Introduction
As Guyana’s economy expands at an unprecedented pace, driven by transformative oil revenues and ambitious infrastructure development, hundreds of billions of dollars in both recurrent and capital budget expenditures annually fall within the purview of the Public Procurement Commission (PPC). This massive scale of public spending, coupled with citizens’ constitutional right to access information about these procurement decisions through the Commission of Information, makes the oversight role of both bodies more critical than ever.
Unfortunately, the current PPC has failed to meet even the minimum standards of competence, accountability and integrity. They are made worse by a web of conflicts that undermine the very foundations of constitutional governance. This failure is particularly damning when contrasted with the exemplary work of the previous Corbin-Gopaul PC which included two persons with earned PhD’s, two with Masters – one in finance and one in Procurement – and the fifth person with both engineering and legal professional qualifications. They produced a comprehensive body of work, including a strategic plan, detailed investigation reports, policy guidance to procuring entities, an employee handbook that any organisation in Guyana would consider exemplary, and proactive correspondence addressing systemic procurement issues. They demonstrated courage and independence by compelling a senior Minister to appear before them in their investigation into drug purchases at the Georgetown Public Hospital Corporation.
PPP/C’s failure
Fifteen years after the Constitution mandated a Procurement Commission and 13 years after the Procurement Act during which oversight under successive PPP/C Administrations was troublingly inadequate, the first Commission was appointed by President Granger in 2016, comprising the persons identified above. Mrs. Carol Corbin gave up a secure position at the CARICOM Secretariat and, supported by a team that met all the Constitution requirements, began discharging their constitutional duties. Commencing with no fixed place of abode, the Commission’s legacy includes strengthening Guyana’s entire public procurement framework and establishing proper rules of procedure, work that demonstrated the transformative potential of competent constitutional oversight.
The current Commission, headed by Ms. Chase and Vice-chair Berkley Wickham, a former Head of the National Procurement and Tender Administration (NPTAB), represents this standard’s complete antithesis. NPTAB was the subject of adverse criticisms during Mr. Wickham’s tenure there.
Egregious conflicts
At the centre of this institutional failure lies an extraordinary conflict of interest that spans both the Procurement and the Information Commissions. Ms. Chase continues to engage in private legal practice despite holding a full-time constitutional post, most troublingly serving as legal counsel for the Commissioner of Information in both his official and personal capacity. This interlocking relationship creates obvious consequences for the independence and effectiveness of both bodies, even if they were otherwise operating competently.
Under the Access to Information Act, the Commissioner exercises certain functions over the PPC. Without compromising both offices, the Chairperson cannot act as legal counsel for the very official to whom her Commission is answerable in a statutory relationship. Indeed, the PPC is also subject to the Commission of Information, exacerbating the conflicts and effectively neutering both institutions’ capacity to meet their intended purposes.
Ms. Chase’s position seems irretrievably egregious. Her relationship with Ramson appears to breach the PPC’s Code and the Code of Conduct under the Legal Practitioners Act, which prohibits attorneys from engaging in behaviour that undermines the dignity of the profession or the administration of justice.
This raises serious doubts about the judgment of both these senior lawyers.
Performance
The investigative record of the current PPC in its first year is equally indefensible. Only two of the ten complaints noted in its first-year report tabled in the National Assembly seem to have been satisfactorily concluded. The procedures for one were not followed, and there was no evidence of procedures being followed in another. Two were awaiting further information, and four were stalled pending the receipt of legal advice. Not only was the advice received several weeks before the end of the reporting period, but it was also months before the report’s submission date.
The Commission’s failure to act on these seems to evidence a high level of dysfunction. Even more astonishing is that legal advice was sought on a foundational issue: whether the Commission could investigate matters that predated its appointment. Any competent body or legal professional should resolve this basic jurisdictional point without external input. This contrasts with the previous Commission’s proactive investigations into major contracts like the New Demerara River Bridge feasibility study, their oversight of pharmaceutical procurement, and their systematic approach to addressing procurement irregularities across government agencies.
The report fails to note critical information, including contract values, procurement methods and the basis of selection. A separate compliance review of twelve projects is similarly limited, omitting the names of contractors, values and timelines. I would not wish to bore readers with another set of contrasts except to state that those set the benchmark for thoroughness and transparency.
Beyond these procedural and ethical failings, the Commission’s internal structure appears designed to obstruct functionality. The offices once assigned to Commissioners were repurposed, leaving Commissioners without a dedicated workspace. It is unacceptable and confidence-destroying for a constitutional body to operate in this manner, notably when the previous Commission had established proper operational procedures and professional standards, which the current Commission bizarrely sought to criticise in its first annual report.
Conclusion
The current Commission’s term expires in about six weeks. We look forward to seeing the reports for the twelve months to July 2024 and 2025 to measure the decline. Commissioner Ramson appears entrenched for life – or at least as long as the PPP remains in power. There is little to look forward to there.
The previous PPC proved that this institution could excel. The current Commission’s standards represent institutional decline and a betrayal of constitutional principles. The vast resources over which they exercise constitutional and statutory functions make their poor performance too essential to ignore.