speak broadly of justice. None addresses corruption, the deficit of professionalism in policing or the delays in the courts.

The NIS and Pensions

All the parties speak about pensions – the PPP/C boasting of increases to the old-age pension, APNU and WIN committing $100,000 a month, AFC and Forward Guyana Movement (FGM) invoking “living wages.” Yet the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), the contributory backbone of social security, is ignored. Not a word on the age-old problem of independence, missing contribution records, inadequate benefits, and the endless struggles to place the Scheme on a certain and sustainable trajectory.   

Access to Information

On access to information, the PPP/C promises “greater access” but only after the elections, while APNU speaks of implementing the Act and appointing an independent Commissioner. The AFC goes further, pledging to publish all contracts, permits, licences, EIAs and feasibility studies within a week of approval, while WIN proposes amending the Act to impose time limits and make the Commissioner answerable to Parliament.

FGM is the boldest, promising full transparency – from contracts and expenditures to the daily schedules of officials.

Inclusion and Rights

On gender, disability, and social inclusion, the manifestos offer warm words but insufficient machinery. Equal pay is not enforced, persons with disabilities are treated as charity, not rights, and targets or quotas are absent. On the environment, the AFC stands out. 

Conclusion

The PPP/C has governed for 28 of the past 33 years. It has controlled the machinery of state, dictated and increased borrowings, and spending on what it considers as priorities. But its refusal to embrace action that touches on democracy – access to information, campaign finance rules, independence and the efficient functioning of constitutional bodies – betrays something deeper: a party that treats openness as an existential danger. It does not hesitate to label every civil society organisation – even the Carter Center – as political. Such an obsession with power does not inspire comfort. 

APNU and the AFC carry their own stain: neither has apologised for the attempt to rig the 2020 elections. APNU’s flagship pledge to lift the tax-free allowance from $130,000 to $400,000 per month is hard to justify. The AFC – once the hope for the breakup of the duopoly PPP and PNC by whatever names – has lost its national authority. Yet, its manifesto offers some bold initiatives.

WIN has produced a commendable manifesto with the novel idea of a Transportation Authority and a reference to tax reform. Its challenge will be to assemble a team to carry out its ambitious programme. FGM has also produced a noteworthy manifesto – which it describes as a Contract – with ideas and programmes that can move Guyana forward.

Realistically, these smaller parties have no chance of winning the Presidency/Executive but their lack of governmental experience should not be held against them. Their contribution in an inclusive National Assembly will help take Guyana forward.

PS: I had promised to deal this week with the parallel economy. That will appear next week. 

Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram

Part I: When business disputes expose underground networks

Introduction

The leak of an explosive March 25, 2025, interview between businessman Azeem ‘Junior’ Baksh of Gold Target Imports and intrepid journalist Travis Chase has triggered more than just a public clash between wealthy businessmen. Baksh detailed what he described as a “harrowing” gold importation scheme, claiming it implicated high-ranking officials. “I am sure that they want to close me down,” Baksh said. “Tamesh Jagmohan wants me closed down… Sonna made that very clear to me – if I pursue him for owed cash, (those in authority) would use state agencies to get me.”

The parties have denied the revelations. But beyond the specific business dispute lies a more troubling question: how did our country arrive at a point where underground economic networks appear so deeply intertwined with state power?

This is no child’s play. It recalls a time when the underground economy which kept the country supplied to an extent that it was tolerated by the state and woven into everyday life. But crucially, it did not threaten the state’s survival – it existed around politics, not inside it.

Frighteningly, Baksh, reflecting his experiences, tells us that in this new world, State agencies would act as agents of a different type in service to private disputants.

In the 1970s and 1980s, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish the underground economy from what was described as the official economy. Top public servants and business executives left their offices to buy contraband flour and potatoes and dhal and toilet paper from shops that had lookouts for the state police. After the Sophia Declaration nationalisations, the government controlled an estimated over 80% of the economy. Import licences, foreign exchange rationing, and price controls created chronic shortages. The oil crisis of 1973, collapsing bauxite prices, and the fixed exchange rate of G$2.55 to US$1 became a fiction.

How the original underground worked

On the streets, US dollars traded at several times the official rate. Traders traveled to Trinidad, Suriname, Venezuela, and Curaçao to buy goods with black-market dollars for resale at home. Tellingly, when President Hoyte introduced cambio licences to formalise currency exchange, the men who had been selling US dollars in Commerce Street (where else?) and around Stabroek Market were among the first to apply for licences to operate non-bank cambios.

Border routes moved goods from neighbouring countries: Springlands on the East, Lethem on the South and fuel coming via Morawhanna to the North. Some operators became household names – the man with an oriental nickname who started out dealing with flour, built a massive construction equipment empire, an accomplished athlete who hawked ladies’ underwear was eponymously associated with a nightclub (and noise nuisance) and now a major entertainment and gambling operation.

That phase also produced the market vendor who founded a prominent national newspaper; another whose buildings have transformed Georgetown’s skyline, and three enterprising professionals who pioneered the barrel trade that grew into a major shipping operation. These were textbook cases of how contraband profits could be folded into legitimate corporate identities.

Political tolerance, not dependence

Despite public threats to “stamp out smuggling,” the state often looked the other way. Contraband eased shortages, and the underground currency market provided hard cash that even official agencies sometimes accessed through intermediaries. Crucially, operators did not try to buy political influence – they were traders, not power brokers. Indeed, one of them up to this day describes himself simply as a hustler.

By the mid-1980s, this economy was part of normal life. Border towns like Lethem and Corriverton bustled with unofficial markets. Regent and Water streets offered goods that government outlets lacked. Civil servants and police officers ran small side ventures – a minibus, a shop, rental rooms – to supplement incomes. These were modest, low-profile, and carefully kept separate from public activities.

That sector did not escape academic interest. Perhaps the most famous was Clive Thomas whose study found that the underground economy at 80-100% of the official economy during the mid-1980s. Notable too were Bishnodat Persaud (UWI) and Kenrick Hunte (UG) who found valuable opportunity to study the phenomenon of parallel markets and shadow activities, exchange rates and tax evasion. Inevitably too, there were institutional sources like the IMF, World Bank, and ECLAC.

Then and now

This first-phase underground economy distorted prices and eroded formal business, but it was not an existential danger to governance. The black market, not the Bank of Guyana, set the real price of the dollar. Formal importers could not match contraband’s speed or cost. Staying in one’s place was the rule. Politicians tolerated the underground economy. The unwritten rule was simple: take a little, keep it quiet, and stay away from the political arena.

The most telling difference between then and now lies in scale and integration. In the 1970s-80s, a senior public servant might own one or two minibuses or run a small shop. Today, many in similar positions have become major contractors, licensed and unlicensed exporters, or concession-holders, and dredge owners, using public office as commercial weapons.

This change is fundamental: the side hustle has moved from the margins to the heart of the state apparatus. Phase One was a safety valve in a scarcity economy. Underground operators made money but did not bankroll political parties and their election campaigns or dictate policy. Nor did politicians need them to survive in power to retain – and remain in – power.

Conclusion

What we see in the Baksh revelations is fundamentally different. The underground economy has grown richer, politically powerful – and dangerous. Unexplained and dark money are called on to finance expensive election campaigns. Political and commercial interests combine in a symbiotic web of private and public corruption.

This is no longer tolerance – it is mutual dependency. When underground wealth and political power lock together, they threaten not just fair competition, but democracy itself.

Next week: Part II examines how this transformation threatens democratic institutions and what the Baksh case reveals about modern underground networks.

Introduction
One day before Guyana observed Emancipation Day, the mercurial universe Boss Donald Trump confirmed his April 2 Liberation Day Executive Order to unilaterally impose tariffs on every country trading with the United States of America. The US President imposed on Guyana’s products entering the United States a 15% tariff beginning next week – a blow with implications for this country’s trade policy and its economic diversification programme. If one is looking for any consolation, maybe it lies in the initial implausible reciprocal rate of 38% previously announced in April, using an amateur’s methodology based on the size of the trade deficit which that country has with the United States. Thanks Exxon!

It is no consolation however that Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago all have a higher rate than the other countries of the Region, including all the CARICOM countries, Suriname, Cuba and Haiti. This appears a cautionary word to Guyana which has been cosying up to the Americans, accepting that the lopsided 2016 Petroleum Agreement will remain unchanged up to 2057, hosting its Secretary of State at a special function and tolerating its ambassador interfering in Guyana’s domestic affairs in an election season. It will take some time to see the economic consequences of Trump’s action which even questions the well-worn cliché that America does not have permanent friends, only permanent interests.

Strategic partner?
It is not as if Guyana is of no consequence to the United States. We are not only of strategic importance, sitting at the top of South America. Nor are we of no diplomatic value – we make our voice heard at the United Nations and are not ideologically at odds with the USA. Indeed, there is a view that Guyana is a compliant and accommodating partner. On the economic front, we have no equal among CARICOM states. In another few years, Guyana will contribute significantly to the energy security of the USA with around 600,000 barrels of oil per day earned by American giants Exxon and Chevron from the Stabroek Block. Does that not count for something!

This imposition is not an oversight. We have former President Sam Hinds heading our embassy in Washington. We have a highly paid lobbyist in that country, and we have in Georgetown an ambassador with whom we are obviously in contact. They have all failed us and the question we must ask – without getting any answers – is why has Guyana been excluded from the 10% club? By what measure could we be placed below Cuba and Haiti and on the same plane as Venezuela? What message are the Americans trying to send? 

Despite the abundance of rhetoric about Guyana being “a strategic partner” or “the new frontier,” we remain little more than a resource basin, extracted by multinationals and then sidelined when broader trade benefits are being shared. This 15% tariff is not merely economic. It is a diplomatic signal that Guyana does not carry sufficient weight in U.S. trade calculations to warrant even the same treatment as Haiti or Saint Lucia. That is both alarming and deeply humiliating.

Question time
Even as we accelerate towards national elections, we expect our leaders and politicians to ask some searching questions. Did we request inclusion in the 10% group? Did we raise objections when the 15% classification was being drawn up? Were our diplomats even informed? This is no time for passivity. The 15% tariff decision is a clear sign that our foreign policy must be recalibrated. Our leaders must be willing to make meaningful, not symbolic representation.

Make no mistake: this has real economic consequences. Exporters of rice, rum, lumber, processed foods, and other non-oil products will now find their goods 15% more expensive in the U.S. market than similar products from Barbados or Jamaica. It undermines Guyana’s already fragile export base and disadvantages any attempt at economic diversification.

Even as we talk about building a manufacturing sector or value-added production, such efforts are directly harmed by this kind of tariff penalty. And since our oil exports are outside the scope of these tariffs, it is the non-oil sector – the very segment we claim to want to strengthen – that takes the hit.

Conclusion
We must now wait until the elections are over to address the issue and its consequences. Late as it is, we need to understand the rationale for the decision. There seems no reason why we do not call in Kingston for an explanation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must publish the timeline of its knowledge of this classification and the representations, if any, made to U.S. authorities. The Office of the President and Ministry of Finance must clarify how this tariff will impact exports and growth. And the Private Sector Commission must shake off its inertia and demand redress on behalf of the exporters it claims to represent.

Business and Economic Commentary By Christopher Ram

Introduction

The recent letter to Stabroek News (SN 19th. July – Decision to have Attorney General lead the compulsory land acquisition process contradicts global best practices) raises legitimate concerns about the Attorney General leading the compulsory land acquisition process. The writer’s observations about power imbalances strike at the heart of what I have been advocating – that Guyana’s approach to compulsory land acquisition is fundamentally flawed and incompatible with constitutional principles and international best practices. I go further: the role played by the Attorney General blatantly violates the Compulsory Acquisition Act.

Let us remember that Article 142 of the Guyana Constitution guarantees “prompt payment of adequate compensation” for compulsorily acquired land. Yet the reality reveals a troubling disconnect between constitutional guarantee and the Act which dates back to 1914. The relevant provision restricts compensation to basic market value while excluding factors any reasonable person would consider relevant – including psychological trauma of forced displacement and loss of generational ties to ancestral lands. This creates what I have previously described as “a very imbalanced relationship between the Government and the citizen,” where the state wields “the coercive force of the law against the timidity of all but the well-heeled in society.”

When the Constitution promises adequacy, but the law delivers only market value minus most market factors, we have a system designed to shortchange citizens. Market value (MV) itself contradicts compulsory acquisition since MV is defined as the price agreed by a willing buyer and a willing seller. But the law is even worse. It has so many exclusions as to strip the landowner of his or her rights. In other words, not only is market value inappropriate, it is further denuded of the flawed amount offered by market value. My preference would be for a replacement value, or an expansion of section 19 to the Act which gives the Court latitude in increasing the amount of the market value. Sadly, it has not been my experience that the Government is too comfortable with this addition. 

The Attorney General’s role

The AG is, by definition, the government’s chief legal advocate. The practice in all these compulsory acquisitions is that the Chief Valuation Officer and the Attorney General play lead roles. I am not in the least bit certain that the roles they play in practice are legal, let alone proper.

The Act sets out detailed procedures that the State must follow when acquiring private property compulsorily, beginning when the Minister declares a project “public work” under section 3, authorises land examination under sections 4 and 5, and receives a survey report and plan under section 6, after which the Minister may either negotiate a purchase with the landowner or compulsorily acquire the land by making a declaration under section 6 that automatically vests the property in the State one month later subject to compensation (s.7), requiring the Minister to serve notice on the proprietor (s.8) and file certified copies in the Deeds Registry (s.9), before the Attorney General must apply to the Court under section 13 for compensation assessment, with the Court directing valuation and determination of appropriate compensation under sections 13-16. It is unclear whether these steps are followed and what non-compliance means to property owners.

Mr. Barrington, as Chief Valuation Officer, has held no statutory authority under the Act since the post-1990 period, and his valuation disclosed a single inapplicable comparator, raising serious concerns about the soundness of the evidence he would have tendered within the land acquisition process on behalf of the state.

The practice is different

The AG plays a lead role in meeting with and negotiating with landowners, ably supported by the Chief Valuation Officer who is promoted as an authority. This is not only wrong. It is unfair. Asking affected landowners to negotiate with the person whose job is to advance the government’s legal interests creates an inherent conflict that no amount of good intentions can resolve. International best practice emphasises independent facilitation precisely to avoid such conflicts. When communities feel they are negotiating with an adversary rather than participating in a fair process, the entire legitimacy of the project comes under threat.

No wonder then the several reports of property owners being presented with offers significantly below reasonable market rates, with little opportunity for meaningful appeal. The psychological pressure created by the government’s legal authority creates a system where “consultation” becomes a euphemism, at best for managed consent extraction, and at worst, being knowingly swindled by the State.

The deafening political silence

At the national, collective level, the most troubling feature is the complete absence of political discourse, let alone leadership on this issue. Despite the unprecedented spate of compulsory acquisitions that has accompanied Guyana’s oil trajectory – from gas-to-shore infrastructure to new highways and energy projects – not a single political party or prominent politician has paid meaningful attention to how citizens have been systematically cheated of their property.

The PPP government implements these unfair acquisitions. The PNC opposition remains silent about the constitutional violations. Third parties focus on trivia. The result is that ordinary Guyanese facing compulsory acquisition find themselves entirely alone, confronting the full power of the state with antiquated legal protections designed to favour colonial authorities.

The only and limited improvement to the 110 years old Act came in 1990 when then President Desmond Hoyte introduced a new version of section 19 which empowered the Courts to use its discretion to enhance the so-called “market value” to give the property owner “prompt payment of adequate compensation”.

The political dimension

And now, as we approach another election cycle, these same political parties that have ignored citizens’ property rights want our votes. They will speak eloquently about development and progress, but not about the families whose sacrifice made that development possible. Political parties that think they can systematically violate property rights and then count on electoral amnesia are making a dangerous miscalculation.

One of the tragedies of Guyana is that as voters do not react to having suffered from property under-valuations. Our voters can divorce their personal challenges from their political choices.

The way forward

Meaningful reform requires compensation that reflects the constitutional standard of adequacy, including a compulsory acquisition premium – no less than 25% above market value—to account for the forced nature of the transaction. The process must be genuinely independent, removing the Attorney General from stakeholder engagement and replacing government-dominated valuation with independent assessment panels.

The letter writer’s call for independent, participatory consultation processes reflects democratic wisdom. Our constitution promises adequate compensation for compulsory acquisition.