Category: Business and Economic Commentary

Business and Economic Commentary

Just over two years ago, nineteen female students and one boy died in a horrific fire that engulfed the Mahdia Secondary School dormitory. Within hours, Education Minister Priya Manickchand posted detailed Facebook updates from the scene. The government rushed to issue formal statements, dispatch planes, and position itself as the sole source of assistance, compassion and care. It even established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the causes of this horrific tragedy. A recent meeting of the Private Sector Commission of Guyana showed that the Government was not only interested in shaping the narrative and redirecting any blame, but also acted to deny the families benefits and assistance.

Horrified by the tragedy, nearly thirty million dollars were channeled through the Private Sector Commission for the victims’ families – a genuine expression of corporate social responsibility and human compassion. Persons from the leadership of the PSC decided, quite improperly, to share this information with the government’s leadership. Instead of matching the contribution or congratulating the PSC for this independent charitable initiative, the government inveigled the Private Sector Commission to withhold the donation. The government demanded exclusive credit for assisting victims, even if it meant denying desperate families the help they needed. Even charitable space, it seems, must be occupied by the government, to the exclusion of all others.

The PSC complied, burying this act of charity as a single, unexplained line item in its 2024 financial statements. This was a demonstration of staggering insensitivity to the PSC’s independence, but far more importantly, to the bereaved families’ suffering as an accounting footnote.

This represents a triple betrayal: of the families affected by the Mahdia disaster, of corporate governance principles, and most importantly, of basic human compassion in service to a government that only boasts how much it cares.

The Government’s monopoly on grief

Through programmes like “Because We Care,” the Government owns compassion, the tragic death of 20 children as an opportunity to burnish their brand. The hypocrisy is staggering. When genuine private sector compassion emerged to contribute thirty million dollars for the families, the all-caring government swiftly suppressed it. They could not tolerate competing narratives of care or independent expressions of humanity that might diminish their political capital from tragedy.

The Mahdia fire represented catastrophic government failure: children dying in state custody due to official negligence. Yet when private citizens attempted a genuine charitable response, the government saw competition rather than cooperation. Equally shamefully, the PSC’s compliance reveals an organisation that prioritises political favour over human decency, allowing political and personal calculations to strangle corporate conscience.

This capitulation reflects the PSC’s systematic capture over the past decade. The Commission has become a revolving door for PPP/C friends and family – a launching pad for loyalists seeking lucrative state appointments or government contracts. Senior PSC positions now function as auditions for government favours rather than platforms for service to membership and country. This may be an egregious example, exposed by the membership at an Annual General Meeting. By casually documenting their failure to assist grieving families, the leadership revealed an organisation without a moral compass or institutional shame.

The Mahdia families have endured compounded tragedy. Their children died due to government negligence. Now they may never know that thirty million dollars was raised specifically for them and deliberately withheld for political reasons. Their grief has been weaponised and politicised while their practical needs remain unmet.

A moment of reckoning

The AGM has given the PSC a chance to start on the road to redemption. The new leadership must distance itself from the unacceptable culture that has degraded the organisation over the past decade. The immediate test is clear: pay out the thirty million dollars to victims’ families immediately and tell the government to keep away. This money belongs to grieving families, not political calculations.

The Commission must also publicly apologise – to the donors who trusted them with their charitable intentions, to the Mahdia families who were denied assistance, to PSC members who were kept in the dark, and to all Guyanese who expected better. The PSC’s leaders were too weak and put political service above humanity when strength and compassion were most needed.

It must also call for and demonstrate a culture of independence, strength and courage that does not alter because of its new leaders’ personal qualities and values. The culture of the revolving door must be outlawed by the PSC’s constituent documents and a code of conduct that demands a Declaration of Interest and a Register of Interest. It must start setting an example of good governance by stopping blocking the introduction of a Code of Corporate Governance.

But immediately, pay out the money.

Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram 

Introduction

The contrast could not be starker: As Guyana continues to offer American oil giants ExxonMobil and Hess some of the most generous terms in the global petroleum industry, US President Donald Trump is crafting trade policies that could devastate the Caribbean’s traditional export sectors.

Trump’s latest trade offensive goes far beyond his previous actions against major trading partners like China, Canada, and Mexico. After successfully pressing Colombia and Guatemala into trade concessions, he now targets the fundamental tools developing economies use to build their industries – including the Value-Added Tax (VAT) system that underpins Caribbean government revenues.

Immediate challenges

For the business community, three aspects of Trump’s new approach demand immediate attention:

First, his team is examining not just tariffs but entire national economic systems – including tax policies, industrial subsidies, and exchange rate management. His senior trade counselor, Peter Navarro, has specifically criticised VAT systems like those used throughout CARICOM as “trade exploitation,” suggesting they could face American countermeasures.

Second, Trump’s declaration that “if you build your product in the United States, there are no tariffs” reveals a puzzling blind spot toward services – a sector that dominates modern economies. This manufacturing-centric view raises questions about how digital services, financial products, and tourism might fare under Trump’s latest proposed regime.

Third, and most concerning for Caribbean businesses, is the April 2 deadline set by commerce secretary nominee Howard Lutnick for implementing these sweeping changes. This compressed timeline leaves little room for the diplomatic negotiations typically used to resolve trade arrangements and disputes.

The Vulnerability of CARICOM

For Caribbean enterprises, the Common External Tariff (CET) – long considered a shield for regional development – could become their greatest liability. Under Trump’s expanded criteria, this cornerstone of CARICOM economic policy could trigger retaliatory U.S. tariffs, creating a difficult choice between regional integration and access to American markets.

The implications for Guyana’s business sector are particularly complex. While the oil sector enjoys unprecedented benefits, gold, seafood, sugar, and rice exporters face a double threat: potential U.S. tariffs on their products and additional penalties triggered by the development policies designed to support them.

Consider a rice exporter: Not only might they face higher tariffs on their U.S. shipments, but government programmes supporting their industry – from preferential financing to export promotion – could be deemed “unfair practices” under Trump’s new framework.

Business Impact and Response Options

Caribbean businesses need to prepare for multiple scenarios:

Direct export challenges: Companies selling to the U.S. should model the impact of potential tariff increases and explore market diversification strategies.

Supply chain disruption: Firms relying on U.S. imports may need to identify alternative suppliers or pass increased costs to consumers.

Regulatory compliance: Businesses benefiting from government support programmes might face scrutiny under the new U.S. criteria.

The absence of a coordinated regional response is particularly troubling. While individual companies can take defensive measures, the broader threat to Caribbean economic integration requires collective action. CARICOM’s Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) needs to develop a comprehensive strategy that protects both regional businesses and the integration framework they depend on.

A time to act

Given the stakes involved, the current silence from both Shiv Chanderpaul Drive as well as Robb Street is worrying. With political appointees occupying key diplomatic posts and career trade negotiators sidelined, the private sector may need to be more active in defending its interests.

The coming weeks will test both the resilience of Caribbean businesses and the strength of regional economic integration. As Trump’s trade offensive unfolds, the cost of inaction could be devastating for companies that have built their success on access to U.S. markets and regional cooperation.

The April 2 deadline leaves little time for Caribbean governments and businesses to adapt. President Ali and other CARICOM leaders must urgently address both the immediate threat and longer-term implications for regional economic integration.

For the business community, waiting for their government to act may be both inadequate and too late. Forward-thinking companies must assess their tariff vulnerabilities, diversify their markets, document their trade compliance, and build coalitions to advocate for their collective interests.

Business and economic commentary by Christopher Ram

Introduction

In a letter in the Stabroek News of 11 January 2025, spurred by the tragic death of the Chinese rigger at the Demerara Harbour Bridge (DBH), I noted that the many injuries and fatalities that occur annually in mining pits, construction sites, and factories across Guyana underscore the widespread neglect of workplace safety. A few days later, a stevedore died while working at John Fernandes Limited Wharf.

While the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Ministry of Labour has been forthcoming about their investigation into the death of the stevedore at John Fernandes Wharf, there is a parallel legal requirement that seems to have escaped public attention. Under Guyana’s Coroners Act, any unnatural death – which includes workplace fatalities – requires investigation by a coroner, either through an inquest with a jury or an inquiry without one. My attempts to ascertain from the relevant Magistrate’s office whether either form of investigation has been initiated for either death have been unsuccessful, with calls unreturned. This silence is particularly concerning given that the Act requires the coroner to “forthwith cause due investigation to be made” when such deaths occur.

Curiously, neither the press, which initially reported these deaths, nor trade unions have followed up on whether these legally mandated investigations are taking place. Media coverage typically ends with Ministry of Labour announcements, overlooking the crucial role of coroner’s investigations in ensuring public accountability for workplace deaths. This oversight by the press and organized labour effectively shields employers from public scrutiny.

Legislative framework

In 1997, Guyana passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, designed to “Improve working conditions and the environment with an emphasis on prevention rather than cure.” Yet, the culture of unsafe workplace conditions is widespread and worsening. A couple of weeks ago, at a construction site in Ogle, East Coast Demerara, I witnessed a worker climbing the boom of a huge crane without headgear or harness.

The gap between law and practice is stark. While the Ministry of Labour actively investigates workplace deaths, the parallel legal requirement for coroner’s investigations appears neglected. The Coroners Act provides a crucial framework requiring post-mortem examinations, witness testimony, and detailed documentation – elements that could strengthen accountability and workers’ compensation claims. However, these mandated procedures often fall victim to resource constraints.

Poor enforcement

Poor enforcement and inadequate resources explain much of this gap. The Ministry of Labour and Regional Administrations lack the necessary resources to enforce compliance with safety legislation. The magistracy, required by the Coroners Act to investigate every unnatural death, appears similarly constrained. Consequently, workers’ lives remain at risk in a system that has not evolved to meet the complexities of modern employment relationships, particularly in the country’s booming construction sector and extractive industries.

A significant legislative gap exists in cases where principal employers contract out work. This loophole allows businesses to disclaim responsibility, leaving employees at the mercy of subcontractors who often operate in the informal sector. In such cases, the absence of proper coroner’s investigations means that the chain of responsibility remains unexamined and unrecorded.

The compensation system is equally problematic. While the law requires compensation for workplace injuries and deaths, many contractors fail to secure adequate insurance coverage, or any at all. Victims’ families must navigate a convoluted process without the benefit of findings from proper coroner’s investigations that could support their claims.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Four areas require urgent attention. First, while the Ministry of Labour provides information about workplace fatality investigations, the parallel requirement for coroner’s investigations must be honoured. Second, the Coroners Act must be fully implemented, with adequate funding and staffing. The current situation, where attempts to confirm whether legally required investigations are taking place meet with silence, is unacceptable. Third, the entire system of apportioning legal liability between primary and secondary contractors must be addressed. Fourth, the adequacy of insurance coverage against injury and death at the workplace must be addressed. 

Trade unions, consumer rights advocates and civil society generally must educate themselves about existing legal frameworks, including the Coroners Act, and use these tools to demand accountability. Workers must be educated about their rights and encouraged to report unsafe conditions without fear of retaliation. Most importantly, the press must follow workplace death cases beyond initial Ministry of Labour statements and demand to know whether legally required coroner’s investigations are held.

By Christopher Ram

Introduction

Paul Cheong, appointed Chief Executive Officer of GuySuCo just over a year ago, has been pitching a vision for the sugar industry that sounds remarkably familiar: more investment in machinery, expanded packaging facilities, upgraded logistics, drone technology, and greater mechanisation to make up for a shrinking labour force. It all sounds promising: until we go behind the numbers.

Mr. Cheong does not come to the job with a record of high-level managerial experience in agribusiness or complex state enterprises. In fact, his most recent outing was as Chair of the Private Sector Commission, during a period marked by accelerating dysfunction and declining public credibility in that organisation. That track record does little to inspire confidence in his ability to navigate the far more challenging terrain of GuySuCo.

While he cannot be blamed for the more structural issues at the Corporation, he does not escape responsibility for some of the poor results. Undeterred by reality, he now has even more billions to be poured into capital works, as though the problem were a lack of equipment rather than failed leadership and flawed strategy.

Dream on

This is a rerun of the same movie.  New CEO promising transformation but leaving a final scene worthy of cinematic metaphor: not a triumphant turnaround, but a graveyard of expensive, inappropriate equipment. Rerun the cycle. If this is Paul Cheong’s plan for GuySuCo’s revival, it is not a business strategy – it is wishful thinking dressed up in technical jargon. This journey into fantasyland costs the country huge sums. According to Agriculture Minister Zulfikar Mustapha, since the return of the People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) to power in 2020, over $28 billion to improve productivity across the sector, including $13.3 billion for 2025 alone. That is a staggering number and suggests caution. But then Cheong was on the PPP/C list that had the crazy idea of reopening the shuttered estates.

Mr. Cheong speaks of progress: of drones, of predictive maintenance, of Brazilian partnerships. But GuySuCo’s past is littered with announcements just like these, each one arriving with a price tag and disappearing into the black hole of unmeasured outcomes. He cannot explain what portion of the 2025 Government subsidy has been spent and the expected returns. But he sails on: no one to account to.

GuySuCo does not suffer from a lack of equipment. It suffers from a lack of accountability, transparency, and leadership grounded in agronomic and financial reality. Every season of mismanagement, every dollar wasted on ill-timed or ill-considered machinery, moves us further from viability and deeper into a pit of public debt.

At what point does a government say “enough”? When will taxpayers, especially the unemployed, underpaid, and underserved in other sectors – demand a stop to this endless bail-out of an industry whose cost of production exceeds the world market price by a factor of two times? To put this in stark terms: it would be cheaper to import sugar than to continue producing it under these circumstances.

Not my first run

This is not the first time I have spoken out on the state of the sugar industry.

In 2010, I wrote a five-part series titled GuySuCo Needs Drastic Surgery to Ensure Survival, dissecting the corporation’s finances, its bloated costs, and the strategic failures behind the Skeldon debacle. Then Agriculture Minister Robert Persaud took objection. Then in 2015, I appeared before the Parvattan Commission of Inquiry, urging a rational, evidence-based approach to reform – one that acknowledged the industry’s structural weaknesses rather than papering over them with politics.

And here we are again in 2025 – fifteen years later – confronting the same old story: poor decision-making, political interference, the appointment of the wrong people, and the removal of those who dared to speak the truth or ask the hard questions.

GuySuCo has become a theatre of dysfunction. The PPP/C government, which campaigned on the promise to reopen shuttered estates, has in fact overseen their further decay. That promise was never rooted in economic realism – it was a political slogan, not a viable plan. What followed has been an even greater politicisation of the industry, with President Irfaan Ali taking a direct hand in operations and appointments. Square pegs have been forced into triangular holes, and capable professionals have been sidelined in favour of loyalists. Promises are recycled. Excuses are reissued. Capital is burned. And accountability is nowhere in sight. Losses mount.

Conclusion

The sugar industry once built this country. It was the backbone of our economy, our employment, and our exports. But it must not now become the millstone around our necks – dragging down our national finances, distorting our development priorities, and draining our public resources.

But it secures the PPP/C electoral support. That is the only thing that matters.

Introduction

As Guyana’s economy expands at an unprecedented pace, driven by transformative oil revenues and ambitious infrastructure development, hundreds of billions of dollars in both recurrent and capital budget expenditures annually fall within the purview of the Public Procurement Commission (PPC). This massive scale of public spending, coupled with citizens’ constitutional right to access information about these procurement decisions through the Commission of Information, makes the oversight role of both bodies more critical than ever.

Unfortunately, the current PPC has failed to meet even the minimum standards of competence, accountability and integrity. They are made worse by a web of conflicts that undermine the very foundations of constitutional governance. This failure is particularly damning when contrasted with the exemplary work of the previous Corbin-Gopaul PC which included two persons with earned PhD’s, two with Masters – one in finance and one in Procurement – and the fifth person with both engineering and legal professional qualifications. They produced a comprehensive body of work, including a strategic plan, detailed investigation reports, policy guidance to procuring entities, an employee handbook that any organisation in Guyana would consider exemplary, and proactive correspondence addressing systemic procurement issues. They demonstrated courage and independence by compelling a senior Minister to appear before them in their investigation into drug purchases at the Georgetown Public Hospital Corporation.  

PPP/C’s failure

Fifteen years after the Constitution mandated a Procurement Commission and 13 years after the Procurement Act during which oversight under successive PPP/C Administrations was troublingly inadequate, the first Commission was appointed by President Granger in 2016, comprising the persons identified above. Mrs. Carol Corbin gave up a secure position at the CARICOM Secretariat and, supported by a team that met all the Constitution requirements, began discharging their constitutional duties. Commencing with no fixed place of abode, the Commission’s legacy includes strengthening Guyana’s entire public procurement framework and establishing proper rules of procedure, work that demonstrated the transformative potential of competent constitutional oversight.

The current Commission, headed by Ms. Chase and Vice-chair Berkley Wickham, a former Head of the National Procurement and Tender Administration (NPTAB), represents this standard’s complete antithesis. NPTAB was the subject of adverse criticisms during Mr. Wickham’s tenure there.

Egregious conflicts

At the centre of this institutional failure lies an extraordinary conflict of interest that spans both the Procurement and the Information Commissions. Ms. Chase continues to engage in private legal practice despite holding a full-time constitutional post, most troublingly serving as legal counsel for the Commissioner of Information in both his official and personal capacity. This interlocking relationship creates obvious consequences for the independence and effectiveness of both bodies, even if they were otherwise operating competently.

Under the Access to Information Act, the Commissioner exercises certain functions over the PPC. Without compromising both offices, the Chairperson cannot act as legal counsel for the very official to whom her Commission is answerable in a statutory relationship. Indeed, the PPC is also subject to the Commission of Information, exacerbating the conflicts and effectively neutering both institutions’ capacity to meet their intended purposes.

Ms. Chase’s position seems irretrievably egregious. Her relationship with Ramson appears to breach the PPC’s Code and the Code of Conduct under the Legal Practitioners Act, which prohibits attorneys from engaging in behaviour that undermines the dignity of the profession or the administration of justice.

This raises serious doubts about the judgment of both these senior lawyers.

Performance

The investigative record of the current PPC in its first year is equally indefensible. Only two of the ten complaints noted in its first-year report tabled in the National Assembly seem to have been satisfactorily concluded. The procedures for one were not followed, and there was no evidence of procedures being followed in another. Two were awaiting further information, and four were stalled pending the receipt of legal advice. Not only was the advice received several weeks before the end of the reporting period, but it was also months before the report’s submission date.

The Commission’s failure to act on these seems to evidence a high level of dysfunction. Even more astonishing is that legal advice was sought on a foundational issue: whether the Commission could investigate matters that predated its appointment. Any competent body or legal professional should resolve this basic jurisdictional point without external input. This contrasts with the previous Commission’s proactive investigations into major contracts like the New Demerara River Bridge feasibility study, their oversight of pharmaceutical procurement, and their systematic approach to addressing procurement irregularities across government agencies.

The report fails to note critical information, including contract values, procurement methods and the basis of selection. A separate compliance review of twelve projects is similarly limited, omitting the names of contractors, values and timelines. I would not wish to bore readers with another set of contrasts except to state that those set the benchmark for thoroughness and transparency.

Beyond these procedural and ethical failings, the Commission’s internal structure appears designed to obstruct functionality. The offices once assigned to Commissioners were repurposed, leaving Commissioners without a dedicated workspace. It is unacceptable and confidence-destroying for a constitutional body to operate in this manner, notably when the previous Commission had established proper operational procedures and professional standards, which the current Commission bizarrely sought to criticise in its first annual report. 

Conclusion

The current Commission’s term expires in about six weeks. We look forward to seeing the reports for the twelve months to July 2024 and 2025 to measure the decline. Commissioner Ramson appears entrenched for life – or at least as long as the PPP remains in power. There is little to look forward to there.

The previous PPC proved that this institution could excel. The current Commission’s standards represent institutional decline and a betrayal of constitutional principles. The vast resources over which they exercise constitutional and statutory functions make their poor performance too essential to ignore.