Category: Business and Economic Commentary

Business and Economic Commentary By Christopher Ram

Introduction

Part 1 looked at the contrasting visions of President Irfaan Ali and Mr. Paul Cheong, Ali’s choice for CEO of the beleaguered state-owned GuySuCo, articulated within weeks of each other. As Chief Executive Officer, Cheong unveiled a seven-point plan for the sugar industry, announcing a bold 2025 target aimed at – implausibly – doubling sugarcane yield and securing the sector’s long-term sustainability.

President Ali’s vision seems to change with every pronouncement, his latest being diversification into rice, corn and cassava. In 2020, we heard that Dubai would partner with Guyana to revitalise the industry and make it profitable. Then we heard it would be the Indians, then the Cubans, then the Brazilians. Last year, Ali told the Caribbean Investment Forum that Guyana aims to supply all the sugar the Caribbean needs within two years. A few weeks ago, the slogan was to “make sugar great again” – even as corn, rice, and livestock were added to the mix, as if sugar skills were somehow automatically transferable. These are head-spinning changes that are too difficult to make sense of, let alone implement.

Shuttered estates

We should not forget the overriding 2020 elections campaign promise, repeated by the newly appointed Minister of Agriculture when he announced the appointment of a turnaround specialist as CEO to lead the Conditional Survey ahead of reopening the shuttered Enmore, Rose Hall, and Skeldon Estates. That CEO has since moved upwards, production has moved downwards, and confusion all around. The reality is that since the PPP/C returned to power in 1992 – with a break of five years of the Coalition – GuySuCo has staggered along in crisis, surviving only because of costly, endless bailouts.

Sugar has been in decline for decades. The Parvatan Commission of Inquiry traced GuySuCo’s production history back to 1940, when the industry produced 155,800 metric tonnes of sugar, rising to 327,400 tonnes by 1960. Between 1960 and 1981, production regularly topped 300,000 tonnes, with only six years falling below that level. But the decline was already set in motion: between 2005 and 2015, production never crossed 230,000 tonnes. Then came the dramatic slide – by 2024, production was down to 47,130 tonnes, and the first crop of 2025 fell to just 15,000 tonnes.

The gambler

Ignoring Kenny Rogers (Know when to walk away, and know when to run), the government keeps pouring good money after bad. It is estimated that the sugar industry has cost this country about one hundred billion dollars over the past decade – and that is a conservative figure, ignoring hidden subsidies, debt write-offs, free land, and all the opportunity costs of what that money could have built instead.

The repeated justification is that thousands of rural workers depend on sugar. In fewer and fewer communities, that remains true – but the reality is that many traditional workers have little appetite for this backbreaking, low-paid work in today’s Guyana. The fact is that even the reduced industry is facing a labour supply crisis – the younger generations, mostly Gen Z, want modern, less punishing livelihoods. They have not gone to school to become cane cutters, by whatever name called. Low recruitment rates are worsened by persistent absenteeism. It means that the promise of “protected jobs” has become more political than practical.

Meanwhile, the industry’s governance remains a structural weakness. GuySuCo is kept on life support by taxpayers but remains under political control – the government appoints both the Chair and the CEO. This ensures that every major decision is at best a political compromise, not a sound business choice. The Parvatan Report’s blunt assessment – that the government’s heavy hand prevents real turnaround – has proved accurate year after year.

The perpetuator  

No amount of money or slogans will solve this. With oil money flowing, only the return of the PPP/C in the September elections will ensure this irrational cycle of promises, wasteful spending, and poor performance continues. It is an expensive pattern that Guyana cannot afford forever. A new administration genuinely committed to sound economics, independent management and fiscal responsibility must break the cycle.

The opportunity of windfall oil wealth does not erase basic economic truth. For every billion dollars spent to prop up GuySuCo’s outdated model, billions are diverted from roads, water, schools, hospitals, technology training, rural diversification and transport – all increasingly urgent needs. The opportunity cost is vast and must not be forgotten, even though it is rarely stated plainly.

The problem solver

There is a way out. The PPP/C did not reopen the estates, and its supporters went about their lives. It can do what the Coalition once did – face reality. A credible first step would be to establish an impartial Commission of Inquiry to recommend on the remainder. Estates that are structurally unviable must be formally and permanently closed. Viable assets must be opened to credible, well-regulated private investment, with binding safeguards for workers and communities. Large sections of estate lands should be transferred or leased to workers, communities or co-ops who can diversify into rice, corn, cassava, livestock or modern agro-processing – matching today’s workforce, not the workforce of the 1940s. The entire corporation must be run by an independent, professional board, free from the revolving door of political patronage. Workers must also have real transition pathways – upskilling, alternative livelihoods, and proper support for those who want to move on from the cane fields.

If the government is serious about rural development and food security, it must stop confusing emotional slogans with economic truth. “Making sugar great again” will not work if we continue to pretend this failing model can be fixed by pouring in more taxpayers’ money.

Until GuySuCo’s fundamental flaws are faced honestly, the same bitter pattern will repeat: more bailouts, more promises, and no real answers.

Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram No. 33

When criticism meets political pressure, grand schemes emerge from thin air

Introduction

Within just a few weeks, Guyana has been treated to two competing visions for GuySuCo. First, President Ali’s appointee as CEO, Paul Cheong promises salvation through drone technology and Brazilian partnerships – focused on making sugar work. Next comes President Ali’s vision of GuySuCo as a “hub of rural development” – many of them towns – extending into rice, cassava, and livestock – essentially admitting sugar alone cannot work.

The contradiction is telling. One vision assumes sugar can be saved through technology. The other requires diversification – or more accurately, diversion – into entirely different sectors. Both appeared as reactive responses to pressure rather than genuine planning. Yet they point in fundamentally different directions, revealing an administration with no coherent strategy whatsoever.

The trigger: Reactive announcements

Cheong’s technological pitch emerged directly in response to my critical analysis published in this newspaper in June. Within days of “Sugar Dreams and Capital Nightmares” appearing, Cheong felt compelled to respond with his vision of transformation.

Ali’s diversification scheme was unveiled weeks later at the Enmore Martyrs’ commemoration – a setting unsuitable for accountability for the PPP/C’s and his own administration’s failures. Faced with explaining why production has collapsed after nearly five years in office, Ali chose to pivot to fantasies about GuySuCo’s future transformation.

Neither vision emerged from planning sessions or stakeholder consultations. Both were hasty responses: Cheong defending against criticism, Ali deflecting from decades of failures.

What both visions completely lack

More telling than what these visions promise is what they lack: any known planning whatsoever. Neither has provided clear objectives, implementation timelines, cost projections, risk assessments, management structures, marketing strategies, or financial projections.

Nothing. For an administration with nearly five years to develop a coherent GuySuCo strategy, this absence of substance is breathtaking. This is governance by public pronouncements designed for all the wrong announcements and certainly not solid strategies for results.

The logical absurdity is staggering. We have wasted hundreds of billions on GuySuCo even when we had actual plans – flawed though they were. To expect better results with no plan and no execution sounds like insanity. Yet both are proposing grand visions plucked from thin air, unencumbered by planning or realistic assessment.

Cheong’s recycled technology

Cheong’s vision reads like a Silicon Valley pitch: drone technology, predictive maintenance, Brazilian partnerships, new dryers, packaging machines, and “greater mechanisation.” Yet these are hardly revolutionary concepts for GuySuCo – similar technological promises have been made repeatedly over the years, with mixed results at best.

The pattern is familiar: new management arrives promising transformation through the latest technology, whether it’s modern factory equipment, improved field techniques, or partnerships with international experts. Each time, the focus remains on capital expenditure and technological fixes rather than addressing fundamental issues of management, planning, and market viability.

Rather than acknowledging this history of failed technological promises and seeking proven leadership like former successful chairpersons Vic Oditt and Ronald Alli who understood both the industry and sound management principles, Cheong retreats to the same playbook of technological solutions that have disappointed before.

Ali’s trademark diversion

Ali’s pronouncement reveals his characteristic response to failure: pivot to even grander schemes that ignore present realities. Rather than explain why sugar production has collapsed, he declared GuySuCo should expand into rice, livestock, agro-processing, and fabrication services.

This is not a diversification strategy – it was Ali’s trademark diversion from accountability. His approach treats GuySuCo as a political instrument rather than an economic enterprise. The audacity is breathtaking. A complex organisation producing sugar at twice world market prices, struggling with basic operations, is somehow going to become competitive in multiple unrelated sectors?

The track record: Five times the opportunity

Before accepting either vision as credible, examine the track record. The PPP/C has governed for 27 of the past 32 years versus just 5 years and 3 months for APNU+AFC.

This means the PPP/C has been in charge of GuySuCo for more than five times longer than the Coalition. They have had the opportunity to implement technological solutions more than five times, pursue diversification, and achieve the very goals they now promise. The PPP/C tried technological solutions before. They attempted diversification before. They announced grand plans before. Each time: more money spent, more targets missed, more excuses offered.

Ali specifically has had nearly five years to deliver on reopening estates. The results: “catastrophic” production levels and a corporation whose “very future is under real threat.”

We have been this way before

Every element has been promised before. The 2010 Turnaround Plan promised 400,000 tonnes by 2013, mechanisation and transformation. The Skeldon Project promised technological revolution. Previous diversification attempts promised GuySuCo would become more than sugar. Each time, grand announcements without substance. Each time, the same result: failure dressed up in new rhetoric.

Conclusion

Both visions represent competing versions of the same delusion, made worse by their fundamental contradiction and complete absence of planning. When the CEO and President offer incompatible visions within weeks of each other, both triggered by external pressure, it reveals an administration that has lost control of its narrative, let alone its strategy.

Next week: Part 2 examines what this fool’s gamble has cost Guyana while public services crumble and opportunities are squandered.

In October 2024, President Irfaan Ali announced to the Parliament of Guyana that a payment of a one-off Cash Grant would be introduced for National Insurance Scheme (NIS) contributors and that the full details of this allocation will be revealed in the 2025 National Budget. The additional information – that the money would facilitate the payment of a one-off sum to persons who have made between 500 and 749 contributions was so unhelpful that accountants Ram & McRae commented in their flagship Budget Focus that such sparseness was “not only disappointing but thoughtless”.

Then on 10 April 2025, the Department of Public Information issued a statement that with the injection, “more than $10 billion in disposable income will be placed into the pockets of some 25,000 pensioners nationwide.” Displaying an incredible lack of understanding of how the NIS works, the President urged “eligible pensioners who are not on the NIS database to swiftly register at the various NIS branches to benefit from this programme.” As if that was not bad enough, the President added that “the payout could even begin this Friday after some $10 billion is transferred to the NIS.” The calendar shows that the first Friday after the announcement was 11 April, which made any immediate payment impossible.

Reminiscent of his mis/announcement of the general cash grant of $200,000 per household in October 2024, the President’s advisers seem to provide him with poorly thought-out information that embarrass him.  The fact is that the NIS cash grant is as muddled as the wider grant and plays on the poverty, the hopes and the lives of pensioners. The reality is that no one with the possible exception of the President himself knows how the disbursement will be made – and certainly not to persons on the “NIS database”.

The poor NIS is placed in a bind. It has published on its website a document with limited information setting out as the conditions of eligibility that persons must have between 500 to 749 contributions on record; be 60 years or older as of 31 December 2024; and “MUST NOT  (emphasis the NIS) be receiving and/or do not qualify for any pension from NIS”. It invites persons to insert their NIS number or their personal data to determine their eligibility. 

We tested the system for three persons who were paid an NIS Old Age Grant. The system came back promptly: Record Not Eligible. This runaround will be worse than the general cash grant and is further support of the view of the Attorney General that this “solution is not a solution.” See chrisram.net on 15 May 2025.

I anticipated the problem and wrote a WhatsApp message to the President on 21 April offering a solution. He is yet to respond while the confusion continues.

Anong the suggestions were:

Calculating payments as a percentage of what contributors would have received with full contributions, based on their last insurable earnings. For example, a contributor with 500 contributions would receive 500/750 of their potential pension for life. This maintains the core principle that benefits should reflect contribution history and earnings.

Amending the NIS Benefit Regulation to make the payment a permanent feature, thus avoiding the recurrence of the problem and the accompanying dissatisfaction. 

I advised the President that the recommended approach is implementable within a similar fiscal framework while offering a more equitable distribution. As he is entitled to do, the President never responded to my message and the system  is a total mess. The responses to my inquiries using real particulars suggest that the benefit applies to 2024 Old Age grants only. Not next year, not last year. So here is the rub. Using the most recent available NIS Annual Report, the one-off Cash Grant will cost approximately $750 million dollars, about 7.5% of the $10 Bn.

This raises questions about the seriousness of the entire process and the people involved. On this, the NIS is without blame. President Ali never consulted or instructed the Board. So was the Budget Office and the Ministry of Finance to negligent, so reckless, to just plug $10 Bn simply because the President told them to? And was the famous Cabinet asleep or too coward to ask any question when it gave the Minister approval to present the Budget with that big, beautiful sum included? Is there now no one, not even the Budget Office that we can trust with managing public money? Is this the resource curse in action? Will anyone listen, let alone answer?

There is precedent of Ali reversing himself on a cash grant. Then we can make something good out of this mess by establishing some proper solution, withdraw the appeal against the Zainul decision and show how much we care for our elderly. The money has already been voted on and is available. It can be put to good and constructive use.

Business and Economic Commentary

Just over two years ago, nineteen female students and one boy died in a horrific fire that engulfed the Mahdia Secondary School dormitory. Within hours, Education Minister Priya Manickchand posted detailed Facebook updates from the scene. The government rushed to issue formal statements, dispatch planes, and position itself as the sole source of assistance, compassion and care. It even established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the causes of this horrific tragedy. A recent meeting of the Private Sector Commission of Guyana showed that the Government was not only interested in shaping the narrative and redirecting any blame, but also acted to deny the families benefits and assistance.

Horrified by the tragedy, nearly thirty million dollars were channeled through the Private Sector Commission for the victims’ families – a genuine expression of corporate social responsibility and human compassion. Persons from the leadership of the PSC decided, quite improperly, to share this information with the government’s leadership. Instead of matching the contribution or congratulating the PSC for this independent charitable initiative, the government inveigled the Private Sector Commission to withhold the donation. The government demanded exclusive credit for assisting victims, even if it meant denying desperate families the help they needed. Even charitable space, it seems, must be occupied by the government, to the exclusion of all others.

The PSC complied, burying this act of charity as a single, unexplained line item in its 2024 financial statements. This was a demonstration of staggering insensitivity to the PSC’s independence, but far more importantly, to the bereaved families’ suffering as an accounting footnote.

This represents a triple betrayal: of the families affected by the Mahdia disaster, of corporate governance principles, and most importantly, of basic human compassion in service to a government that only boasts how much it cares.

The Government’s monopoly on grief

Through programmes like “Because We Care,” the Government owns compassion, the tragic death of 20 children as an opportunity to burnish their brand. The hypocrisy is staggering. When genuine private sector compassion emerged to contribute thirty million dollars for the families, the all-caring government swiftly suppressed it. They could not tolerate competing narratives of care or independent expressions of humanity that might diminish their political capital from tragedy.

The Mahdia fire represented catastrophic government failure: children dying in state custody due to official negligence. Yet when private citizens attempted a genuine charitable response, the government saw competition rather than cooperation. Equally shamefully, the PSC’s compliance reveals an organisation that prioritises political favour over human decency, allowing political and personal calculations to strangle corporate conscience.

This capitulation reflects the PSC’s systematic capture over the past decade. The Commission has become a revolving door for PPP/C friends and family – a launching pad for loyalists seeking lucrative state appointments or government contracts. Senior PSC positions now function as auditions for government favours rather than platforms for service to membership and country. This may be an egregious example, exposed by the membership at an Annual General Meeting. By casually documenting their failure to assist grieving families, the leadership revealed an organisation without a moral compass or institutional shame.

The Mahdia families have endured compounded tragedy. Their children died due to government negligence. Now they may never know that thirty million dollars was raised specifically for them and deliberately withheld for political reasons. Their grief has been weaponised and politicised while their practical needs remain unmet.

A moment of reckoning

The AGM has given the PSC a chance to start on the road to redemption. The new leadership must distance itself from the unacceptable culture that has degraded the organisation over the past decade. The immediate test is clear: pay out the thirty million dollars to victims’ families immediately and tell the government to keep away. This money belongs to grieving families, not political calculations.

The Commission must also publicly apologise – to the donors who trusted them with their charitable intentions, to the Mahdia families who were denied assistance, to PSC members who were kept in the dark, and to all Guyanese who expected better. The PSC’s leaders were too weak and put political service above humanity when strength and compassion were most needed.

It must also call for and demonstrate a culture of independence, strength and courage that does not alter because of its new leaders’ personal qualities and values. The culture of the revolving door must be outlawed by the PSC’s constituent documents and a code of conduct that demands a Declaration of Interest and a Register of Interest. It must start setting an example of good governance by stopping blocking the introduction of a Code of Corporate Governance.

But immediately, pay out the money.

Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram 

Introduction

The contrast could not be starker: As Guyana continues to offer American oil giants ExxonMobil and Hess some of the most generous terms in the global petroleum industry, US President Donald Trump is crafting trade policies that could devastate the Caribbean’s traditional export sectors.

Trump’s latest trade offensive goes far beyond his previous actions against major trading partners like China, Canada, and Mexico. After successfully pressing Colombia and Guatemala into trade concessions, he now targets the fundamental tools developing economies use to build their industries – including the Value-Added Tax (VAT) system that underpins Caribbean government revenues.

Immediate challenges

For the business community, three aspects of Trump’s new approach demand immediate attention:

First, his team is examining not just tariffs but entire national economic systems – including tax policies, industrial subsidies, and exchange rate management. His senior trade counselor, Peter Navarro, has specifically criticised VAT systems like those used throughout CARICOM as “trade exploitation,” suggesting they could face American countermeasures.

Second, Trump’s declaration that “if you build your product in the United States, there are no tariffs” reveals a puzzling blind spot toward services – a sector that dominates modern economies. This manufacturing-centric view raises questions about how digital services, financial products, and tourism might fare under Trump’s latest proposed regime.

Third, and most concerning for Caribbean businesses, is the April 2 deadline set by commerce secretary nominee Howard Lutnick for implementing these sweeping changes. This compressed timeline leaves little room for the diplomatic negotiations typically used to resolve trade arrangements and disputes.

The Vulnerability of CARICOM

For Caribbean enterprises, the Common External Tariff (CET) – long considered a shield for regional development – could become their greatest liability. Under Trump’s expanded criteria, this cornerstone of CARICOM economic policy could trigger retaliatory U.S. tariffs, creating a difficult choice between regional integration and access to American markets.

The implications for Guyana’s business sector are particularly complex. While the oil sector enjoys unprecedented benefits, gold, seafood, sugar, and rice exporters face a double threat: potential U.S. tariffs on their products and additional penalties triggered by the development policies designed to support them.

Consider a rice exporter: Not only might they face higher tariffs on their U.S. shipments, but government programmes supporting their industry – from preferential financing to export promotion – could be deemed “unfair practices” under Trump’s new framework.

Business Impact and Response Options

Caribbean businesses need to prepare for multiple scenarios:

Direct export challenges: Companies selling to the U.S. should model the impact of potential tariff increases and explore market diversification strategies.

Supply chain disruption: Firms relying on U.S. imports may need to identify alternative suppliers or pass increased costs to consumers.

Regulatory compliance: Businesses benefiting from government support programmes might face scrutiny under the new U.S. criteria.

The absence of a coordinated regional response is particularly troubling. While individual companies can take defensive measures, the broader threat to Caribbean economic integration requires collective action. CARICOM’s Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) needs to develop a comprehensive strategy that protects both regional businesses and the integration framework they depend on.

A time to act

Given the stakes involved, the current silence from both Shiv Chanderpaul Drive as well as Robb Street is worrying. With political appointees occupying key diplomatic posts and career trade negotiators sidelined, the private sector may need to be more active in defending its interests.

The coming weeks will test both the resilience of Caribbean businesses and the strength of regional economic integration. As Trump’s trade offensive unfolds, the cost of inaction could be devastating for companies that have built their success on access to U.S. markets and regional cooperation.

The April 2 deadline leaves little time for Caribbean governments and businesses to adapt. President Ali and other CARICOM leaders must urgently address both the immediate threat and longer-term implications for regional economic integration.

For the business community, waiting for their government to act may be both inadequate and too late. Forward-thinking companies must assess their tariff vulnerabilities, diversify their markets, document their trade compliance, and build coalitions to advocate for their collective interests.