Introduction
Guyana joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) in 2002, twelve years after it was established in May 1990. The CFATF is an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international body established in 1989 charged with examining countries’ money laundering techniques and trends, reviewing the actions which they had already taken, and setting out the measures that still needed to be taken to combat money laundering. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF added terrorist financing to its mandate.
By 2002, Guyana had already passed the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 2000 which granted to the Minister of Finance the discretion to appoint the Bank of Guyana or some fit and proper person as the Supervisory Authority for the Act. Favouring the latter course, some time in 2005 the Minister of Finance handpicked Mr Paul Geer to head a Financial Intelligence Unit located in the Ministry of Finance. Mr Geer’s experience included five years as head of the Guyana Bank of Trade and Industry, which he left abruptly – officially for personal reasons ‒ in a golden parachute and after a meeting of the bank’s Board of Directors.
Despite the allocation by the National Assembly for the FIU of more than two hundred and seventy-five million dollars since Mr Geer took up the position, the unit has had virtually no success in pursuing even the limited objectives of the 2000 Act. Not surprisingly then, Guyana’s reputation as a prosecutor of money-laundering has no gloss. Some have blamed the deficiencies of the Act but Mr Geer did not help the government’s case by his unavailability to meet the press or unwillingness to answer questions about the FIU.
Following some critical reviews of the by then limited 2000 Act and the country’s anti-money laundering efforts, the government introduced the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Finance of Terrorism Bill on June 4, 2007. After nearly two years and fifteen sittings of a Select Committee the National Assembly on April 30, 2009 passed the Bill. Reinforcing the perception that he was never serious about pursuing crime and its proceeds, then President Jagdeo took one hundred and seven days before he assented to the Bill on August 14, 2009. And then it took another 87 days before the publication of Order # 22 of 2009 to bring the Act into force.
The later Act was equally poorly administered prompting President Jagdeo some time in 2011 to publicly castigate the unit for its inability to meet even basic annual reporting obligations to the National Assembly. Put bluntly, the FIU of the 2009 Act and its predecessor Supervisory Authority under the 2000 Act have been disastrous failures, so much so that we probably could have done without them, without noticing their absence.
Continue reading “Playing with money laundering and terrorism legislation”
