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Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 159 – June 6,  2025

Exxon’s 2024 Financial Statements

1. Overview

Earlier this week ExxonMobil Guyana Limited (EMGL) summoned the Guyana press to the launch of its2024 Annual Report. Two conditions: only questions on the financial statements would be entertained and the number of questions strictly restricted. Like one of its junior partners Hess, the results for 2024 are staggering, and its profitability measures more that double the Exxon group as a whole. Guyana’s Stabroek Block now joins Kohinoor (India circa 1300) and the Cullinan (South Africa 1905) to create an imperial trinity of exploitation of plunder acquired under unequal terms, adorned as triumph and defended by the exploiter and the exploited.

Unusually for a branch or what is called an External Company incorporated in The Bahamas, Exxon publishes a glossy annual report with more photographs than our own public companies. It presents a glowing picture of economic transformation and partnership with the people and the Government of Guyana. However, beneath the positive narrative, the report glosses over – or buries – critical details about the tax treatment under the 2016 Petroleum Agreement, including the government’s controversial obligation to pay Exxon’s taxes.

One cannot help but describe Exxon’s statements as a deliberate web of deception – as they have been since the overstating of pre-2016 costs. The Business Service Manager announced a 60% increase in revenue while the actual figures show 56%, a result of how far they will go to conceal the fact that they do not pay taxes – Guyana pays it on their behalf. The difference between the 56% shown above and the 60% announced is as a result of adding the tax shown as deducted – which they do not pay – to the revenue which in 2023 was shown as “includes] non-customer revenue related to Article 15.4 of the Agreement”. SHAME on the Company, SHAME on the Government and SHAME on our accounting profession which never calls them out.

As a percentage Production cost has remained at 4% of revenue, Exploration cost 1% of Revenue, Lease Interest 3% and Royalty 2%. The big cost is Depreciation and Amortisation of $301,849 Mn which makes up 17% of Revenue.  

One titillating statistic: Exxon’s total comprehensive income for the year – after accounting for taxes which the Government pays – is close one and a quarter trillion dollars. It took Guyana fifty-nine years before its budget reached one trillion dollars. Exxon earns in income for its foreign shareholders substantially more in less than ten years.

Thank you Trotman, thank you Jagdeo and thank you Ali!

The Balance Sheet

The Balance Sheet is sometimes called the Statement of Affairs or Statement of Net worth or simply Statement of Assets and Liabilities. The table below is a (slightly) summarised restatement of the audited financial statements. The figures are stated in Guyana Dollars but for convenience, the table is prepared in millions of Guyana Dollars.

 

Highlights

Expenditure on Wells and Production facilities accounts for $605,000 Mn, of which a significant portion comes out of Work in Progress. Deferred and Trade Receivable has increased by 90% and requires some explanation. Deferred Receivable represents amount due from Joint Venture Partners from cash calls and also non-customer revenue which is probably the amount it expects to receive from the Government of Guyana to meet its tax obligations. An amount that will be cleared in four months’ time is hardly a deferred receivable but that is how flexible and creative Exxon is.  

What is even more astounding is the amount of $352,681 Mn. described as amounts due from the Home Office to fund Petroleum Operations. The average amount due from the Home Office over the year is just short of $400,000 Mn. That’s an embarrassment of wealth.

What makes this situation even more incredible, is that in 2024, this 45% interest in the Stabroek Block – our Stabroek Block – earned Exxon’s 45% interest a whopping $1,255,300 Mn, or $1.2 Trillion. That is more than 150% that Guyana is likely to earn by way of income through the Consolidated Fund.

The tax mystery

The mysterious tax arrangement is causing all kinds of contortion and deception among the oil companies. Here is a comparison of the note on tax charge in 2024 compared with 2023.

2024

2023

Note 7 – INCOME TAX EXPENSE Income Tax Expense is recognised in respect of taxable profit calculated on the basis of the income tax laws of Guyana that have been enacted as of the date of these financial statements.

Note 7 – INCOME TAX EXPENSE Under Article 15.2 of the Petroleum Agreement, the Branch is subject to the Income Tax Laws of Guyana with respect to filing returns, assessment of tax, and keeping of records. Under Article 15.4 of the Petroleum Agreement, the sum equivalent to the tax assessed on the Branch will be paid by the Minister responsible for Petroleum to the Commissioner General, Guyana Revenue Authority and is reported as non-customer revenue.

Conclusion

ExxonMobil is the first Branch entity that produces an Annual Report. It is shiny, designed to present an image of corporate responsibility and national partnership. That is a trap. Exxon knows how to play gullible politicians like those they have met in Guyana. In the Coalition, they met amateurs, dazzled by oil, eager to please and out of their depth. In the PPP, they confuse the bright ones out of renegotiation, ring-fencing, an independent Petroleum Commission and into insider dealings, fears and cowardice. Exxon did not need to change its strategy. Just the faces across the table.

Every Man, Woman and Child Must Become Oil-Minded Part 158

Introduction

On May 17, 2025, the National Assembly passed the Oil Pollution Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Responsibility Bill on a voice vote. The bill’s thirty-seven clauses and three schedules were considered en bloc, meaning that no clause-by-clause examination was conducted. One wonders whether the Speaker or the Mover of the bill wanted to avoid a critical analysis of the Bill’s provisions.

It may be coincidental that the architects have incorporated the ubiquitous PPP into the title. In any case, a Bill should be judged not by its title or acronyms, however unique, but by its contents. On that basis, when evaluated against international standards, this law collapses under its own inadequacies. In coming to this conclusion, I assessed the Bill against ten criteria drawn from international best practice, including the experience of countries like the United States, Canada, and Norway, as well as the principles set out in global instruments such as the IMO’s Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention (1990). These criteria are not academic – they reflect solid, real-life experience.

Each has been forged in the crucible of real oil spills, corporate denials, and costly public clean-ups. They cover the core elements of effective legislation: scope, prevention, monitoring, financing, preparedness, liability, penalties, public participation, institutional design, and legal coherence. Although a senior Minister ruled out any input from me in the discussion on the Bill as “unhelpful”, what follows is not a partisan view – it is a professional assessment based on years of studying and writing on Oil and Gas.

Poor grade

The analysis reveals that the Guyana Bill falls short of meeting objective standards: it is non-compliant with eight of the ten standards, partially compliant with two, and fully compliant with none.

“Strong” = Fully or substantially compliant; “Moderate” = Partially compliant or significant compliance with notable gaps; “Weak” = non-compliant or largely deficient

Structural weaknesses

There is no definition for the critical term “petroleum operations” in the Bill. The term is defined in the 1986 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, adopted in the 1999 Agreement, and defined differently in the 2021 Petroleum Activities Act. Littering the Bill with undefined, critical terms like pipelines, transportation systems, subcontractors – often the source of actual pollution – is not just poor drafting, but an open invitation for litigation. The “helpful input” from relevant industry experts is woefully lacking. And that is not one of the ten criteria!

While Clause 12 imposes a general duty to prevent pollution, it delegates sweeping regulatory powers to the Minister, without prescribing scope, principles, or limitations. Even more troubling, the Minister is authorised to amend all three Schedules to the Bill by negative resolution, which avoids parliamentary scrutiny. In the context of a largely dormant National Assembly, this backdoor lawmaking is inappropriate and dangerous. Further, the Bill defers critical technical standards to future regulations, effectively legislating in blank. And while it references substantial penalties, it is silent on enforcement architecture: no inspectors, timelines or triggers.

Notable absences

Despite its ambitions, the Bill stops short of establishing a proper licensing regime for oil spill preparedness and response. Instead, it requires only the approval of contingency plans — an administrative hurdle rather than a substantive regulatory gatekeeping mechanism. This means that an operator may legally function without ever being granted or held to a formal licence under this Act. Compounding this shortfall is the Bill’s treatment of financial responsibility. While it nominally requires responsible parties to maintain financial assurance, it defers the standard by allowing coverage only “as far as practicable.” This vague qualifier erodes the principle of strict liability. It opens the door to discretionary interpretations and potential evasions – a troubling prospect in a country exposed to high-risk petroleum operations and limited enforcement capacity.

On liability and obligations, the Bill makes any director, manager, or secretary personally liable only if the offence is proved to have been committed with their consent or connivance. These are high thresholds for a prosecutor to overcome. If the framers were serious about prevention, they could have made the more egregious cases strict liability offences, shifting the burden onto those responsible for compliance, rather than requiring the prosecution to prove mental elements like intent or collusion.

Monitoring obligations fare no better. Operators must report pollution as soon as it occurs (Clause 14). Responsible parties must submit an oil spill contingency plan to the CDC, and Clause 29 requires them to conduct periodic inspections following that plan. But notably, it is empowered to audit only the records, not to conduct a physical or other inspection.

To be continued

In the next column, we will examine the special case of ships, funding, the relevance of the 2016 Agreement and guaranties and indemnities.

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 157

Introduction

Amid concerns about unresolved audit issues, mysterious tax certificates and controversial oil spill legislation, Hess Exploration Limited, a branch of a Hess subsidiary incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is the first of the Stabroek Block partners to lodge audited financial statements. The Cayman Islands company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hess Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, USA, which is one of the most permissive jurisdictions in the United States.

Hess filed two sets of financial statements: Hess Guyana Exploration Limited, which operates the Stabroek Block as a subsidiary, and Hess Guyana (Block B) Exploration Limited, a subsidiary of a Bermuda-based company that holds a 20% interest in the Kaieteur Block. The separate external companies arrangement probably allows the two separate branches with similar names under the Guyana Companies Act. Another point of interest is that the financial statements of the Stabroek Block branch are stated in US Dollars, while those of the Kaieteur Block are stated in Guyana Dollars. Notwithstanding, both have the same Guyana auditors. The separate financial statements for this Block note that it was relinquished in 2023.  There is an additional anomaly that the financial statements for the Stabroek Block are expressed in United States Dollars, while those of the Canje Block are stated in Guyanese dollars.

The rest of this column examines the financial statements of Hess Guyana’s 30% participating interest in the Stabroek Block.  While the audited statements are stated in US$, we have converted these to Guyana Dollars.  All Tables sourced from the Branch’s financial statements.

Except for the tax borne by the Government being accounted for as non-customer revenue, revenue is derived from the sale of 40 million barrels of crude oil in 2024 (up from 19 million in 2023) to a marketing subsidiary of Hess Corporation. Revenue rose by 58%, from GY$738.03 billion in 2023 to GY$1,165.51 billion in 2024. Cost of sales as a percentage of revenue fell from 11% to 8%, while Depreciation, Depletion and Amortisation accounted for 15% in 2024, up slightly from 14% in 2023. Gross margin reached 77%, up from 75%. General and Administrative expenses remained steady at 1% of revenue. Due to rounding, Operating Income was GY$880.5 billion before financing costs of GY$3.16 billion, leaving Net Income before tax of GY$877.34 billion—an increase of GY$351.10 billion or 67% over 2023.

Here comes the quirk. The Statement shows a tax expense of exactly 25% of pre-tax income, explained by Hess in a manner both confounding and misleading. Article 15.4 of the 2016 Stabroek Agreement clearly states that the Government of Guyana, not the contractor, pays the income tax liability using the State’s share of profit oil. Yet Hess describes this as a portion of “gross production,” separate from cost oil and profit oil, being used to “satisfy” the tax. This is not only misleading, it is false. There is no third allocation. The tax is paid from the Government’s share, exactly as agreed.

This dishonest accounting narrative is not the doing of local auditors or management. It originates in documents filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and passed down to Guyana. That makes it not just a local embarrassment but an international one.

The Balance Sheet

The Balance Sheet exhibited substantial asset growth, with total assets increasing by 35% to reach GY$1,791,314 Mn at year-end 2024, an increase of GY$465 billion from the prior year. Significant additions included the purchases of Liza Destiny and Prosperity FPSOs, as well as increases in material and supplies of over US$100 million in current inventory.  Receivables of $61,837 Mn were an increase of 17% over the previous year and represent amounts due from the sale of crude oil, all of which is sold to a related party.

Staggering returns

A key measure of financial performance is the return on capital, measured by income divided by average capital employed. Given that the profit before and after tax is the same (GY$ 877.34 billion), and the average of the 2023 and 2024 year-end equity figures is GY$1,280.714 million, the return on capital employed to Hess stands at a staggering 68.5%.

This means the company generated nearly 69 cents in operating profit for every dollar of equity capital deployed – an extraordinary return by global oil industry standards. Such a result confirms that HESS Guyana’s operations in the Stabroek Block are not only profitable, but exceptionally so, raising important questions about how much value is being retained by Guyana itself in this contractual relationship.

And this is the result. The Branch distributed to its head office – we are not sure which one – US$1,454,509,084! All for a 30% stake, and the extreme generosity of our politicians who accuse the nation of being “stupid” and “unable to understand.”  

Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 156 – 17 May. 2025

Introduction

As feared, the Government ignored calls to refer the Oil Pollution Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Responsibility Bill to a Select Committee and advanced it to a second reading. Listening to the exchange in the National Assembly, it was entertaining to see how members accused each other across the House of not having read the Bill. Standing among these was the Minister of Natural Resources, who spent most of his time discussing the IMF, the OAS, EITI, the World Bank, and the NRI.

Yesterday’s column spoke of the maze of institutions created by this Bill. At the top of the pile is the Civil Defence Commission, currently a loose body that, in a single clause, is transformed into a body corporate, a legal entity headed by a Governing Board. There is nothing to suggest how this body will relate to the Environmental Protection Agency and to the Ministry of Natural Resources.

One thing is sure: any idea of a Petroleum Commission is now dead, as dead as Review and Renegotiate. Another certainty is that the CDC has no capacity in personnel and assets to carry out the functions and duties imposed on it by this Bill. As the Competent National Authority, the CDC is required to develop, prepare, and publish a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan to guide all coordination and response operations of oil spill incidents or potential oil spill incidents. It faces an immediate uncertainty: the Bill provides no guidance on development processes, consultation requirements, approval mechanisms, or update frequency. Even though it is a “National” plan, there is no indication whether the plans of various companies and sectors, including those of the oil companies, are to be incorporated into the National Plan.

The other organisational issue is how this Bill will alter the CDC’s prior focus – the management of disasters.

The Prosecution Puzzle

Another feature of the Bill is the bewildering array of offences – from failing to submit plans to refusing to respond to spills – with penalties ranging from fines to mandatory three-year prison terms. Yet remarkably, it fails to specify who will bring these criminal charges or which courts will hear them. The legislation simply states that responsible parties “commit an offence” and “shall be liable on summary conviction” or “on conviction on indictment,” leaving prosecutors, defendants, and courts to guess whether the Director of Public Prosecutions, the CDC, the EPA or some other authority has the power to initiate proceedings. The Attorney General did not name the Office of the DPP as one of the persons and organisations consulted.

This omission creates potential chaos where administrative agencies like the EPA pursue civil penalties while criminal prosecutors pursue parallel charges in different courts for the same conduct.

The link with the Deal of the Millennium

The greatest threat from any environmental disaster comes from the operators of the Stabroek Block, which controls over eleven billion barrels of oil. Clause 10 of the Bill requires oil companies (the “responsible party”) to submit their contingency plans which must align with or be incorporated into the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan. The problem is that the 2016 Agreement has its own provisions dealing with environmental disasters, including oil spills. Yet, this Bill conspicuously avoids directly addressing how it interacts with the existing 2016 Petroleum Agreement between Guyana and the ExxonMobil consortium, particularly the Agreement’s powerful stability clause in Article 32.

Oil companies will therefore have two obligations and two options. They can point to either the Agreement or the Bill, whichever is more favorable, while taxpayers fund the oversight system.

International Outlier

Almost every speaker on the Government side spoke of the international standing of Guyana’s Bill, with several countries cited as sources from which this Bill was drawn. That is not supported by evidence from several countries. The United States’ Oil Pollution Act of 1990 makes operators the primary responders and creates a trust fund financed by a tax on oil companies. Norway imposes criminal liability on executives for willful violations and maintains strict liability without regard to fault. Canada requires operators to submit prevention plans while maintaining clear operator responsibilities. The UK’s approach focuses on vessel discharges with consolidated controls.

What makes Guyana’s Bill particularly troubling is its funding model – every other country either requires operators to pay directly or ensures operator liability, whereas Guyana’s taxpayers fund the entire bureaucracy. I found no other country with as many layers of bodies and overlapping jurisdictions. The effect of this Bill is that many of the costs are shifted from operators to taxpayers.

Conclusion

The Government has used its majority in the twilight of the 12^th Parliament to rush this Bill through its second and third reading to passage. However, there is no funding for the massive structure and functions contemplated in the Bill, which, along with a range of marine, air, and land transportation assets and technical facilities, will be required to give the Bill a chance of success. Passage of the Bill will prove to be the easy part.